

NATIONAL SECURITY CULTURE AND ALLIANCE: THE U.S.-JAPAN  
ALLIANCE AFTER THE COLD WAR

by

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## The University of Utah Graduate School

### STATEMENT OF DISSERTATION APPROVAL

The following faculty members served as the supervisory committee chair and members for the dissertation of Koji Haraguchi.  
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## ABSTRACT

Why and how has the U.S.-Japan alliance survived the end of the Cold War? More generally what happens to an alliance when the international security environment changes? The present dissertation aims at developing a new model of alliance politics that explains the continuity of an alliance by focusing on cultural factors of international security. Building on the constructivist theory of international relations, the present dissertation argues that the U.S.-Japan alliance has survived even after the demise of the Soviet Union, against which the alliance was originally formed, because the two allies have interdependent national security cultures that are deeply institutionalized in their defense policies. The two allies not only share identity as capitalist democracies, but also embrace complementary norms of national security. Namely, to secure its longstanding norm of homeland protection, the United States needs Japan's assistance in maintaining its military presence in Asia so that it can minimize threats from the region. For its part, Japan, in an Asian regional security environment full of threats, needs the United States' assistance in maintaining the antimilitarist national security norm that grew from the bitter experience and memory of World War II.

By analyzing domestic processes of revising basic defense policies after the Cold War in Washington and Tokyo, as well as the bilateral negotiations for the New Guidelines for Defense Cooperation between the United States and Japan, the present dissertation demonstrates that institutionalized national security cultures in both countries

provided ideational bases for their post-Cold War national security policies. These ideational constructs established the foundation for defense policies that the two countries developed to deal with new sources of national security threats in the Asia Pacific region.

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Political science is social science not only because it studies social phenomena and events with scientific methods, but also because political scientists themselves form a society whose members collaborate, criticize, encourage, and compete for the common goals of understanding, explaining, predicting, and improving governance and politics throughout the world. The present dissertation is a product of this social endeavor. A large number of individuals made both tangible and intangible contributions to it over an extended period of time.

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## CHAPTER 1

### RESEARCH QUESTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

#### Research Question

*Why Did the U.S.-Japan Alliance Survive the End of the Cold War?*

The survival and “redefinition” of the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold War has been both a theoretical and practical puzzle. The United States and Japan decided not only to maintain their bilateral alliance but also strengthened it by revising the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation in 1997. Under the new Guidelines, the two countries agreed to develop joint plans for regional contingencies, especially ones in the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait (Funabashi, 1999). Japan also agreed to participate in the development of a regional ballistic missile defense system led by the United States. In short, Japan has decided to play more active roles *within* the bilateral alliance after the Cold War.

Political scientists, especially realists, expected that the demise of the common threat, which the alliance was originally formed against, should have promoted dissolution of the alliance and more independent and assertive national security policy of Japan (Walt, 1987; Waltz, 1993, 2000). The U.S.-Japan Alliance is not an isolated case. The majority of American Cold War alliances have survived the end of the Cold War, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (McCalla, 1996), the U.S.-

South Korean alliance, and the U.S.- Philippines alliance. Considering the fact that the central drive of international relations for the last 5 centuries has been the cycles of alignment and realignment among great powers (Gilpin, 1981; Kennedy, 1980), the existence of stable alliances among major powers today is worth closer attention and analysis (Jervis, 2002).

In addition, the risks of entrapment and abandonment by allies are as serious problems as external threats (Samuels, 2007; Snyder, 1997). Throughout the Cold War Japan faced the risk of being entrapped into the wars the United States fought in Asia. At the same time, Japan has been under criticism of being a free rider of the alliance and been under constant pressure from the United States to assume more responsibilities in its own national defense and the regional security, which triggered the fear of abandonment by the United States unless Japan should share more burden of the alliance. Because of those risks involved in an alliance, realists assume that a state prefers building its own defense capabilities first then seeks alliances to balance against the threats it cannot handle unilaterally (Waltz, 1979). But in the Japanese case, the order of preferred means of national security is reversed. Instead of developing more independent and offensive military capabilities of its own, Japan has focused on defensive capabilities and building closer ties with the United States. Although the Japanese defense budget ranks seventh in the world and it has acquired some of the most sophisticated weapons, its ability to act independently of the U.S. has been severely limited by the types of weapon systems that it has acquired, by the kinds of missions for which its forces train, and by various institutional limitations placed on its armed forces (Berger, 1996).

Institutionalists have been puzzled by the persistence of the bilateral alliances and

the weakness of multilateral security institutions in the Asia Pacific region and Japan's adherence to bilateralism in its national security policy. As some Japan experts argue, "Japan may increasingly have need of resources to develop alternative multilateral security options" (Hughes & Fukushima, 2004, p. 56); thus, a multilateral, not bilateral security organization could have better served national interests of Japan in the post-Cold War world. Similarly, the United States has had reasons for developing a multinational regional security institution in Asia after the Cold War in order to maintain its hegemonic status by utilizing institutional efficiency (Hemmer & Katzenstein, 2002).

In addition, the bilateral alliance has been costly for both the United States and Japan. As President Clinton closed numbers of military bases both in the United States and overseas, maintaining large military forces in peacetime was fiscally unjustifiable. Moreover, overseas bases are easier to close because they have much less electoral and economic impact than domestic bases and more problems with local populations (Calder, 2007). Among the overseas U.S. military bases closed after the Cold War, Subic Bay Naval base and the Clark Air Base in the Philippines best illustrated the changed cost-benefit calculations of maintaining overseas bases. After the eruptions of Mt. Pinatubo and the refusal of the Filipino Senate to renew the leases, Washington decided not to renegotiate a base agreement with the Philippines (Brands, 1992).

Closure of the U.S. military bases in the Philippines offered a stark contrast with those in Okinawa. In spite of the high fiscal and political costs, the Japanese government has failed to reduce the number of U.S. military bases in Okinawa to the level which the local population had demanded. People in Okinawa have suffered from the noise of the aircrafts, the danger of stray shots and aircraft accidents, and repeated crimes by U.S.

soldiers, their families and military contractors. What is worse, Okinawa Prefecture alone hosts over 75% of the U.S. military bases in Japan while the rest of the nation enjoys the benefits of the security guarantee the alliance offers (Giarra, 1999). Not only has Japan provided locations for U.S. military bases, it has also been the most generous provider of host nation support funds among U.S. allies. In order to cover stationing costs of the U.S. military forces, the Japanese government has paid over 4 billion dollars every year (United States Department of Defense, 1999).

The United States and Japan had policy options other than retaining and strengthening their bilateral alliance after the Cold War. For example, Colin Dueck explored four options for the post-Cold War American grand strategy: strategic disengagement, liberal internationalism, balance of power, and, primacy. Strategic disengagement policy advocates a complete withdrawal from political and military commitments of the Cold War and a return to isolationism. Liberal internationalism promotes a liberal world order through multilateral institutions. The balance of power strategy focuses on preserving a power equilibrium among major states in the key areas of the world. The last option and the one the U.S. has chosen is primacy, the strategy to maintain America's political and military predominance in the world and to prevent the rise of any challenger to the America's preponderance (Dueck, 2006). John Ruggie also predicted that "sustained engagement by the United States for the sake of a stable international order will prove more problematic in the years ahead than it was during the Cold War" (Ruggie, 1997, p. 92). In sum, both realist and liberal scholars had good reasons for predicting the dissolution of the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold War.

Likewise, Japan had alternative strategies. For example, Michael Green discussed

five issues around which Japan's post-Cold War foreign defense policy has been debated: alliance or autonomy, constitutional revision, Asia or the West, bilateralism or multilateralism, and economic security versus military security (Green, 2001). Although Japan has chosen an alliance over autonomy, preservation of the "peace" constitution over revision of it, being a part of the West over Asia, bilateralism over multilateralism, and economic security over military security, the choices between the competing options have never been easy and there has been room for more nuanced and integrated solutions. For example, the U.S. tried to develop multilateral security organizations in Asia, such as the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), only to find a web of bilateral alliances more effective (Borden, 1984b). More recently, the United States and Japan have tried a multilateral approach to the North Korean nuclear development. But the Six Party Talk has failed to produce meaningful and lasting solutions to North Korean nuclear problem, which has given more incentives to the United States and Japan to strengthen their bilateral alliance.

The U.S.-Japan alliance survived not only the end of the Cold War, but also the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The Koizumi administration made military contributions to the War on Terrorism by dispatching the Maritime Self Defense Force to the Indian Ocean to support the U.S. Navy and the Ground Self Defense Force to Iraq for relief and reconstruction missions (Kliman, 2006). Although sending Self Defense Forces overseas seemed to be a significant departure from the post-World War II national security policy of Japan, its missions in the War on Terrorism were carefully limited to reconstruction and logistic support. And most importantly, Prime Minister Koizumi justified his decision to send SDF to international conflicts without U.N. authorizations by asking



“What country would defend Japan in case a foreign country should attack us?”(Koizumi, 2003, ¶.14). While NATO allies were divided if they should support the United States in the Iraq War, the United States and Japan have emerged as closer allies since 9/11. If dramatic changes in international relations after the Cold War and the 9/11 terrorist attacks could not end the U.S.-Japan alliance, what would?

In sum, there were both theoretical and practical reasons for which the United States and Japan could have taken alternative national security policies to their bilateral alliance in the post- Cold War era. But there were no serious public discussions in the United States or Japan to terminate the bilateral alliance. Rather Japan found it rational to keep placing the U.S.-Japan alliance at the center of its national security policy after the Cold War. Likewise, making the U.S.-Japan alliance the cornerstone of its Asia-Pacific policy is a rational option for the United States. What the United States and Japan did not question were their sources of rationality, ideational foundations of their national interests. How and why have the United States and Japan kept choosing each other as major allies in spite of significant changes in international and domestic politics in both countries since 1951, when the two countries signed the original Mutual Security Treaty? What has made the asymmetrical alliance acceptable for both the United States and Japan so long? Allies have to find their national interests to be mutually compatible, or even complementary, in order for an alliance to survive for an extended period and changes in domestic and international politics. The present research will ask why and how the United States and Japan conceive of their national security and place each other within their ideas of national security.

## Literature Review

Existing literature of international security and the U.S.-Japanese relations has addressed the puzzle of the surviving U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold War only partially at best. While realist scholars have contributed to the majority of alliance studies, they tend to ignore or downplay ideational factors of alliance politics (Snyder, 1997; Walt, 1987; Waltz, 1979). On the other hand, constructivists have made significant contributions to revitalize cultural studies of national security, especially that of Japan, but paid little attention to unique aspects of American foreign defense policy. In addition, constructivists have not reached a consensus on what level of analysis they should focus on. Some constructivists emphasize the importance of shared norms and identities among states in their studies of weapons of mass destruction, and humanitarian intervention (Finnemore, 1996), NATO (Risse-Kappen, 1996), and Pan-Arabism (Barnett, 1996). Others focus on domestically shared norms and identities to explain unique aspects of particular countries such as Japan, Germany, China, and Russia (Berger, 1998; Hopf, 2002; Johnston, 1995a; Katzenstein, 1996a). Although Alexander Wendt admits that shared norms and identities do not always facilitate cooperation among states, his discussion of the three cultures of international anarchy suggests that states have to share the Kantian culture to engage in high level of international cooperation (Wendt, 1999). Likewise the literature on security community, a constructivist study of alliance, argues that shared norms and identity help states to form a zone of peace where international conflicts are solved without military forces (Adler & Barnett, 1998).

The present research aims at combining the insights of the two kinds of

constructivism, analyzing the roles of internationally shared and domestically driven unique norms and identities of national security between Japan and the United States. While the United States and Japan share liberal political and economic identities as advanced industrialized democracies, they are not the only ideational foundations binding the two allies. In reality, the differences of national security cultures between the United States and Japan have contributed to security interdependence, not the break-up of the alliance. As a private company acquires or merges with another with complementary technologies and assets to expand its scope of business, a country seeks allies with shared and complementary power resources. And as constructivists argue, the structure within which a state makes foreign and defense policies is ideational as well as material. In order to understand how and why a state develops and uses different power resources, one needs to look into norms and identities of national security of that state (Katzenstein, 1996b). For that purpose, the following sections will survey cultural studies of American and Japanese foreign and defense policies, and studies of the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold War in general.

Since publication of *The Culture of National Security* and *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* by Peter Katzenstein in 1996, the body of scholarly work on Japanese national security has expanded through dialogue between cultural, or constructivist, and realist oriented approaches. Katzenstein focused on the norm of nonviolence which has been domestically shared and given an ideational structure to both domestic and international security policies of Japan since the end of World War II (Katzenstein, 1996a). Along with Katzenstein, Thomas Berger employed a cultural approach to explain why Japan and Germany have been reluctant to regain

military power even after they achieved remarkable economic development. Berger's answer to the question is the antimilitarist cultures that are deeply rooted in the two countries' national psyches (Berger, 1998). Thus the cultural study on foreign policy solved the puzzle of policy continuity of Japan after the Cold War that was not answered by structural realists. The strength of the research by Katzenstein and Berger lies in their integration of ideational and domestic factors with material and external factors to explain seemingly irrational or unique aspects of Japanese defense policy that structural realism failed to explain.

Another group of Japan specialists are inspired by realist theories and explain the weakening norms of antimilitarism and emergence of more independent and active, or "normal," national security policy of Japan in the post-Cold War era. For example, Michael Green summarizes his findings about an emerging "reluctant realism" of Japan as follows: a greater focus on balance of power, frayed idealism, a higher sensitivity to security, a push for independent foreign policy, a focus on Asia, and a more fluid foreign policy making process (Green, 2001). Based on Green's notion of "reluctant realism," Daniel Kliman analyzes changes in Japan's national security strategy since 9/11. He explains recent changes in Japanese defense policy by external threats from North Korea and China, the leadership of Prime Minister Koizumi, declining Japanese economic power, and generation changes in Japan (Kliman, 2006).

Instead of siding with one school of international relations theory, Richard Samuels' *Securing Japan* takes a synthetic approach between constructivism and realism to analyze Japanese grand strategies since the Meiji Restoration. He demonstrates how international constraints and domestic politics have interacted at different historical

periods to form Japan's grand strategies such as "Rich Nation, Strong Army" and "Yoshida Doctrine." Samuels is a realist when he emphasizes pragmatic strategic thinking and the end-means rationality of Japan. At the same time, Samuels is a constructivist when he argues that Japanese strategic culture emphasizes autonomy and prestige. He also analyzes the dynamics between ideational and material factors of Japan's national security strategy by examining how national discourse and consensus on foreign relations and defense issues have alternated as new world orders have come and gone. Samuels explains recent changes in Japanese foreign defense policy by the rise of China, reckless foreign policy by North Korea, and doubts about the U.S.' security commitment, and the decline of the Japanese economy. Because of those external forces, New Autonomists, Neo-Revisionists, Realists, Globalists, Mercantilists, and Asianists are competing for a new grand strategy after the demise of the Yoshida Doctrine (Samuels, 2007).

One of the surprisingly weak links in constructivist studies of international relations is the United States. There is no chapter on the United States in Katzenstein's *The Culture of National Security* or a comparable book to *Cultural Norms and National Security* to ask what is the national security culture of America. This lack is even more surprising because cultural aspects to the U.S. foreign and defense policies have been one of the major topics in both political science and diplomatic history. To name a few, Hans Morgenthau established the foundations of classical realism in international relations by criticizing liberal traditions of American foreign policy (Morgenthau, 1948). Louis Hartz traced liberalism as a unifying tradition of both domestic and foreign policies of the United States since its beginning (Hartz, 1955). In the 1970s, political scientists began to

study what they call “strategic culture”(Snyder, 1977, 1991) and analyzed ideational factors of American ways of war in comparison with those of the Soviet Union. Inspired by Snyder’s work, Klein argues that the central tenet of American strategic culture is power projection (Klein, 1988). Lord examined the liberal democratic roots of American strategic culture (Lord, 1985). Diplomatic historians have also developed a large body of literature on styles and traditions of American foreign policy (Gray, 1981; May, 1973).

More recently, neoclassical realist scholars, such as Christopher Layne and Collin Dueck, explained the continuity of hegemonic grand strategy of the United States after the Cold War with ideologically and domestically driven liberal projects such as global free market and democratization, and a military balance of power at the international level (Dueck, 2006; Layne, 2006). Another body of literature that uses ideas as independent variables focus on the problem of expansionist ideas in U.S. foreign policy, which has led the United States to intervene in the periphery or the parts of the world that are not so vital to core national interests (Kupchan, 1994; Mearsheimer, 2001; Snyder, 1991; Stein, 1993; Taliaferro, 2004).

What has made that hegemonic foreign defense policy of the United States possible is not only “a preponderance of power” (Leffler, 1992), but also a high respect for the military (Huntington, 1957; Johnson, 2004; Russett, 1990) and the rise of internationalism in the United States (Holsti, 1996, 2004; Legro, 2000). The United States started acting as a hegemon not when it had developed overwhelming material power but when it developed a national consensus to use its preponderant military and economic power and to assume international leadership. While Japan became a trading state by focusing on economic development after World War II (Rosecrance, 1986), the

United States assumed international leadership by developing a new identity of a “national security state” at the beginning of the Cold War (Leffler, 1992). In short, hegemony is not only a state of balance of material power, but also a state of the national identity of the most powerful state in the international system.

While hegemonic identity of the United States emerged in the 20th century, John Lewis Gaddis points out that the most enduring tradition of the U.S. foreign policy is the norm of homeland security (Gaddis, 2004). Although the term homeland security has been used more commonly after 9/11, the prevention of foreign military attacks on the soil of the United States has been the unifying norm in both isolationist and internationalist foreign policy. Since the United States was dragged into World War I and II, it learned the country would not be safe as long as illiberal states dominated the power centers of the world. Instead of isolating itself from the dangers and evils of power politics, the best way to secure the homeland of the United States is to assume international leadership and make the world safe for democracies.

While ideational studies of American and Japanese foreign defense policies focus on characteristics and unique aspects of each country, both constructivist and realist theories of alliance and studies of the U.S.-Japan alliance highlight common factors that bind the two allies. Constructivists focusing on internationally shared norms and identities explain a pattern of international alignment, rather than defense policy of a particular state by pointing to shared norms and identities. For example, Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett developed the notion of a security community, in which war is inconceivable because of shared norms and identities (Shore, 1998). They were inspired by a pioneering work by Karl Deutsch on the trans-Atlantic community (Deutsch, 1957)

and still the best case of a security community is Western Europe. Although the volume explores security communities in other parts of the world outside Europe, it failed to recognize the bilateral security community between the United States and Japan. Among constructivist research on the U.S.-Japan alliance, Henry Nau offers one of the most promising models. He explains stability of the Cold War Western alliances, including the U.S.-Japan alliance, by the combination of power asymmetry and shared identity as democracies (Nau, 2002).

While culturist and constructivist researchers focus on unique or even irrational aspects of Japanese defense policy and the U.S.-Japan alliance, scholars employing the realist approach try to rationalize them. Although neorealism has failed to explain why the bilateral alliance survived in spite of fundamental changes in global balance of power after the Cold War, other variants of realism have offered partial answers to the research question of this dissertation. First, neorealism itself has offered an alternative explanation of international relations in East Asia after the Cold War by focusing on regional, not global, balance of power. The Cold War was not over in Asia in the same way as in Europe. Both China and Korea are ideologically divided and have been the major sources of potential military conflicts in the region. The United States and Japan need their bilateral alliance to balance against the threats from the rising power of China and the heightened threat from North Korea (Christensen, 1999; Friedberg, 1993; Green, 2002). Kenneth Waltz goes so far as to argue that sooner or later Japan will adopt a more independent and assertive national security policy, including nuclear armament, matching its economic and technological capabilities in an increasingly dangerous region (Christensen, 1999; Waltz, 2000).



In addition to the literature on the Japanese foreign defense policy, the literature on the U.S.- Japan alliance has grown since the end of the Cold War. The majority of this literature is in edited volumes focusing on the future of the alliance with strong policy orientations; however, these efforts have not addressed from a theoretical perspective the question of why the U.S.-Japan alliance survived the end of the Cold War. For example, the volume edited by Ikenberry and Inoguchi examines whether and how the U.S.-Japan security alliance can evolve and remain at the core of the region's security order. Although they recognize the rise of multilateralism in Asia and the need for the alliance to evolve, they concluded that "even if all the external threats in the region were to disappear, the alliance would still be important for regulating relations between the United States and Japan" (Ikenberry & Inoguchi, 2003, p. 2). Green and Cronin examined the U.S.-Japan alliance by assembling both scholars and practitioners to examine the historical evolution of the bilateral alliance, the military, diplomatic, and technological connections between the U.S. and Japan, the domestic and international constraints on the alliance, and the linkages between economic and security issues. The volume as a whole successfully describes how deeply the two allies have been integrated not only militarily but also politically, economically and culturally. The editors concluded the volume with four policy recommendations: gradual enhancement of military cooperation, engagement with China, bilateral cooperation in global security issues, and a long-term commitment to a forward U.S. military presence in Asia (Green & Cronin, 1999).

While other books on the U.S.-Japanese relations after the Cold War are anthologies, two monographs have made significant contributions to further

understanding of the dynamics and the complexity of the bilateral alliance. One is *Alliance Adrift* by Yoichi Funabashi. Funabashi provided in-depth stories of the diplomatic negotiation which led to the revision of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation in 1997. Until the official documents of the negotiation are available under the Freedom of Information Act in the U.S. and until the Japanese government decides to release them, Funabashi's book will serve as the best source for insider stories of the redefinition process of the U.S.-Japan Alliance after the Cold War. As one of the top journalists in Japan, Funabashi interviewed key negotiators and decision makers of both governments numerous times between 1991 and 1996. He successfully demonstrated how the personalities, backgrounds, and experiences of individual decision makers mattered in the diplomatic negotiations between the two allies (Funabashi, 1999).

Kent Calder's new monograph starts with the argument that the U.S.-Japan Alliance is in danger of "quiet erosion" and questions the basic rationale of the alliance from both the American and the Japanese sides. Calder's book is more theoretical than other works on the U.S.-Japan alliance since the end of the Cold War. He employs comparisons with other cases across time and space to examine why and when not only the U.S.-Japan Alliance, but also alliances in general, survive changes in international and domestic environments. He argues that the political, economic, and transnational personal networks between the United States have been weakened while global military cooperation has been enhanced. The imbalance between the enhanced military cooperation and the weakened political, economic, and personal infrastructure of an alliance is a dangerous combination (Calder, 2009). While Calder asks an important question about alliance continuity and employs comparative methods with historical

cases such as the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the Anglo-Portuguese alliance in order to explain the changes in the U.S.-Japan alliance since 2001 and predict its future, he does not ask why the alliance survived the end of the Cold War and his analysis of the 1990s is rather brief. The changes in the bilateral alliance in the post-9/11 era should have never happened without its redefinition in the 1990s. He also ignores the entire body of constructivist research on Japanese security although he emphasizes the importance of cultural bases of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

While constructivism and realism have mainly contributed to the debate on Japanese defense policy and the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold War, liberalism and its subtheories could provide alternative explanations with their focus on economic relations, domestic regime types, and institutions in the United States and Japan. First, the two allies are so economically interdependent that any military conflict would hurt the interests of the both countries (Keohane & Nye, 1977). But most experts of U.S. – Japanese relations see economic ties as a source of conflict rather than cooperation between the U.S. and Japan in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Instead of strengthening ties, economic issues endangered the survival of the U.S.-Japan alliance (Funabashi, 1999; Green, 2000).

Liberalism also expects peaceful relations among democracies by shared identity, norms of peaceful conflict resolution, and institutional constraints on war-making decisions (Brown, Lynn-Jones, & Miller, 1996; Doyle, 1997; Russett, 1993). Although a shared identity as democracies seems to have contributed to the survival of the U.S.-Japan alliance, democratic peace theory is not the best theory to explain the bilateral alliance after the Cold War. First, democratic peace theory does not argue that

democracies necessarily form an alliance. It only argues that democracies do not engage in war against each other. Second, a democratic identity is just one of the ideational foundations of the U.S.-Japan alliance. In order to understand asymmetrical security interdependence between the U.S. and Japan, other cultural factors, such as other identities and national security norms, should be considered.

Liberalism tries to explain the survival of the U.S.-Japan alliance by institutionalization of security cooperation between the two allies. As McCalla argues that institutionalization prolonged the life of NATO by finding new missions after the Cold War (McCalla, 1996), the U.S. and Japan have developed domestic laws, national bureaucracies, military forces, and domestic industries to manage the bilateral alliance. Those interests in both Japan and the United States contributed to extend the life of the alliance (Tsuchiyama, 1997). McCalla also argues for the need to analyze an alliance as an organization, paying more attention to diversity of scope and depth of alliance structure and process, and internal dynamics of allies. In other words, alliance politics is a two-level game. Like any other foreign policy making, decision makers try to balance external pressures and domestic political needs. This view is particularly helpful in analyzing alliance politics during peacetime when decision makers in both Tokyo and Washington were more sensitive to domestic pressure than during the heat of the Cold War. Barnett and Levy also argue that the choice of strategy depends on a combination of systemic and domestic factors, including the perceived degree of external threat to state security, the perceived degree of domestic instability and threat to the government, and the constraints that derive from the domestic political economy (Barnett & Levy, 1991).

While institutional explanations have an advantage of bridging international and domestic levels of explanations and material and ideational bases of an alliance, the very mediating function of institutions can be a weakness. In the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the asymmetrical nature is a reflection of either material power balance between the American and the Japanese military forces or of active or passive national security norms. While the institutions could delay the changes caused by power or cultural shift among allies, institutions alone cannot change power balance or national security cultures.

The review above has demonstrated both the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches. As dominant theory of international security studies, realism offers various explanations of survival of the U.S.-Japan alliance. But they fail to explain how different realist prescriptions, from free riding to the U.S. security umbrella to Japan's nuclear armament, can be rational at the same time. In order to justify their claims, realists need to look into the sources of rationality and national interest of both the United State and Japan.

Thus, realist scholars have argued that the existing and newly rising external national security threats in the Asia-Pacific region were the main causes of the survival of the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold War. For their part, liberal scholars would emphasize factors such as institutionalization of the bilateral alliance, economic interdependence, and shared democratic identity between the United States and Japan. These competing explanations are not mutually exclusive but rather complementary, and any serious analysis of the case should synthesize them, rather than singling out one or the other class of explanations in isolation.

Moreover attempting to explain the survival of the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold War by realist or liberal reasons alone can lead to analytical contradictions. Both realism and liberalism are so broad and ambiguous that each of them could provide conflicting explanations and predictions. For example, realism could explain and predict both the dissolution and continuity of the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold War. In general realist theories tend to emphasize the dynamic, rather than stable, nature of military alliances because of the risks of entrapment and abandonment (Snyder, 1997). Based on this strain of realism, the U.S.-Japan alliance should have dissolved when the original common threat, the Soviet Union, disappeared. When allies face disparate rather than common threats, they run the risk of being entrapped into disputes or conflicts that do not directly affect their individual national interests. Similarly, when a state engages in a military conflict with a third country which its allies do not see as a threat, it runs a higher risk of being abandoned by those allies.

Realism would also offer another explanation of a possible dissolution of the U.S.-Japan alliance by focusing on states' interests in limiting hegemonic dominance. According to this line of realism, because the United States had much greater power than any other country in the Asia-Pacific region at the end of the Cold War, Japan should have aligned with China to balance against the United States. In a similar manner, the United States should have allied with China to preempt possible Japanese challenge to the U.S. hegemony (Friedman & LeBard, 1991). By emphasizing the importance and influence of norms of national security, constructivism can explain not only Japan's reluctance to challenge U.S. hegemony, but also America's willingness to extend its security guarantee to Japan in spite of persistent asymmetry in burden sharing and

division of labor within the U.S.-Japan alliance, even though the power gap between the two allies had closed significantly during the Cold War.

Instead, realist scholars have emphasized common threats from North Korea and China as the main reasons for the continuing cohesion of the U.S.-Japan alliance (Green, 2001; Kliman, 2006; Samuels, 2007). Yet they failed to fully explain why the United States and Japan have perceived North Korea and China as more threatening than each other without mentioning shared liberal identities and institutionalization of the bilateral alliance. Liberalism and constructivism provide more convincing rationale for the stability of the alliance.

Similarly, liberalism offers multiple, also often inconsistent, explanations for the endurance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. First, the democratic peace theory strands of liberalism would argue that the alliance survived the end of the Cold War because of shared democratic identity between the United States and Japan (Mochizuki & O'Hanlon, 1998). Second, economic liberalism would emphasize economic interdependence between the two countries. As the largest and the second largest economies in the world and one of the top trading partners with each other at the end of the Cold War, the United States and Japan had unmistakable interest in maintaining peaceful relations. Third, neoliberal institutionalism would emphasize highly institutionalized nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance, as well as NATO (McCalla, 1996). But the first and the second factors only explain peaceful relations between the two countries, not the need for a military alliance in peacetime. Even assuming that the shared interests as democracies and capitalist countries have positively affected alliance cohesion between the United States and Japan and that institutionalization extended the life of the military alliance, liberalism

has failed to sufficiently explain how these different factors *combined* contributed to the survival of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Furthermore, liberalism fails to explain ever-increased tension between Japan and China in spite of a growing level of economic interdependence. It is clearly necessary to consider historical issues between the two countries in order to account for this phenomenon. In short, both realism and liberalism contain competing explanations not only against each other but also within themselves.

Constructivism not only enables the synthesizing of explanations from competing realist and liberal theoretical propositions that are more powerful than either can provide independently, but it can also help rationalize internal inconsistencies within each separate theoretical tradition (Barkin, 2003; Katzenstein, 2005; Katzenstein & Okawara, 2001; Sterling-Folker, 2000, 2002). Constructivism adds more explanatory and specifying power to realism by highlighting ideational factors such as threat perceptions, construction of national interests, and soft power. In the case of liberalism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism are combined, the effects of identities and norms in formal and informal institutions will be revealed (Hemmer & Katzenstein, 2002).

Constructivism will help realism by asking why the U.S. hegemony has been in Japan's national interest, rather than a threat to it. By adding shared liberal identities and interdependent national security norms between the two countries to the balance of power analysis of the regional security in Asia after the Cold War, the present dissertation reveals rationality behind mutual friendly perceptions between the United States and Japan. My argument can also provide more coherent explanations as to why the United States and Japan have perceived North Korea's nuclear development and China's rise as a regional hegemonic power as common threats.



As for liberalism, constructivism will specify when close economic relations through international trade and investment lead to either interdependence or vulnerability (Baldwin, 1980). By adding identities as an intermediate variable, Constructivism will explain why the high level of economic interdependence between the United States and Japan has enhanced their alliance cohesion, while that between the United States and China has triggered the fear of vulnerability. Because of the shared identities as capitalist democracies and allies, the United States and Japan do not have to fear that any economic disagreements on conflicts will lead to military conflict between the two countries. But when it comes to China, in contrast, both Japan and the United States need to consider the possibility that China may use its economic leverage gained through interdependence to achieve their security and diplomatic goals. Thus, economic interdependence without security and cultural interdependence contains the risk of vulnerability rather than the promise of international cooperation.

Conversely, liberal institutionalism can help constructivism by highlighting how the national security norms of the United States and Japan have been institutionalized with commensurate durable impact on their respective national security policies (Sterling-Folker, 2000). Abstract ideas, however persuasive, do not have real impact on government policy unless they are written into laws, regulations, and organizations, and unless budgetary and human resources are allocated to put them into practice. The third and the fourth chapters will examine how identities and norms of national security of the United States and Japan became strongly institutionalized and a source of policy continuity in the changing international security environment.

Thus, constructivism will demonstrate that the combination of the shared liberal

identities, economic interdependence, and institutionalized asymmetrical military alliance have made the U.S hegemony in the Asia Pacific region an integral part of Japan's national interest. Similarly, constructivism would rationalize the threat perceptions of the United States and Japan toward China and North Korea. It is the combination of undemocratic political systems and increasing military capabilities that have made the China and North Korea sources of national security threats to the United States and Japan.

## CHAPTER 2

### HYPOTHESES, METHODOLOGY, AND CONTRIBUTIONS

#### Hypotheses

Based on the preceding literature review, the combination of constructivist and realist models of national security and alliance is most promising in explaining the alliance politics between the United States and Japan in the 1990s. As realists argue, a state uses alliances in order to fill the gap between its goals of national security and its means (Morgenthau, 1948; Walt, 1987; Waltz, 1979). But realists' focus on balance of material power often fails to explain threat perceptions of states. In addition, the choices of allies and the content and specifics of security cooperation between allies cannot be explained without asking how and why a state defines its national interest (Barnett, 1996). Constructivism provides the answers to those questions. It argues that the identities and norms of national security, which are the main components of a state's national security culture, define national interest (Katzenstein, 1996b). And then a state develops national security institutions, including alliances, to defend and promote culturally defined national interests (Katzenstein, 1996a). By looking into ideational basis of national interest and state's rationality, the current research explains why the United States has been the only ally for Japan and why Japan has been the most important ally for the U.S. in the Asia Pacific region as well as the asymmetrical nature of their

bilateral alliance.

Based on the theoretical models of alliance and national security developed by realists and constructivists above, the present dissertation will test 4 sets of hypotheses below.

1. *The U.S.-Japan Alliance survived the end of the Cold War because they have developed interdependent national security cultures.*
  - a. *Interdependent national security cultures develop when allies have both common and complementary identities and norms of national security.*
2. *U.S. national identity as a liberal hegemon and its norms of homeland security and respect for the military allowed the U.S. to include the survival and prosperity of other industrial democracies into the America's own national interest.*
3. *Japan's national identity as a liberal trading state and its norm of antimilitarism have made powerful American hegemony and close relations with it integral parts of Japan's own national interest.*
4. *The U.S.-Japan alliance has filled the gaps between the national interests and the means to them for both the United States and Japan.*
  - a. *The United States needs Japan to project its power in Asia.*
    - i. *Because of its liberal hegemonic identity, the survival and prosperity of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are in the national interest of the U.S.*
    - ii. *Because of its liberal hegemonic identity, preventing China from dominating East Asia is in the national interest of the U.S.*

- iii. Because of its liberal hegemonic identity, North Korea's nuclear development has threatened the national interest of the U.S.
  - iv. Because of its norm of homeland security and respect for the military, the U.S. protects those interests by maintaining overseas bases in Japan and South Korea.
- b. *Japan needs the United States to protect the country from external threats.*
- i. Because of its liberal trading state identity, strong US hegemony and close relations with it are in the national interest of Japan.
  - ii. Because of its liberal trading state identity, preventing China from dominating East Asia is in the national interest of Japan.
  - iii. Because of its liberal hegemonic identity, North Korea's nuclear development has threatened the national interest of the U.S.
  - iv. Because of its norm of antimilitarism, Japan has protected its national interest by hosting U.S. military bases and by keeping a minimal level of its own military forces.

Figure 1 illustrates the proposed cultural model of alliance and its application to the U.S.-Japan alliance. The first row represents the causal relations among state identity, national interests, national security norms, and defense policy. The second row shows how the general model can be applied to explain U.S. national security policy and the third row represents the relations between Japanese national security culture and its defense policy.

Before a further discussion of national security culture, some key terms need to be defined. First, culture, following a widely quoted definition by anthropologist Clifford




Figure 1. Cultural Model of Alliance

Geertz, is “an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and their attitudes toward life” (Geertz, 1973). This definition highlights several key characteristics of culture. First, culture is a social idea shared by a group of people. When a certain set of ideas is held by a single individual, it is not a culture. But when individuals form groups of almost any size, culture quickly manifests itself. For example, the Catholic Church, Apple Computers, the New York Yankees, the United States of America, the International Monetary Fund, Asia, and Western civilization all have distinct cultures that give unique characteristics to the groups. Second, for culture to exist, it must be shared across time. Although culture does change, it does so slowly and the main elements of a

culture survive changes over time. Thus, culture tends to serve as an ideational anchor that contributes to historical continuity of the group. Third, culture is a system of values, rather than a set of concrete material facts. Nevertheless, its ideational and intersubjective nature creates a perception shared by the group and has important influences over the group's behavior. Therefore, cultural explanations can be useful in cases that concrete material factors cannot explain or have difficulty in explaining. In sum, culture provides the basis for behavioral continuity in the face of environmental and structural changes, as well as for behavioral diversity among actors with similar material properties.

Political culture is a subculture of a national culture. It is a set of citizens' beliefs about, attitudes toward, and expectations for the political system, process, and policy (Almond, Dalton, Powell, & Strom, 2006). Political culture sets both cognitive standards on political actors and institutions and evaluative standards on how they should behave (Katzenstein, 1996b). The studies of political culture address questions such as: Who belongs to the nation? What type of the government should the nation have? Who should be political leaders? What are citizens' rights and duties? How should the government address political issues? What are proper roles of the government in citizens' lives? The studies of political culture cover three levels of political attitudes: political system, political process, and policy. For example, the system-level studies of political culture focus on the notion of legitimacy while the process level studies how particular type of political culture affects the level of citizens' participation in politics.

For example, the recent debate over health care insurance in the United States can be better understood if one is familiar with American political culture. It has been a norm among other developed countries that the government offers universal health insurance

coverage to its citizens. International observers have wondered why so many Americans are resistant to the notion of national medical insurance, especially when the United States spends a much larger share of its GDP on health care than any other OECD members. Similarity of political and economic institutions, as well as income level, among OECD members leads to expectations for similar policy preferences in health care issues, leaving a puzzle as to why the United States is so dramatically different. Inclusion of American political culture into the analysis, however, helps to solve the puzzle.

American political culture emphasizes the liberty of individual citizens over equality and solidarity among them, individual property rights, independence from overdependence on the government, and preference for limited roles of government in economy and society. Adding political culture to the analysis better explains the late and difficult adaption of public health insurance, one of the key policy features of the modern welfare state. Thus political culture, along with other factors, defines the identities and norms of the government and its citizens, as well as the relations between the ruler and the ruled.

National security culture is a set of norms and identities which define national interests, national enemies, and the proper means to defend the nation (Katzenstein 1996a). It develops out of the domestic and diplomatic history of a given nation and is institutionalized to serve as a basis for the continuity and stability of national security policy. National security culture provides the ideational structure *within* which a state develops its national security policy.

In order for states to develop a reliable and durable alliance, they must have interdependent national security cultures. Interdependent national security cultures result from two main factors. The first of these is commonality. An alliance survives better in



peacetime, when allies share common identities and norms that set common interests. In the case of the U.S. and Japan, they are both capitalist democracies. The two countries share the interest of making the world safe for democracies and beneficial for capitalism. While the origins of the Japanese democratic and capitalist identities can be largely attributed to the American military occupation after World War II (Dower, 1979; Iokibe, 1985) and the bilateral alliance with the U.S., those new identities initially established by the U.S. have taken firm root in Japan and have contributed to the survival of the alliance after the Cold War. In contrast, the Allied Powers of World War II lacked interdependent national security cultures and were divided into two camps with opposing political and economic ideologies.

But common identities alone are not sufficient to develop interdependent security cultures between states; they must also have complementary identities and norms. The U.S. and Japan have developed such mutually constitutive identities as the two allies need each other to remain who they are. While the U.S. developed identity as a hegemon and national security state, Japan has developed the complementary identity as a junior partner of the U.S. and a trading state (Rosecrance, 1986). Japan needs U.S. military protection and an open U.S. market to keep their antimilitarist norm and trading state identities while the United States needs military bases in Japan and diplomatic and economic support to act as a global hegemon. In short, both countries needed each other to maintain their different but complementary identities after the Cold War.

The norms of national security, which provide the basis of culturally defined national interests, are different but compatible between the U.S. and Japan. The norm of homeland security and respect for armed forces have been developed and institutionalized

in the course of American history. Because the United States has experienced a limited numbers of foreign military attacks on its homeland but has nevertheless been dragged into two world wars, fighting war overseas, rather than waiting for enemies to attack the U.S. homeland, has become one of its most important norms of national security. In order to achieve homeland security, the United States has had to maintain large military forces and project its military power globally since the World War II, even during peacetime. Such expansive national security goals are only possible to achieve in a country where the respect for military services is high. Because of highly integrated and friendly nature of civil-military relations dating back to its War of Independence (Huntington, 1957), the respect for the military is one of the strongest social and political norms in the United States. Building on the existing literature of nationalism and the national character of the United States (Citrin, Haas, Muste, & Reingold, 1994), its militarism (Bacevich, 2010; Glain, 2011; Hixson, 2008; Johnson, 2004), civil-military relations (Feaver & Kohn, 2001), strategic culture (Booth & Trood, 1999; Johnston, 1995b; Lord, 1985), and grand strategy (Art, 2009; Dueck, 2006; Layne, 2006), the current research explains the interaction between domestic and international politics, as well as the relationship between cultural and material factors that have shaped the U.S. national security policies in the postwar era.

Japan's post-World War II national security culture is a mirror image of that of the United States. While the United States learned from two world wars that it cannot be safe and wealthy by seeking to isolate itself in a world full of authoritarian and imperial governments and that it must be prepared to use its power and military forces to make this world safe for America, the Japanese people and government learned that even strong

military forces cannot protect the nation. As a result Japan has developed new national security culture based on its new identities as a trading state, democracy, and pacifist middle power. Pre-World War II exclusivist, religious, militant, and imperial nationalism have been replaced with international, secular, pacifist, and democratic nationalism (McVeigh, 2004). These new Japanese identities have set the foundations of post-World War II Japanese national security policy, which emphasizes nonmilitary dimensions, close ties with the United States, and the aspiration of multilateralism. The guiding norms of Japan's national security policy have been those of nonviolence and civilian control of armed forces, and they have been firmly institutionalized in Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, the three nonnuclear principles, an exclusively defense-oriented policy, the subordinate status of Defense Agency, and the 1% of GDP limit on the defense budget (Berger, 1998; DiFilippo, 2006; Katzenstein, 1996a). Another norm that has shaped Japan's foreign defense policy has been follower-ship or avoidance of international responsibility. Instead of taking initiatives in international security issues, Japan has followed the lead of the United States.

Thus the two different but complementary national security cultures of the United States and Japan have mutually constituted, reinforced each other, and kept defining their national interests. Their culturally defined national interests have been stable and slow to change in spite of the changes in external environment after the Cold War. Thus the U.S.-Japan alliance survived the end of the Cold War in order to protect their culturally defined national interests.

## Methodology

I will analyze how the interdependent national security cultures of the U.S. and Japan shaped their national interests, national security institutions, and national security policies, especially alliance policies. For that purpose, the main methods employed in the present research are qualitative and descriptive, supplemented by quantitative methods whenever possible. First, I define national security culture as nationally shared identities and norms that define the subjects of national defense, threats to them, and proper means of national security (Katzenstein 1996a). In other words, the culture of national security defines who we are, who are our enemies, and how to defend ourselves.

Followed by literature review and methodology chapters, in the third and fourth chapters of the dissertation, I will describe what American and Japanese security cultures are. Based on the analytical framework developed in *The Culture of National Security* (Jepperson, Wendt, & Katzenstein, 1996), I will focus on the two countries' national security identities and norms. As in any culture, political or otherwise, identities and norms in a national security culture are contested ideas. Among competing identities and norms of national security, I will focus on liberal and hegemonic identities and the norms of homeland security and respect for the military in the United States. For the Japanese part, I will examine its liberal and trading state identities and the norm of antimilitarism.

I will employ statistical data to measure the impact of those norms of national security policies of the two countries. For example, data on defense budgets will be analyzed chronologically and comparatively. By looking at changes in defense budgets and developments in international relations, the research will show that external threats are not the sole deciding factor of a country's defense spending. Comparatively the U.S.

has spent much more money on its defense than Japan, not only absolutely but also in relation to GDP. The U.S. has spent about 4 to 5 % of its GDP for its defense; Japan has spent 1 %. Similarly, the size of military forces in relation to the population and national security institutions within the U.S. and Japanese government will be analyzed to demonstrate the civil military relations in each country. The size of defense industry is another indicator of importance a country places on military forces. By comparing the two countries' defense industries, I will demonstrate how the norm of antimilitarism has restricted development of the military industrial complex in Japan, while the norms of homeland security and respect for the military have promoted the growth of it in the United States.

I will also utilize public opinion polls to show similarities, differences, and compatibilities in the ideas on national security held by the Americans and the Japanese as nations. For example, the Japanese government has accumulated public opinion polls on foreign and defense policies since the 1970s and asked such questions as: "Do you feel friendly toward the U.S.?" and "What is the best way to defend Japan?" In the United States, public opinion data have been primarily collected not by the government but by private companies such as Gallup, ABC News, and *New York Times* as well as nongovernmental organizations such as the Chicago Council of Global Affairs.

Then I will analyze how the national security cultures of the two countries have defined their national interests. In this part, I will examine how American and Japanese national interests are defined and expressed in major defense and foreign policy documents of the two countries published in the 1990s, including the Quad-annual Defense Reviews, National Security Strategy of the United States, the United States

Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region for the U.S., and the National Defense Program Guidelines of Japan, Mid-Term Defense Program, Defense of Japan, and Diplomatic Bluebook of Japan for Japan. By analyzing the contents of those documents, I will demonstrate both the similarities and differences of the two allies' definition of their national interests and the compatibility between them.

In this part I will analyze how the liberal identity shared between the U.S. and Japan served as an ideational base for their national interests in a global free market and the security of democratic states. Conversely, different identities and norms of national security in the U.S. and Japan will be demonstrated through the two countries' differing definitions of national interests. For example, the hegemonic identity and the norm of homeland security in the U.S. found its national interests in maintaining the largest and strongest military forces even during peacetime. In a similar way, the Japanese trading state identity and the norm of antimilitarism has made good relations with the United States, the strongest military power and the largest trading partner, the primary determinant of its national interest.

Third, I will analyze what kinds of institutions the U.S. and Japan have developed to pursue and defend their culturally defined national interests. In the Japanese government, the antimilitarist norm and the trading state identity is institutionalized in Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, the notion of Comprehensive Security, its Exclusively Defensive policy, the Three Nonnuclear Principles, the 1% of GDP ceiling for defense budget, and the subordinate position of the Defense Agency until 2007. In the U.S., the norms of homeland security and respect for the military have been institutionalized through development of large and strong military forces with emphasis

on power projection capabilities, and in the prominence of defense related positions in the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government, including the Department of Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others.

In the fifth chapter I will analyze how the interdependent national security cultures of the United States and Japan contributed to the survival of the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold War. By examining a series of diplomatic negotiations between Japan and the United States between 1993 and 1997 to redefine their bilateral alliance, I will employ the case study method. Through this redefinition process, the two allies decided not only to keep the alliance, but also strengthen it. In this case study, I will analyze how the national security cultures of Japan and the United States shaped their national interests, threat perceptions in the Asia Pacific region, and roles each ally should play within the alliance. In this case study, I will use process tracing. Process tracing enables researchers to explain actual process and mechanism of policy making while large N studies confirm or deny correlations among variables. I begin by tracing the actual process of the diplomatic negotiations of alliance redefinition in detail. Such process tracing gives a researcher a large number of observation opportunities even in small number of cases involving multiple variables (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). Second, after identifying those multiple variables through process tracing, I will compare and contrast these variables to determine which are most important in explaining the endurance of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

I will use official documents including the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security and the new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, and press releases

regarding the negotiations issued by the U.S. and the Japanese governments. Although the full minutes and memos of actual negotiations are not yet available, parts of them were documented by journalists such as Yoichi Funabashi of Asahi Shinbun and reported by major Japanese and American newspapers and magazines. Another important source for this case study comes from the legislative branches of the American and the Japanese government. In the U.S. Congress officials from the Defense and State departments appeared before hearings at the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Service Committees and the House International Relations Committee to explain the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The Japanese Diet created a special committee on the new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation to discuss domestic legislation to implement the new guidelines. In the special committee, Foreign ministers, the directors of the Defense Agency, and the Defense Facilities Administrative Agency and members of ruling Liberal Democratic Party justified the continuation of the alliance. Those legislative documents are particularly useful in process tracing because they include competing arguments about the bilateral alliance and will show how a particular position won over others.

Lastly, the current research will verify if the diplomatic agreements between Japan and the United States were actually implemented. One of the problems of using official announcements and documents to demonstrate the power of ideas in foreign policy is that they are not always implemented as agreed upon. More than a decade has passed since the United States and Japan redefined their bilateral alliance in the mid-1990s. Has the United States reduced the size of military forces in Japan? Has Japan taken more active roles in the alliance? Has the scope of the U.S.-Japan alliance



expanded? Have the two allies developed concrete contingency plans in case of emergencies in the areas surrounding Japan? In this part, I will mainly focus on the activities of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) and the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2). SACO was created in 1995 to solve the problems between local communities of Okinawa and the U.S. military forces there by reorganizing military bases and improving implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement. The 2+2 was upgraded to the cabinet level bilateral meeting after the Cold War and has tracked the progresses on the bilateral agreements on strengthening the bilateral alliance.

### **Contributions**

The proposed research is expected to make several contributions to the study of international security. First, this research tries to bridge the gap between realism and constructivism in research on alliances. By specifying under what conditions and through what process national security culture has impact on alliance politics, the current research will show the dynamic relations between material and ideational, as well as domestic and international forces in foreign policy making. Much of the existing research emphasizes dichotomies between materialism and ideationalism, rationalism and postmodernism, or realism and constructivism in a futile attempt to definitively support one side and discredit the other. The current research will take the more productive approach of seeking to explain how those contrasting forces interact in international relations.

Second, the current dissertation proposes a cultural model of alliance. Some constructivists argue that states sharing cultural elements, including norms and identities,

tend to make and maintain an alliance (Nau, 2002; Shore, 1998). As the dysfunction of the trans-Atlantic alliance after 9/11 has demonstrated, shared identities of capitalist democracies are not enough to secure active cooperation among NATO members. The current research emphasizes the importance of cultural interdependence, which requires not only shared but complementary national security cultures between allies.

Third, the current research aims at introducing mainstream theoretical analysis into research on the U.S.-Japan alliance. Most of the recent scholarship on the U.S.-Japan alliance has weak theoretical bases and contributions. Rather they are more interested in specific policy issues such as the rise of China, the North Korean nuclear crises, the possibility of multilateral security institution in Asia, and others (Ikenberry & Inoguchi, 2003; Krauss & Pempel, 2004). Most of the literature on revisions in the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold War has been journalistic, rather than academic (Akiyama 2002; Funabashi 1999). While admitting the cultural uniqueness of post-WW II Japanese national security policies, the current dissertation explores what aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance can be explained and then generalized by existing theories of international security. In other words, the current research will ask not only what is unique about the U.S.-Japan alliance, but also ask what parts of it are common with those of other alliances; the study will develop an analytical framework out of Japanese cases that can be applied to other parts of the world.

Lastly, it analyzes ideational bases of American alliance policy from constructivist perspectives. Although *The Culture of National Security* contains chapters on NATO (Risse-Kappen, 1996), no contributor of the volume asked what is the national security culture of the United States. Because the international order reflects the

identities, norms, interests, and institutions of a hegemonic state (Ruggie, 1982), it is crucial to study national security culture of the United States. While middle and small powers have little room for projecting their cultural and domestic preferences into their national security policies in the face of external and material constraints, a hegemonic state has more choices and liberty to impose its cultural preferences in an international system than any other country. In the case of post-World War II international relations, it was the United States that provided not only material but also cultural foundations of international order, especially within the Western camp (Ikenberry, 2001). Japan was one of the biggest beneficiaries of not only material but also cultural frameworks of international order the United States has laid out since World War II. The present dissertation will demonstrate Japanese national security culture has been developed *within* the framework the American national security culture has provided. Thus studying the U.S.-Japan alliance to the balance of material power, the balance of national security cultures constraints states' behavior.

## CHAPTER 3

### NATIONAL SECURITY CULTURE OF JAPAN

#### Introduction

In this chapter I will trace the historical developments of Japan's national security culture between 1945 and 1960. The Japanese postwar security culture born and developed during this period has defined Japanese national security policy and alliance politics with the United States even after the end of the Cold War. Japan's national security culture is a product of domestically shared experience of World War II and institutionalized in the creation of a new national identity of Japan as a peaceful merchant state with a democratic government and capitalist economy. As a result postwar Japan has developed a much weaker and smaller military establishment than realist theories of international politics predict. According to realist arguments, a strong economic power should also be a strong military power.

First, I will explore how the Japanese security culture developed since the end of World War II and was institutionalized by 1960, when the United States and Japan revised their bilateral security treaty. I will trace the ideas and opinions about Japan's postwar national security of key figures of the Supreme Command of Allied Powers (SCAP), the Japanese government, and intellectuals. By the 1960s, the Yoshida Doctrine, a major consensus on national security had been accepted among Japanese public and

elite. The doctrine prescribed a grand strategy focusing on economic development, limiting Japan's independent defense capabilities to bare minimum, and developing a close alliance with the United States. It served as an anchor to secure policy continuity through the 1980s. Although the Japanese government steadily and gradually developed a more capable Self Defense Force and provided crucial support to U.S. military forces in Japan, it had kept a disproportionately low profile in international security issues throughout the Cold War. By 1980, the Japanese government had formally institutionalized antimilitarist national security culture including Three Nonnuclear Principles, Exclusively Defense-Oriented policies, civilian control of the SDF, and GNP 1% ceiling of defense budget. Thus, the relatively stable national security environment around Japan between 1960s and 1990s enabled institutionalization of the Yoshida Doctrine. Yet, stability and continuity of Japan's antimilitarist national security policy since World War II could be a phase in much longer cycle of change and continuity of Japan's national security policy. National security cultures tend to go through phases of dramatic changes and stability. Japan adopted militaristic and imperial national security policy in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and democratic capitalist and antimilitarist foreign policy after World War II (Samuels, 2007). National security culture is not static and it does change. But generally it changes more slowly than external security environment, especially in peacetime, thus causing delay in institutional adjustment to environmental changes. But, in a crisis situation, especially in a serious failure in national security policies, dramatic changes in national security culture lead institutional changes. At the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union and former communist countries went through far more dramatic institutional changes in their national security institutions, including the

break up of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact (Hopf, 2002), than their counterparts in the West, which have kept most of their national security institutions, including NATO and other Cold War alliances.

Second, I will discuss the current national security culture of Japan. Since the end of the Cold War, Asia regional specialists and political scientists have engaged in debate over the questions of whether or not Japan would become a regional hegemon by building up stronger and more independent military forces. Roughly speaking, political scientists who take the realist view argue that Japanese remilitarization would be inevitable because the changing regional balance of power would not allow Japan to maintain a low profile militarily and that economically powerful nations have always transformed themselves into military power (Friedman & LeBard, 1991; Waltz, 1979, 1993). On the other hand, Japanese experts and political scientists who look into domestic factors shaping Japanese security policy tend to deny such a possibility (Berger, 1993; Katzenstein, 1996a; Katzenstein & Okawara, 1993). The latter group points out the importance of Japanese security culture, characterized by antimilitarism, taboo against nuclear armament, civilian control of the military, a comprehensive view of national security, and dependence on the United States.

Finally, I will synthesize the realist and constructivist analyses of Japanese security policy by focusing on Japan's alliance with the United States. Changes and continuity in Japanese national security policy have been and will be heavily influenced by its relations with the United States, which have provided both a material and an ideational framework to Japan's national security policy since the end of World War II.

### **Development of Japan's Postwar National Security Culture**

Most of the elements of Japan's postwar national security culture can be traced back to the period between 1945 and 1960. Through its defeat in World War II and the American military occupation afterwards, Japan developed a completely new national security culture. Until the end of World War II, Japan embraced its imperial and militaristic national security culture and sought regional hegemony by trying to eliminate Western influences from Asia and through subjugation of other Asian countries by brute force. Politically, Japan developed a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral legislature, modeled after the Great Britain. Although it developed some democratic institutions, including expansion of franchise to universal male suffrage by 1925, Japan also developed a nationalistic, religious, and militaristic oligarchy by the 1930s. Economically, prewar Japan embraced mercantilism with heavy intervention into the national economy. For example, the Japanese government established the Tomioka Silk Mill in Gunma Prefecture in 1872 to promote exports of silk textiles. In order to produce the best quality steel for industrialization and the military build-up of the nation, the Japanese government established the Yahata Steel Mill in Fukuoka Prefecture in 1895. The diplomatic and military history of the Japanese Empire is primarily the story of attempts to catch-up industrially and militarily with the European great powers. After national unification under the Meiji Emperor, Japan developed modern military forces by inviting military advisors from Britain, Prussia, France, and the United States, and by sending missions to those countries. Between 1867 and 1939, Japan allied with Britain, the hegemon at the time, to balance against Russia, its major regional rival, fought and won three wars (the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, and World War I),

acquired and expanded overseas colonies, and subsequently realigned itself with the European Axis partners to challenge the existing international order in World War II.

As the forgoing illustrates, most of Imperial Japan's behavior in international relations can be explained by realist theories; however, the foreign and defense policies of postwar Japan require the additional insights of liberal and constructivist theories. For example, Takashi Igarashi, a professor at Tokyo University, portrays the postwar Japanese diplomatic system, *Gaiko Taisei*, as a dual system where realist diplomatic ideology of power politics and ideational democratic pacifism peculiarly coexist (Igarashi, 1995).

According to Igarashi, the postwar diplomatic system is the product of two different political ideologies. One is liberal pacifism that envisions international peace through international laws and institutions, particularly by the United Nations, and economic development through free trade and international investment. Domestically, it aims at democratization of politics and liberalization of economy. Those who supported this line of ideas argued for making peace with all Allied Powers, including the Soviet Union. They denied a need for any form of military forces and expected that the United Nations would provide protection if a foreign nation were to attack Japan. In the case of postwar Japan, this ideal was embodied in the Constitution that prohibits the use of military forces as means of achieving national goals. Domestically, this line of argument was supported by the left wing Socialist and Communist parties and by liberal intellectuals, such as University of Tokyo's President Shigeru Nambara (Igarashi, 1995).

The SCAP's initial reform programs in occupied Japan also represented the ideal of a peaceful Japan. These programs promoted demilitarization, democratization, and deconcentration of the economy. The SCAP tried to separate postwar Japan from its



militarist past dating back to the Samurai era in the 12<sup>th</sup> century. By purging wartime political and military leaders, such as the former Prime Minister Tojo Hideki and the former Foreign Minister Hitota Koki, and reinvigorating liberal political elements, the SCAP tried to liberalize and democratize Japanese politics. The dissolution of the *Zaibatsu*, such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo, was central to this deconcentration and liberalization process, through which the economic foundation of militarist Japan was destroyed (Dower, 1979; Takemae, Ricketts, & Swann, 2002). The SCAP also enforced war reparation programs by confiscating machinery and plants from Japanese factories and giving them as reparations to Asian nations that had suffered from Japanese wartime aggression (Borden, 1984; Schaller, 1985). Through land reform, the SCAP carved the economic and political power of the rural landlords, who had also been the strong supporters of the prewar imperial militarist government. Land reform created a considerable number of independent farmers in rural Japan, and later they became a solid political support base for postwar Japanese political establishment dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party. In terms of politics, the SCAP legalized the Japanese Communist Party and released prewar political criminals from jails. Additionally, the Japanese people won true universal suffrage in 1948 because the new Constitution has a gender equality clause (Dower, 1979; Gordon, 1999; Takemae et al., 2002). In short, the initial occupation policies were reflection of Progressive and New Deal reforms back in the United States (Cohen & Passin, 1987).

The other political ideology reflected in the postwar Japanese diplomatic system is realism, which sees international relations as predominantly a power struggle among nations (Gilpin, 1981; Mearsheimer, 2001; Morgenthau & Thompson, 1993; Waltz,

1979). It was this line of thought that forced a change in American occupation policy around 1948. Policy makers in Washington, especially George Kennan of the State Department Policy Planning Staff (PPS), felt a strong need to rebuilt Japan as a Cold War ally in Asia, rather than to punish it as a former World War II enemy (Leffler, 1992).

In 1948, the same year the Marshall Plan was promulgated in Europe, Kennan was sent to Japan to review and assess the American occupation of Japan. Kennan recommended to Secretary of State Marshall that the SCAP should not proceed any further with their original reform programs, and stop purging Japanese leaders, stop economic deconcentration and war reparations to the Allied powers, and delay a formal peace with Japan. In contrast to MacArthur, Kennan took the Soviet threat to Japan as a much more immediate threat to both domestic and international security (Gaddis, 1982).

The so called “reverse course” of American occupation policy in Japan and the realignment among major powers after World War II are better explained by realist theories of international security. The realist theory of balance of power argues that nations ally against the most powerful or threatening nations in the international system. After they defeated common enemies in the war, the United States began to perceive its former ally, the Soviet Union, as the major threat in the postwar world. Not only did the Soviet Union install communist regimes in Eastern and Central European countries after liberating them from Nazi Germany, but also it began supporting communist regimes in Asia. Against this geo-strategic background, Japan and West Germany, former enemies of the United States, emerged as its new allies in the Cold War.

In regard to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, realism won over idealism. In spite of persistent hopes for peace with all parties, Prime Minister Yoshida decided to make

peace only with Western nations. Yoshida made the decision to ally with the United States based on realist assumptions. Although he strongly opposed rebuilding large military forces in Japan, he was not able to ignore the reality of the emerging Cold War. Because the newly created United Nations was not powerful enough to guarantee Japan's national security, it needed to either defend itself or ally with others to balance against communist threats. In addition, Yoshida wanted to secure the earliest possible peace settlement of World War II so that Japan could regain its political independence and access to American market and other economic resources necessary for its economic recovery. The alliance with the United States was the only feasible option to meet imminent and serious national security threats without diverting scarce financial and human resources to build large military capabilities of its own. (Dower, 1979; Igarashi, 1995). Yoshida wanted to place primacy on liberal goals of economic growth and democratization; in order to create the necessary security environment he decided to employ realist means.

Prof. Soeya of Keio University looks at the causal relationship between Japan's dualist approach to international relations and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. This dualism is manifest in two seemingly incompatible approaches to the international system. On one hand, Japan seeks to be a powerful actor in international relations that uses traditional means to pursue its foreign policy goal. On the other hand, it seeks to be unique in assuming a pacifist orientation toward its relations with other major power. He argues because of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, Japan has been able to maintain its dual identity (Soeya, 1998).

It is more productive to look at the mutually constitutive relationship between the

U.S.-Japan security treaty and the postwar Japan's dual political system than to speculate on the causal direction between the two. The U.S.-Japan treaty system and the postwar Japanese political system developed to preserve each other: The Japanese government used the U.S.-Japan alliance to maintain antimilitarist national security policy, and at the same time, Japan's passive defense policy allowed the United States to keep its largest overseas military presence in the strategically important Asia-Pacific region.

### **Antimilitarism and Pacifism**

In order to explain Japan's postwar antimilitarism one has to look beyond structural factors of international relations and examine the domestic cultural and institutional context where Japanese defense policy has been made. Defeat in World War II and American military occupation afterwards, and the way in which the experiences were interpreted by domestic political actors, Japan has developed beliefs and values that make it particularly reluctant to use military force (Berger, 1996).

Defeat in World War II taught the Japanese an important lesson that military power was useless to defend national independence. Since the Meiji era, building strong military forces had been the major impetus behind the expansion of the Japanese empire, along with economic development under the national slogan of *Fukoku Kyohei* (Rich Nation, Strong Army) (Samuels, 1994). The Japanese had built their modern nation state under the name of the emperor, who was the head of the state, the commander in chief of the military, and the head of Shintoism under the Meiji Constitution. Until World War II, military forces served as a source of Japanese national pride and provided a sense of security. In the Sino-Japanese, Russo-Japanese wars, and in World War I, Japan gained

overseas territories and established its international status as a great power, the first non-Western nation to achieve this status. The government educated the nation to sacrifice their lives for the Emperor and the nation. The Imperial Message on Education of 1980 reads “should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth.”

Although economic development and national security were the twin goals of prewar Japan, the latter had priority over the former. The best and the brightest of Japanese young people went to the military and the government, not to private companies.

Antimilitarism was institutionalized by the new constitution drafted by SCAP and modified and accepted by the Japanese. Its Article 9 reads:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Demilitarization was one of the initial core occupation programs of the SCAP, along with democratization and deconcentration of economy. As soon as the occupation started in August 1945, the SCAP instructed the Japanese government to collect, record and destroy all weapons and military supplies stored and hidden in Japan and surrounding small islands. Starting on September 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1945 in Okinawa and the Korean Peninsula, Japanese troops were ordered to surrender to US Army Forces in the Pacific. On September 13<sup>th</sup>, Imperial general Headquarters was dissolved and the SCAP ordered the War and Navy Ministries to start demobilization (Takemae et al., 2002).

Instead of blaming Japanese public in general for their support of the militarist government, SCAP prosecuted leading politicians, military officials, and the *zaibatsu*,

business conglomerates. SCAP interpreted Japanese wartime aggression as resulting from the militarist takeover of Japanese government and society. According to this interpretation, ordinary Japanese citizens were also victims of militarism. This interpretation helped the postwar Japanese government and people to move forward, leaving their militarist past behind. But in the long run, this self-victimization prevented the Japanese people and government from facing their war guilt toward Asian nations (Orr, 2001).

Emperor Hirohito was also exonerated and allowed to lead the nation in reconstruction as a symbolic leader without any political or military authority. MacArthur was convinced that he needed the Emperor to make Japanese occupation effective and peaceful. But other allied powers such as the Soviet Union and Australia demanded execution of the Emperor as a war criminal (Dower, 1979). Some postwar Japanese politicians had similar perception of Japanese national security at the end of World War II. Resurgence of militarism, which had driven Japan into aggression and war against the United States, was in their mind the main threat to postwar Japanese national security, rather than external threats from other countries. Prime Minister Yoshida called military “political cancer” and insisted on taking it away from Japan by “surgical” measures (Tanaka, 1997, p. 21).

Based on his antimilitarist stance, Yoshida was initially against rearmament. In June 1946 before the Diet, Yoshida clearly denied Japan’s right of self-defense. “I think that the very recognition of such a thing (a nation’s right of legitimate self-defense) is harmful. It is an obvious fact that most modern wars have been waged in the name of the right of legitimate self-defense of the nation. Thus, I believe that to recognize a right of

legitimate self-defense is, however unintentionally, to provide rationale for provoking war” (Dower, 1979, p. 379).

But the development of the Cold War in Asia completely changed international security environment and consequently, Japan’s approach to making a peace with former enemies. In 1948, the People’s Republic of China was established and in 1950 the Korean War broke out. The Truman administration reversed the existing Japanese occupation policy and began to engage in an alliance building in Asia. Subsequently, SCAP ordered the Japanese government to create the National Police Reserve. Because of strong antimilitarism among ordinary Japanese citizens and his initial opposition to rearmament, Prime Minister Yoshida was forced to move toward rearmament under disguise. For example, the National Police Reserve was a semimilitary force of 70,000 personnel and officially was a part of the police. But it was the first effort of the Truman administration to build up Japan’s defense capability so that it would be a stable ally of the United States (Dower, 1979; Kowalski, 1999).

In spite of Yoshida’s concern of politicization of rearmament, the vast majority of the Japanese people did not pay attention to politics and devoted themselves to survival and the economic recovery of the nation (Packard, 1966). Dower notes the use of the word “Kyodatsu” to describe the mental condition of Japanese people soon after the end of World War II, emphasizing that ordinary people were separated from politics and government. They stopped believing in and expecting something from the government. The Japanese people no longer believed in lofty public causes, but instead began pursuing private and material welfare (Dower, 1999).

While the Yoshida administration secretly developed a rearmament plan with

SCAP, a group of intellectuals formed the Peace Problems Discussion Circle in order to provide an alternative plan to the Yoshida administration. They called for a comprehensive peace with all allied nations of World War II, including the Soviet Union (Igarashi, 1995). In spite of the concern of Japan's remilitarization expressed by the Peace Problems Discussion Circle, the Truman administration's expectation of Japan as a Cold War ally was realistic. Due to growing strength of leftist political parties, especially the Japan Socialist Party and the Japanese Communist Party, Washington was afraid of the possibility of Japan's communization. They fear that if Japan joined the Communist camp, an alliance among Communist China, the Soviet Union, and Japan would be invincible and unstoppable. Japan had fought for 4 years almost single-handedly against the United States. If Japan should have allies with strong industrial bases, rich natural resources, and large military forces, the United States would be overwhelmed in any conflict. So the minimum requirement became for Japan to remain as an ally to in the Western block. The Truman administration did not expect Japan to engage in a battle with Communist nations as long as the Japanese government prevented the nation from becoming communist. The American fear of Japanese communization was reflected in a clause in the original U.S. -Japan Security Treaty, allowing U.S. forces in Japan to assist in quelling domestic disturbances. Although the clause was repealed in the renewed treaty in 1960, it clearly demonstrates American concern over potential communist infiltration into Japan. Limited U.S. expectations for Japanese military capability were reinforced by widespread antimilitarism in the Japanese political leadership.

In his *Culture of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*, Thomas Berger summarizes the wide-spread cultural foundation of post-World War II



defense policy of Japan; “This negative view of the military is shared all along the political spectrum in the postwar Japan, and was held only by the far left, but many conservatives and even far right-wing figures as well” (Berger, 1993, p. 137).

### **Antinuclear Weapon Sentiment**

No historical event is more significant in Japan’s national security culture than the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. August 6th and 9th of 1945, when atomic bombs were dropped, have been remembered as symbols of the inhumanity, brutality, destruction, and futility of war among Japanese public as well as the beginning of the nuclear age in international security.

The antinuclear norm has provided ideational, historic, and domestic reasons why Japan has not developed an independent nuclear capability. Japan has ample external imperatives that would have given little choice but develop its own nuclear weapons. After World War II, it was surrounded by nuclear powers and the most violent wars during the Cold War broke out in its neighbor. After the Cold War, North Korea started its own nuclear weapon programs and has used it to blackmail the members of the Six Party Talks to extract concessions such as food, fuel, and commercial nuclear power plants (O’Hanlon & Mochizuki, 2003). Technologically and economically, Japan is capable of developing its own nuclear arsenal. It has enough nuclear materials from highly developed civilian nuclear power programs and rocket technologies that can be applied to intercontinental ballistic missiles (L. Hughes, 2007; Kamiya, 2003).

Japan’s policy regarding nuclear weapons consists of three principles. First, Japan should not develop nor possess its own nuclear weapons, as institutionalized by the

Three Nonnuclear Principles. Second, it should rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella to defend the nation from nuclear threat. Third, it should promote nuclear disarmament by supporting the Nonproliferation regime, which Japan joined by signing the treaty in 1970 and ratifying it in 1976 (DiFilippo, 2006).

The three principles above are the products of serious contention between strong antinuclear weapon sentiment by the general public and pragmatic national security needs of the Japanese government. In addition to the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, an accident caused by an American nuclear weapon test promoted the antinuclear weapon movement in Japan. In 1954, a Japanese fishing boat named “Daigo Fukuryu-maru” was exposed to radiation from the U.S. nuclear weapon test at Bikini Atoll. The Japanese public responded to the accident very negatively. By the end of the year, more than 20 million Japanese, led by former Prime Minister Testu Katayama and Nobel Prize laureate Dr. Hideki Yukawa, signed a petition demanding the abolition of all nuclear weapons throughout the world. The Diet in 1957 also passed the Atomic Basic Act (Genshiryoku Kihon-ho) that limited use of nuclear technologies to peaceful purposes and that effectively banned the Japanese government from developing, owning, and using nuclear weapons (DiFilippo, 2006). In addition, the Japanese people were so apprehensive of nuclear weapons that they also tried to control the weapons of American military forces in Japan. In 1960, the United States and Japan agreed on having prior consultation if U.S. forces in Japan were to make major changes in troops and weapons. Based on the agreement, members of minority parties and peace activists demanded that the Japanese government should confirm the absence of nuclear weapons in U.S. military bases in Japan. This issue was particularly sensitive because Japan hosts major naval

bases for the U.S. 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet, including Yokosuka and Sasebo. Officially the Japanese government held the position that if the U.S. government had not consulted with the Japanese government, the latter assumed that no major changes had been made in U.S. forces in Japan. From the U.S. perspective, however, removal of nuclear weapons from U.S. Naval vessels each time they stopped in a Japanese port was highly problematic and unpractical. Throughout 1960s and 1970s, when a U.S. aircraft carrier stopped at the Sasebo or Yokosuka ports, the probable presence of nuclear weapons on board was heatedly debated, and on some occasions, these port visits were greeted by antinuclear weapon demonstrations.

In December 1967, the Japanese government formally institutionalized the nation's antinuclear weapon sentiment into a government policy by introducing the Three Nonnuclear Principles, which pledge that Japan shall not possess, produce, and permit the introduction of nuclear weapons into its territory. Being the only county in the world that was attacked by nuclear weapons has given Japan a unique national security identity. The term "*Yuiitsu no hibakukoku*," literally translated the only country bombed (by nuclear weapon), has been the key word in Japanese public discourse on war and peace.

Even today, antinuclear weapon sentiment among the Japanese is strong. August 6<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> are commemorated nationally as the days for remembering the victims and horror of nuclear weapon. Both Hiroshima and Nagasaki hold ceremonies to remember the victims of the atomic bombs and to renew the pledge not to repeat the tragedies. Since 1971, Japanese Prime Ministers have attended the ceremonies in either or both cities. N.H.K., a Japanese public television, broadcasts the ceremonies nation-wide. Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum are one of the most

common destinations for school excursions among junior and senior high schools in Japan (Orr, 2001). In spite of occasional attempts by hawkish Japanese politicians and repeated predictions by foreign scholars and journalists that Japan would develop nuclear weapons, even the mere discussion of nuclear armament is a public taboo in Japan (DiFilippo, 2006).

Long-standing public support for the Three Nonnuclear Principles demonstrates remarkable strength and durability of antinuclear weapon sentiment considering nuclear proliferation in Japan's neighborhood. Starting with the Soviet success in its development of nuclear weapons in 1949, China developed its own nuclear weapon in 1964, and even North Korea declared development and possession of nuclear weapons in the 1990s. Yet, because of the historical memories of nuclear weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and because of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, it is unlikely that the Japanese people will support nuclear armament of the nation.

The Japanese government has adopted a pragmatic policy to deal with the regional nuclear threat by accepting the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Unlike the Three Nonnuclear Principles and Nonproliferation Treaty, reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella has not been codified. Yet both the U.S. and Japanese governments assume that the best deterrence against nuclear attacks on Japan is the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

### **Civilian Control of the Military**

Since the end of the World War II, the Japanese public not only hated nuclear weapons, but also war and the military in general. SCAP as well as Yoshida tried to blame a handful in the military leadership for the militarism of prewar Japan and portray

ordinary Japanese citizens as victims of extreme militarism. In order to prevent resurgence of militarism, postwar defense institutions were established based on the principle of civilian control. First, postwar Japanese military forces were established as a part of the national police force. The new force, named the National Police Reserve (NPR), was established in July 1950 soon after the Korean War broke out. SCAP ordered the creation of the NPR in order to maintain domestic security after a large number of American occupation troops were reassigned to the Korean Peninsula (Dower, 1979; Igarashi, 1995).

The Japanese government itself had little to say about whether the country should have paramilitary forces or not. The NPR was created by an order from SCAP. Justin Williams of the Government Section warned some minority party leaders not to dispute establishing the NPR in the Diet. By shutting down almost all input from the Japanese government and people, SCAP also successfully prevented the former Japanese military establishment from exercising any influence on the newly created NPR. Instead, the NPR sought key leadership from the national police and other civilian officials. For example, the first head of the NPR was Keikichi Matsubara, a former Interior Department bureaucrat who was Governor of Kagawa Prefecture (Tanaka, 1997).

In order to educate future officers who would understand and embrace the principle of civilian control of the military, Japan's Defense University was established in 1952. It was Yoshida's idea to create a single educational institution for military leaders in postwar Japan, instead of separate military academies for army and navy. He believed that prewar military education generated unnecessary and dangerous competition and conflict between the Imperial Army and Navy. Especially, he disliked the Japanese

Imperial Army that forcefully drove the nation into an invasion of China while the Imperial Navy, especially Admiral Yamamoto, was against war with the United States. In the new Defense University, future officers were immersed in the ideal of democracy and civilian control taught to serve for the security of the people as well as state (Dower, 1979; Kowalski, 1999).

In order to prevent strong military influence on the government and society, the postwar Japanese government tried to isolate the nation's armed forces. Both Japan Socialist and the Japanese Communist parties officially declared that the Self Defense Force is unconstitutional. In spite of Prime Minister Yoshida's effort to separate the Imperial Army and Navy with newly created SDF, ordinary Japanese tended to associate any form of armed forces with negative and destructive images of World War II and tried to distance themselves from them. The Japanese government had not tried to discuss the nation's defense issues and publicize works of SDF up front until the end of the Cold War. It was not until 1970 when the Defense Agency published the first Defense White Paper. Even today, after decades of increased promotion of SDF and defense issues among Japanese public, about 40% of respondents to an opinion poll would oppose if someone close to them should try to join SDF. The main reasons for the opposition include lack of information on SDF, low social status of SDF, and low level of social adaptability resulting from isolation of SDF from general public, as well as the dangers of duty (Naikaku-fu, 2010). Even in Ichigaya, Tokyo, where the Ministry of Defense is located, it is rare to see men and women in uniform. Consequently, military conscription has never been on the political agenda since the end of World War II.

This principle of civilian control has been institutionalized in the Japanese

government. Until 2008, Japan did not have a full cabinet level Ministry of Defense, but only the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA). In the Japanese government, an agency is a subordinate organization to a ministry. The Japanese government has been known for its strong and efficient bureaucracy, with bureaucrats, not elected politicians, taking most major policy initiatives. In the Diet, most of politicians typically only read manuscripts of questions and answers prepared by bureaucrats. But defense bureaucrats were not as powerful as their counterparts in the Ministry of Trade and Industry or the Ministry of Finance. First, most of years during the Cold War, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), not JDA was the central actor of Japan's national security policy-making. With its pro-U.S. policy orientation and priority of diplomatic and economic means of statecraft over military ones, MOFA developed Japan's defense policy by keeping close ties with the United States while limiting its own military capabilities. Moreover, officials temporally assigned from other ministries filled majority of senior positions in JDA. In the budget making process, requests from the Defense Agency were closely scrutinized and kept to bare minimum (Katzenstein, 1996a). As a result, it became a norm in the Japanese government to limit defense spending to less than 1% of GDP.

Although the creation of the Self Defense Force was a major retreat from the popularity of antimilitarism among the public, the force structure of the SDF well reflects the defensive and minimalist approach of Japanese postwar security culture. First, the size of the SDF is proportionally much smaller than most developed nations and Japan's neighbors. For example, the SDF has about 260,000 standing soldiers to protect 130 million Japanese people, while North Korea has 1.1 million standing soldiers for 22 million (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994).

In addition, the Japanese defense budget is relatively small considering its economic size. Japan has spent nearly 5 trillion yen (about \$42 billion) annually since the early 1990s. Depending on how to measure and compare defense spending internationally, Japan is ranked from 5<sup>th</sup> to 7<sup>th</sup> in the world today (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013; Hofbauer, Hermann, & Raghavan, 2012; Stockholm International Peace Institute, 2013). But this is due to size of the Japanese economy. Japan is the third largest GDP in the world, only after the United States and China. Japan continues to spend only 1% of its gross domestic products (GDP) on defense while the United States do 4 to 6%. The growth rate of the Japanese defense budget in the last 5 years is less than 1% while China's defense budget has increased by 57% in the same period. Compared with other government spending, the defense budget is relatively small. Japan spends 23% of its national budget for welfare and 10% for infrastructure. The defense budget consists of only 6% of the total national budget. In addition, only 30% of the Japanese defense budget is spent for weapons. The rest is spent for other purposes: 45 % goes to salaries of military and civilian personnel of the SDF and JDA; 10% is paid as compensation and environmental improvement to local governments where military bases of SDF and U.S. forces are located; another 15% goes to US military forces in Japan to help cover their stationing costs (Japan Defense Agency, 1997). Based on this evidence, it is clear that the Japanese defense budget is not as large as it might look.

The Japanese government has long tried to avoid the discussion of the constitutionality of the SDF. Yoshida once spoke at the commencement of the Defense University and asked graduates to be patient even if they would never be in the spotlight, or worse be treated as an "illegitimate child." Economically, the postwar Japanese



government focused on the civilian sector. SCAP dissolved the *zaibatsu* and banned some strategic industries such as aviation and arms. Japan was allowed to keep a certain level of arms industry by the time of the San Francisco Peace Conference in order to provide supplies and minor weapons to U.S. forces and the SDF, but the Japanese government restricted the domestic arms industry to this level and prevented the development of a strong arms industry (Otake, 1988). Instead, human and financial resources were concentrated on civilian industries such as steel, ship-building, automobile, electronics. The best engineers worked in the civilian industries, eventually leading Japan to economic prosperity. For the SDF, the Japanese government has procured the most sophisticated and expensive weapons from the United States, instead of developing them domestically. By maintaining the distance between ordinary Japanese citizens and military forces, the Japanese government tried to prevent a rise of the military industrial complex similar to that which drove prewar Japan into war.

### **The Comprehensive Security**

The Japanese definition of security goes far beyond what most American officials would recognize, defining its national security in comprehensive terms. It emphasizes the social, economic, and political aspects of security rather than just military aspects (Katzenstein, 1996a). The Japanese concern with economic security dates back in World War II. Japan justified the war as a struggle between “have and have not” nations and sought to expand its overseas colonies to secure natural resources and export markets for its manufacturing products, following the methods of European powers since the 14<sup>th</sup> century. After defeat in the war, Japan wanted to pursue the same goals but this time

without military forces. The long Asia-Pacific war, beginning with the Manchuria Incident in 1933, and Japan's ultimate defeat devastated its economy. It lost all overseas colonies, a significant part of the most productive workforce, and industrial bases through the war. Reconstruction of the economy was the top priority of the postwar Japanese government because it was directly connected with the survival of the people. At the same time, both the Japanese and American governments feared that a poor economy would be a hotbed of communism. In order to prevent the infiltration and expansion of communism among ordinary citizens and politicians, rapid economic reconstruction and recovery were essential (Samuels, 1994; Tanaka, 1997).

Yoshida's notion of national security already had some elements of comprehensive security even though it was not until the 1980s that the notion of comprehensive security formally was adopted in Japanese defense policies. In January 1951, Yoshida explained his position on rearmament in Diet. "It is obvious that in reality any significant rearmament is beyond the capability of our defeated country. The security and independence of a nation is not merely a questions of armaments or military strength" (Dower, 1979, p. 390).

Thus, the U.S. government provided massive economic aid along with security protection in order to stabilize postwar Japan and prevent both its remilitarization and communization. Between 1946 and 1951, the United States gave Japan about 2 billion dollars in economic aid and SCAP provided both internal and external security until the Korean War began in 1950. Under these circumstances, Japanese policy makers were able to devote themselves almost solely to economic development and did not have to worry about traditional security concerns (Soeya, 1998).

By the end of the 1960s, however, Japanese policy makers could no longer take the security and economic advantages of Pax Americana for granted. Because of the Vietnam War and the related economic slow down, the United States was unable to provide security protection and economic benefits to its allies unconditionally as they did in the 1950s. Consequently, Japanese security experts and decision makers had to re-conceptualize Japan's security needs and the idea of comprehensive security as a major component of defense policy was born. The concept was formalized by both economic and security experts and presented to Prime Minister Ohira in 1980. Comprehensive security can be seen as preoccupation with primarily economic security that permitted Japan to disregard military security issues because of the continued military security protection provided by the United States. But in reality, the concept of comprehensive security came from the Japanese government's perception that the United States was a declining hegemonic power. Japan, which lacked sufficient defense capability, felt a strong need to protect its economic interests, which had become the most important national interests of Japan (Hughes, 2004) .

The Comprehensive Security Report in 1980 argued that by the introduction of a new American security policy based on the Nixon Doctrine, Japan needed to reconsider the importance of traditional military security issues for Japan and to create its own new security policy based on the principle of self help (Soeya, 1998). The report recommended the development of "denial defense capability" in order to deter small scale and limited aggression on Japanese soil. The report assumed that under the U.S.-Japan security treaty, Japan's limited defense capability would be enough because larger scale conflicts were subject to the bilateral alliance and the major military role assumed

by the U.S. forces.

The notion of comprehensive security is reflected in the transformation of Japanese national identity from that of a militarist empire to that of a democratic trading nation. By minimizing its own military power as the main pillar of its national defense, Japan sought to put the preponderance of resources into economic development and social welfare of the nation. One of the implications of comprehensive security policy is increased importance of nonmilitary means in Japanese national security policy. For example, the Japanese government justifies relatively large sum of official development aid in the name of national security. Japan's Official Development Aid Charter reads, "(t)he objectives of Japan's ODA are to contribute to the peace and development of the international community, and thereby to help ensure Japan's own security and prosperity"(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003). By the end of the Cold War, Japan became the second largest ODA donor in the world.

### **Reliance on the United States for National Security**

Thus the Japanese conception of comprehensive security leads to another feature of Japanese security culture: dependence on the United States for the military component of national security. Under the original U.S.- Japan security treaty in 1951, the United States committed to provide the military security of Japan in exchange for the stationing of U.S. military forces in Japan. The alliance was renewed in 1960 and the basic framework of the United States protecting Japan from external threats has not changed up to the present. The Articles V and VI of the 1960 treaty reads:

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety

and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1960).

Although the Cold War ended and the need for extended deterrence by the United States should have been decreased significantly, Japan has continued to devote a relatively small amount of resources to defense and to rely heavily on U.S. forces to protect it in any major contingency.

Nothing shows more clearly the institutionalization of this “unequal” security partnership than the Japanese government’s Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA *Bouei Shisetsu cho*). DFAA’s mission is to provide defense facilities to both U.S. forces and the SDF. They are responsible for the acquisition of facilities and settlements of dispute between military forces and residents around bases. Since the late 1980s, they have provided financial assistance to U.S. forces. DFAA covers the stationing costs of U.S. forces and the budget for this purpose is called the “Sympathy (Omoiyari) Budget.” Prime Ministers of Japan have justified the sympathy budgets, about 200 billion yen annually, by saying it is the cost of being protected by U.S. forces (Yoda, 2006). The Japanese government prefers paying the United States for military defense over spending to build up its own military to levels sufficient to accomplish the task.

Japanese reliance on the United States for its external security has been institutionalized through transnational personnel links as well as through formal treaty and agreements. Japan and the United States have established some institutions that facilitate personnel communication and exchanges between defense policy makers and

national security bureaucrats of the two nations: the Security Consultative Committee (SCC), the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC), the Security Subcommittee (SSC), the Security Consultative Group (SCG), and the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee (Katzenstein & Okawara, 1993).

The institutional makeup of the Self Defense Force also symbolizes close relations with and reliance on the United States. While the Imperial Government of Japan modeled its army after Prussian Army and its navy after the British Royal Navy, the three branches of the SDF are modeled after the U.S. military: Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) is comparable to U.S. Army; the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) to the U.S. Navy, and Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) to the U.S. Air Force. Some SDF soldiers are trained by US forces and some SDF officials are educated in American defense educational institutions such as the National Defense University. Most technologically advanced weapons used by the SDF, including F-15 fighter jets, Patriot missiles, Aegis ships, and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), come from the United States because having the same weapons as US military forces enhances interoperability with them in the event of a military conflict. In terms of SDF contingency plans for foreign attacks, most of them presuppose joint operations with U.S. forces in Japan rather than stand-alone operations by the SDF.

In short, Japanese defense institutions and force structure have been designed and developed under the assumption that the U.S.-Japan alliance will remain in essentially the same form as it has since the early 1950s, at least in the foreseeable future. By combining the offensive capabilities of the U.S. forces and defensive capabilities of the SDF, Japan secures itself from external threats.

### Concluding Thoughts: Back to the Future?

In spite of the half century of antimilitarist and peaceful history of postwar Japan, there have been some events and groups of people that have sought to promote a return to the old national identities of a regional hegemon and a major military power or to build a new national identity as a “normal” nation, with more independent and stronger military capabilities (Oros, 2008).

The year 2003 appeared to be pivotal as the beginning of the end of the post W.W.II pacifist history of Japan. In May of that year, three defense related bills were passed in the House of Representatives, allowing the SDF to confiscate or control private property in case of a national security emergency. Critics of the bill warn that it is similar to the Comprehensive National Mobilization Act (*Kokka Sodojin Ho*) of prewar Japan.

The Japanese government also tried to reestablish “healthy” nationalism recently. The *Asahi Shimbun* reported that 178 elementary schools in 11 prefectures evaluate patriotism in students’ report cards, stemming partly from the revised Education Guidelines from the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science that aim to foster love and appreciation of Japanese traditions and history (Asahi Shimbun, 2003).

But other people and events demonstrate that diehard postwar pacifism continues in present day Japan. On August 6<sup>th</sup>, 2003, for example, Mayor Akiba of Hiroshima City proposed the New Three Nonnuclear Principles: allow no production, possession, or use of nuclear weapons (Hiroshima Shi, 2003). Is this a last, desperate cry of postwar Japanese antimilitarism, created by Japanese war memories and sustained by U.S. security protection by the U.S. under the Cold War international system? In coming years, Japanese antimilitarism will face stiff challenges from growing external threats

such as instability in the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits, a potential new economic and military superpower in a rising China as well as the pressure from the international community for Japan to contribute its “fair share” to international peace keeping operations.



## CHAPTER 4

### NATIONAL SECURITY CULTURE OF THE UNITED STATES

#### Introduction

Since its independence from England in 1776, the United States has surprised, been loved, admired, feared, and hated by the rest of the world owing to its rewriting and redefining of the norms, principles, and common sense understanding of international relations. It was the first colony that won political independence from a European colonizer by force. It is the first modern democracy in the world and has been the strongest advocate of democratization of the rest of the world. It was the first great power from the Western Hemisphere whose influence has had global reach. It was the first nation that became a world power without overseas colonies. It was responsible for a creation of global collective security institution, yet failed to join it. It was the first state that developed and used a nuclear weapon. It was the first state that extended multilateral foreign aid to other countries. The United States has been also responsible for the development of global capitalism. Not only did free it itself from the British Empire economically, but it also promoted capitalism whenever and wherever it found an opportunity to do so.

Behind its transforming power, the United States has been driven by unique ideas about itself, its enemies, its national values and interests, and the proper means to defend

them, which collectively, I call its culture of national security. The present paper aims at answering three basic questions about American national security culture: What are U.S. national security identities? What are U.S. national security norms? How does U.S. national security culture shape its foreign and defense policy?

### *What Is National Security Culture and Why Is It Important?*

In general terms, national security culture is a set of norms and identities that define national interests, national enemies, and the proper means to defend the nation (Jepperson et al., 1996; Katzenstein, 1996b). It develops out of the domestic and diplomatic history of a given nation and is institutionalized to serve as an ideational basis for the continuity and stability of national security policy. While realist and liberal studies on national security have focused on material factors including the sizes of military forces, economy, territory, population, natural resources in determining states' foreign and defense policies, constructivist studies have analyzed how national security culture gives meaning to those tangibles and provides the ideational structure *within* which a state develops its national security policy.

By studying national security culture, one can better understand unique aspects of foreign and defense policies of a particular country and the enduring features of them in spite of changes in material reality, including the military balance of power in the region the subject country is in, the size of its economy, technological development, and its population.

One of the surprising deficiencies in the constructivist studies of national security cultures is the lack of attention given to the United States. There is no chapter dedicated

to the United States in Katzenstein's *The Culture of National Security* and a comparable book to *Cultural Norms and National Security* that seek to define and analyze the national security culture of America (Katzenstein, 1996a, 1996b). This lack is even more surprising because cultural aspects of the U.S. foreign and defense policies have been major topics in both political science and diplomatic history. To give a few examples, Hans Morgenthau established the foundations of classical realism in international relations by criticizing the liberal traditions of American foreign policy (Morgenthau, 1948). Louis Hartz traced liberalism as a unifying tradition of both domestic and foreign policies of the United States since its inception as a nation (Hartz, 1955). In the 1970s, political scientists began to study what they call "strategic culture" (Snyder, 1977, 1991) and analyzed the ideational factors that influenced the American way of war in comparison with that of the Soviet Union. Inspired by Snyder's work on strategic culture, Klein argues that the central tenet of American strategic culture is power projection (Klein, 1988). Lord examined the liberal democratic roots of American strategic culture (Lord, 1985). Diplomatic historians have also developed a large body of literature on styles and traditions of American foreign policy (Gray, 1981; May, 1973). More recently, experts on international security have renewed their interests in cultural sources of American defense policy from both realist and constructivist perspectives (Dueck, 2006; Layne, 2006; Legro, 2005; Nau, 2002).

But the majority of existing research on ideational sources of American foreign and defense policies takes cultural influences as given and fails to examine the specific causal mechanisms through which American national security culture shapes its foreign defense policy.

## What Is National Security Culture of the U.S.?

### *Liberal Hegemonic Identity*

Any model that traces the sources of state's rationality needs to specify the cultural traits of the subject country. National security culture is a part of a political culture and shared ideas of who they are, who their enemies are, and how to defend against them. The most important parts of national security culture are national identities and norms of national security. In the case of the United States, scholars agree that two dominant and persistent traits of its national security identities can be identified: liberal and hegemonic identities (Berger, 1998)

First, liberal national identity defines the United States as a nation of a democratic government and a capitalist economy. For the United States national security includes not only physical protection of its population and territory but also "the nation's core values, its organizing ideology, and its free political and economic institutions" (Leffler, 1992, p. 13). Not only have liberal identities defined America's national interests, but "have acted as a filter on potential policy options in the United States, allowing certain strategic alternatives and rendering others unthinkable" (Dueck, 2006, p. 4). For liberal policy options, it has been relatively easier for decision makers in Washington, D.C. to mobilize domestic support.

Domestically, the American political and economic systems emphasize the Lockean principles of individual freedom, equality of rights, majority rule, progress, free enterprise, the rule of law, and limited government (Dueck, 2006). A mature democracy is characterized by frequent and contested elections, separation of powers and checks and balances among government branches, and protection of individual rights of voting,

assembly, free speech, religion, and due process of law. The U.S. Constitution institutionalizes all these characteristics of democracy and the American political system has been recognized as one of the most democratic one internationally. For example, the Polity IV's Authority Trends has consistently identified the United States as "consolidated democracy" with the highest mark of + 10 since 1946 (Marshall, 2009). Liberal identities of the United States is products of both domestic history unique to America and diplomatic history in which the country interacted with other countries (Nau, 2002). Domestically, history of the United States is a continuous process to "form a more perfect Union" in which more groups of individuals including racial, religious, gender, and handicapped minorities, have gained political rights and civil liberties through elections, legislation, constitutional amendments, social movements, court cases, and even a civil war. As Louis Hartz insightfully pointed out, "the psychic heritage of a nation 'born free' is ... a colossal liberal absolutism" (Hartz, 1955, p. 284) and no other political ideology has come close to challenging the dominant position in American politics that liberalism has occupied since the beginning of the nation.

Not only domestically but also externally liberalism has played significant roles to guide policies of the United States because "the success of American policy abroad and the fate of American freedom at home ... are tied up in an intricate knot" (Hartz, 1955, p. 284). Protection and promotion of democracy and capitalism have been driving forces of major wars the United States has fought since its beginning. First it fought two wars with Great Britain to win political and economic independence in 1776 and 1812. Nearly a century after the United States solidified its independence in the War of 1812, President Wilson justified U.S. participation in World War I as a quest to make the world "safe for

democracy.” Responding to Wilson’s speech, the U.S. Senate voted 82 to 6 to declare war against Germany. The House of Representative followed the suit of the Senate and endorsed the decision by a vote of 373 to 50. Wilson’s war declaration also mobilized important public support. For example, *New York World* wrote, “[O]ld isolationism is finished. We are no longer aloof from the rest of the world. Whatever happens now concerns us, for none of it can be withheld from the force of our influence” (KCNET, 2001c). With strong public support for the war, Wilson also managed to institute a military draft by passing the Selective Service Act of 1917 and drafted 2.8 million (Chambers, 1987).

Wilson proposed new principles and institutions of international relations, inspired by German liberal philosopher Immanuel Kant. In the name of “new diplomacy,” Wilson announced a new framework for world order based on democratic political institutions and a market oriented economic system (Ferrell, 1985; Knock, 1992; Tucker, 2004). In his Fourteen Points speech, he proposed following policies along with others:

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and

territorial integrity to great and small states alike. (Lillian Goldman Law Library, 2008c)

The liberal international order Wilson envisioned did not immediately materialize and the United States had to fight World War II against the three totalitarian regimes of Germany, Italy, and Japan. It was a war to defend and promote liberal economic and political systems throughout the world. Following Wilson's vision at the end of World War I, Roosevelt, in collaboration with Churchill, issued the Atlantic Charter to present a liberal vision for a new international order after World War II, which includes:

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security;

Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments. (Lillian Goldman Law Library, 2008a)

Like that of Wilson, Roosevelt's dream of a liberal international order protected by four major powers and a new international organization experienced significant problems in its implementation. After defeating fascism in World War II, the United States faced a new challenge to democracy from communism. The Truman Doctrine in March 1947 represents threat perception the administration held toward the Soviet and the nature of the global ideological struggle between the two political systems:

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between

alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. (Lillian Goldman Law Library, 2008d)

President Kennedy followed his predecessors in his inaugural address by declaring renewed commitment to democratization of the world:

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty. (Lillian Goldman Law Library, 2008b)

He justified the commitment to democratization overseas in his speech in Berlin in June, 1963.

I want to say on behalf of my countrymen who live many miles away on the other side of the Atlantic ... that they have been able to share with you ... the story of the last 18 years ..

[L]et me ask you ... to lift your eyes ... beyond the wall to the day of peace with justice, beyond yourselves and ourselves to all mankind.

Real, lasting peace in Europe can never be assured as long as one German out of four is denied the elementary right of free men, and that is to make a free choice. Freedom is indivisible, and when one man is enslaved, all are not free. (WGBH Educational Foundation, 1996)

President Reagan was even more blunt and called the Soviet Union an “evil empire” because it was an enemy of democracy and proposed

to foster the infrastructure of democracy, the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities, which allows a people to choose their own way to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means. (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library)

Skeptics of American overseas democratic promotion point out that the public



statements above were merely symbolic or rhetorical and that the United States supported numerous undemocratic governments and groups in Asia, Middle East, and Africa in the name of anticommunism (Johnson, 2000). During the Cold War, however, the Soviet Union and communist regimes in its satellite countries suppressed any democratic movement including Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland while American key allies in Western Europe grew into mature democracies. In Asia democratization started in Japan has spread to Taiwan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia during the Cold War. By the end of the Cold War American allies and friends were more democratic than the Soviet counterparts. Henry Nau found that the closer a nation's relation with the United States is, the higher level of democratization of it (Nau, 2002). So it was only after the collapse of the Soviet Union that democratic regimes were established in former communist countries.

The most successful examples of American democratic promotion overseas can be found in Germany and Japan after World War II. Two world wars were caused by the rise of undemocratic regime and policy makers in Washington D.C. felt they needed to democratize its former enemies to avoid being dragged into another world war in future (Fromkin, 1995). Both countries went through military occupation led by the United States and became mature democracies during the Cold War. In both countries new democratic constitutions with protection of basic human rights were drafted, political parties were permitted to organize, free elections were held, and wartime political, military, and economic leaders were purged through war tribunals. Prewar political prisoners were released (Smith, 1994). At the same time, they became two of the most powerful allies of the United States. By the end of the Cold War, the two countries

became the second and third largest economies in the world and hosted the largest number of U.S. military forces overseas.

In addition to Germany and Japan, impacts of American democratic promotion have been visible in other divided nations. At the end of the Cold War, both Taiwan and South Korea were more democratic than their communist counterparts and economically more developed. While West Germany was successfully reunified with East Germany under favorable conditions for the West and has secured a central position in the integrated Europe in collaboration with France and Britain, prolonged ideological divisions in Asia have been a source of instability in the region. In spite of significant economic interdependence, different political ideologies continue to serve as a source of friction and conflict between China and the United States (Christensen, 2001). North Korea's staunch resistance against any democratic process or power shift from the Labor Party to its people has denied any hope for peaceful reunification in the Korean Peninsula. The North Korean regime has been so determined to maintain its existing nondemocratic regime that it has developed nuclear weapon to deter attempts of regime change by external forces (Cha & Kang, 2003; O'Hanlon & Mochizuki, 2003; Perry, 2006).

After all, throughout the nation's history, the greatest national security threats to the United States have come from nondemocracies, including Britain in the War of Independence and the War of 1812, the Axis powers during World War II, and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. These nondemocratic enemies of the United States not only imposed authoritarian rule within their own countries, but also sought to establish international orders unfriendly to and even dangerous for democracies. Historical

international orders established by nondemocracies were characterized by domination and exploitation of the weak by the powerful, endless competition and conflict among powerful states seeking to enlarge their spheres of influence, and secret collusion against common enemies (even though commitments were often transitory as perceptions of interests changed), and severe restrictions on international trade and investment. In such international environments, democracies are forced to exist in constant fear of foreign invasion with consequent loss of political and economic freedom both at home and abroad.

As these historical enemies transitioned from authoritarian rule to democracy, they became less threatening to and even cooperative with the United States. By the end of the 19th century, relations between Britain and the United States had improved to such an extent that Britain supported the United States in the Spanish American War of 1898. In addition to their shared strategic interest in curbing Spanish influence in the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific, broader national interests of the two countries, now mature democracies, began to converge. The United States had ended slavery and expanded suffrage to African Americans through the Civil War while Britain gradually democratized itself by expanding suffrage to 60% of males between 1867 -1918. The convergence of the Anglo-American identities was a significant factor in the United States joining World War II on the Allied side (Burton, 1999; Perkins, 1968; Rock, 1989). In addition to tangible threats to America's commercial interests posed by the German submarine warfare, President Wilson justified the U.S. entry into the war as necessary means to defeat autocracy and to establish international order based on democratic principles.

Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and *autocratic* power and to set up among the really *free* and *self-governed* peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles.... the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by organized force.

A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants.

Cunningly contrived plans of deception or aggression, carried, it may be, from generation to generation, can be worked out and kept from the light only within the privacy of courts or behind the carefully guarded confidences of a narrow and privileged class.

The right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight .... for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. (KCNET, 2001a)

Following Britain, Germany and Italy became American allies after World War II by joining NATO. Initially, formation of NATO was driven by strategic calculations to “keep the Russians out” according to its first Secretary General Lord Ismay. By the end of the Cold War, both countries had matured as democracies and have occupied crucial parts of the trans-Atlantic security community, within which states can solve any international conflict without resorting to force. Not only have Germany and Italy improved their relations with the United States, but also with other democratic members of EU and NATO (Adler & Barnett, 1998; Deutsch, 1957). Although Russia still has yet to become a mature democracy, U.S.-Russian relations nevertheless have been more peaceful and cooperative than when Russia was under Soviet communist rule.

John Ikenberry explains these dramatic transformations of U.S. relations with its former enemies by pointing out the constitutive relations between democratization and

international cooperation.

The democratic character of the states involved also facilitated institutional agreement. .... Democracy was both an end and a means. Western leaders repeatedly justified their unprecedented commitments as necessary for the protection of common democratic values. But they also argued that such commitments were particularly credible and effective because they were established between democracies. (Ikenberry, 2001, p. 164)

What is common among the approaches of all these American leaders is a symbiotic interpretation of democracy and capitalism. True to the philosophical tradition of John Locke who argued that a man needs the rights to life, liberty, and property to be free, the American notion of democracy contains not only political but also economic rights. Political and economic freedom cannot be separated. Since the War of Independence which was culmination of series of political struggle over economic and property rights between England and its American colonies, economic freedom has maintained equal standing with political freedom as a worthy cause for the American government and the people to go to war.

Both domestically and externally, the United States has strived to be a champion of capitalism. Capitalism is an economic system of private property ownership, market economy, and minimal roles of government in distribution of wealth in a society. While the body of the U.S. Constitution mainly focuses on the relations between states and the newly created federal government, the Founding Fathers added the Bill of Rights to protect basic rights of American citizens from potential abuse by the new central government. Especially, the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution clearly represents the prominence of economic freedom as essential to political freedom and protects property rights of its citizens by stipulating “nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without

just compensation.”

The American people generally believe in the efficiency and fairness of the market mechanism in distribution of scarce resources over government redistribution of them (McClosky & Zaller, 1984). The American dream envisions a self-made man accumulating private property and making a fortune through his or her entrepreneurship in free and competitive market economy. Quoting the well-known words of President Calvin Coolidge, “[a]fter all, the chief business of the American people is business” (Peters & Woolley, 1999), pursuit of economic opportunities have been one of the most important reasons, along with religious and political freedom, for which so many people from all over the world have migrated to the United States.

More than 2 centuries after the Bill of Rights was drafted, the United States has developed one of the most capitalistic economic systems in the world. The World Survey of Economic Freedom by Freedom House measures the level of economic freedom by six indicators: freedoms to own property, to earn a living, to operate a business, to invest one’s own earnings, to trade internationally, and to participate in a market economy. Since its inception, the Freedom House survey has given the full marks in all six indicators to the United States and ranked it number one along with other five Western nations (Messick & Kimura, 1996).

Externally the United States has sought economic freedom for Americans engaging business overseas and tried to spread capitalism whenever and wherever possible. Between its independence in the 18<sup>th</sup> century and World War II, the United States made a series of efforts to challenge the European dominated colonial economic system and open foreign markets for free trade to expand and secure sources of natural

resource and for export markets for American products. For example, the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 was “a kind of hemispheric alliance with fellow independent states in South America” (Nau, 2002, p. 66), hedging for return of European colonialism in the region. The document argues that United States “should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and security” (Smith, 1994, p. 24). In 1899 and 1901 Secretary John Hay issued the “Open Door” notes to ensure protection of equal privileges among countries trading with China and in support of Chinese territorial and administrative integrity when European powers and Japan tried to divide it into exclusive spheres of influence (G. Smith, 1994).

The United States fought World War I, not only “to make the world safe for democracy” but also make it open to free trade. In his Fourteen Points speech, President Wilson demanded:

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance. (Lillian Goldman Law Library, 2008c)

American determination for developing a liberal international economic order was repeated by President Roosevelt in the Atlantic Charter, too.

Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity. (Lillian Goldman Law Library, 2008a)

Roosevelt followed through his vision for a liberal international economic order in the Atlantic Charter by proposing global economic institutions in the Bretton Woods Conference in July 1944. The new international financial system the conference introduced was a “managed open system,” in which exchanges rates among major

currencies were pegged to the U.S. dollars and governments had “tools for economic stabilization and expansionary options for macroeconomic imbalances” (Ikenberry, 2001, p. 205). European countries learned that political danger caused financial instability from the Revolutions of 1848 and 1849 and the Great Depression and preferred economic stability to high economic growth, which an open global market would promise.

Although the new international economic institutions were results of the compromises between the United States, which aimed at an open global market, and European allies, which were more interested in safeguards and protections against postwar economic dislocation and unemployment (Ikenberry, 2001), they were symbols of significant departure from the old imperial international economic order and laid foundations for a truly global liberal economic order based on multilateralism (Ruggie, 1992).

The Bretton Woods institutions, which were originally aimed at rebuilding European economy and decolonizing the global economy, have contributed to higher level of economic interdependence among key American allies in Europe and Asia. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, commonly called the World Bank, was established to lend funds to rebuild economies of the member states. The International Monetary Fund was established to stabilize exchange rates among the currencies of member states and provide short-term credits to survive financial crises. The Bretton Woods System of international finance was specifically designed to forge close financial ties between the United States and its Western allies by pegging the currencies of the latter with the U.S. dollar, the only currency backed by gold. This hybrid system of gold standard and fixed exchange rates between the United States and other Western economies kept the value of U.S. dollar relatively high. While American



consumers enjoyed a higher standard of living thanks to the strong purchasing power of the U.S. dollar, exports from western European countries and Japan to the United States proliferated due to their price advantage over American made products.

The third institution, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was established to promote a free market for international trade in 1948 after an American attempt to create more powerful International Trade Organization failed. GATT, in spite of its limited roles and power over its members, had evolved into one of the most important global economic institutions by the end of the Cold War. By the end of the Uruguay Round, the average tariff rates on goods had decreased to 3% from 40% since GATT's establishment (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2012). Its membership had increased from 40 to 128 between 1948 and 1994 (World Trade Organization, 2013). Between 1960 and 1994, merchandise trade as a share of world GDP had increased from 17.8% to 32.4% (World Bank, 2013).

These institutions were developed out of the lessons of the Great Depression and World War II. Decision makers in Washington came to a loose consensus that economic prosperity of the United States and political stability of the world depended on an open global economy where countries depend on each other through free trade and international investment (Pollard, 1985). For example, Secretary of State Cordell Hull justified U.S. involvement in European economic reconstruction as follows;

[U]nhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair economic competition, with war...if we could get a freer flow of trade...freer in the sense of fewer discriminations and obstructions...so that one country would not be deadly jealous of another and the living standards of all countries might rise, thereby eliminating the economic dissatisfaction that breeds war, we might have a reasonable chance of lasting peace. (Ikenberry, 2001, p. 176)

Some historians and political scientists have called that tradition of American

foreign economic policy “Open Door,” naming after famous diplomatic notes Secretary of State John Hay issued in 1899 and 1901, hoping that China would not be divided among the European nations and Japan and that American economic interests in the country would be respected (Layne, 2006; Williams, 2009). The “Open Door” policy aims at creation and protection of an international economic system based on liberal values and institutions. In such an economic system, private commercial interests can engage in international trade and investment to achieve optimal economic efficiency through division of labor based on the principle of comparative advantages. In other words, the policy is projection of American domestic economic norms, principles, and institutions into foreign countries and based on the belief that American economic interests would be best served in global capitalist economic system. At the same time, the “Open Door” policy reflects a persistent distrust and fear Americans have developed toward illiberal economic systems including colonialism and socialism. As demonstrated by World War I and II, American way of life would be endangered in an illiberal international economic order. No longer was isolationism an effective policy option for the United States, either. Instead of playing defensive against threats of illiberal international economic system, the Roosevelt and Truman administrations decided to create an international economic order serving American economic interests, as well as any other countries that would play by the same rules of capitalism.

During the Cold War, the United States promoted capitalism overseas not only to prevent the world from repeating its past mistakes but also to prevent the Soviet Union from taking over the international economic system. Top officials of the Truman administration believed in the importance of economic factors to the U.S. national

security interest. First, the United States would be able to defeat the Soviet Union in war because the industrial power and logistic capabilities of the United States would enable it to deploy forces to Soviet controlled territories, but not the other way around. Second, poverty is a hot bed for the establishment and growth of communism. In order to prevent its further spread, the United States had to help other countries, including its former enemies, to rebuild and develop their economies. Thus, U.S. Containment policy included not only military, but also economic measures. Starting with aid to Greece and Turkey announced in the Truman Doctrine, the United States provided over 13 billion dollars of economic aid to 17 western and southern European countries under the European Recovery Act, better known as the Marshall Plan. Secretary of State Marshall explained that the goal of Marshall Plan was “the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.” (Smith, 1994, p. 117).

Although foreign aid was an important policy measure to help the recovery of European and Japanese economies from wartime destruction, it was chiefly American trade policy that promoted the long-term economic development and growth of the Western block during the Cold War. The United States was generous enough to open its domestic market to imports from other Western countries first and then patient enough to negotiate trade deals to reciprocate market access in respective countries for American exports later. Trade negotiations with the United States also encouraged liberalization of its trading partners’ economies. Most successful U.S. trade partners have largely subscribed to the strategy of export-led growth, rather than that of import substitution. The former strategy is more conducive to creating liberal economies with smaller

government roles than the latter. Trade negotiations with the United States, either through a multilateral organization like GATT or through bilateral negotiations, including ones between Japan and the United States, have forced American trading partners to liberalize their domestic markets so that American companies could expand the business.

Today promotion of democracy and capitalism has no longer been limited to American foreign policy, shared by many American allies in Europe and Asia, and institutionalized by such international organizations as the United Nations, WTO and IMF. What separates American national security culture from those of other industrialized democracies is American exceptionalism (Hunt, 1987; McEvoy-Levy, 2001). It is the belief that the United States is an extraordinary nation with a special role to play in human history, a nation that is not only unique but also superior. While the Old World represents feudalism and imperialism with repressive government and secretive balance of power politics, the New World, which the United States exemplifies, provides positive and constructive alternatives with its democratic political system, economic free enterprise, and peaceful foreign relations based on law and diplomacy. American exceptionalism has formed not only one of the core elements of American nationalism since its inception, but has also justified its liberal and hegemonic identity. (McCrisken, 2002). The American people and government long believed that their unique political and economic systems were better than other systems. When the United States became the world's preeminent economic power by the early 20<sup>th</sup> century it began to assume international leadership and to rebuild the rest of the world after the American model.

Some scholars point out that American foreign policy is not much different from those of other great powers. For example, Lepgold and McKeown demonstrated that the

United States acted in a similar manner with other great powers. It has engaged in power politics by maintaining powerful standing military, making peacetime commitments to other countries security, and overseeing other countries domestic problems for the sake of American national interests (Lepgold & McKeown, 1995).

Focusing on individual decisions and short-term impacts of past American foreign policy, one might find more commonality with the actions of other great powers. But public perception of American foreign policy and politicians' rhetoric widely subscribe the notion that the United States should play unique and constructive roles to make the world a better place for all of humanity. Compared with other countries, the impact of exceptionalism is stronger in the United States, which helps one to understand another important aspect of American national security culture.

The second most important part of American national security identity is its hegemonic identity. A hegemon is a state with predominant military and economic power with which it establishes international order and rules (Keohane, 1984). While developing the strongest military force and the largest economy with the most advanced technological bases are necessary conditions for hegemony, they are not sufficient. Hegemony stems from not only a state's position in the balance of material power in an international system, but also from the national identity of a leading power. Political leaders and citizens, especially in a democracy, need to recognize their country's leadership roles in the world and be ready to bear the burdens necessary to perform them. In contrast to its liberal identity, the origins of the hegemonic identity of the United States are relatively new.

Although by the end of the 19th century, the United States was the largest

economy and had one of the largest naval forces in the world at the end of World War I, it was not until the end of World War II that the United States assumed hegemonic leadership. During the interwar period, the United States did not have a will to lead the world. In his *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, Paul Kennedy demonstrated the power shift among major powers between 1890 and 1938 by measuring population, levels of urbanization and industrialization, energy consumption, industrial output, and size of military forces. In seven demographic and economic indicators, the U.S rose to the top in six by 1913. But the U.S. was at best a second-rank military power before World War I (Kennedy, 1987).

The roles of the United States in international relations expanded during the interwar period in such areas as naval arms control (Buckley, 1970; Iriye, 1965) and the reconstruction of German economy; nevertheless, American grand strategy up until World War II remained basically isolationist in character. It avoided military intervention outside of the Western Hemisphere, peacetime alliances, and collective security institutions, notably the League of Nations (Dueck, 2006; Iriye, 1965; Legro, 2005). Indeed, American diplomacy since World War I was more internationalist than that in preceding centuries, but half-hearted participation in development and maintenance of international order commensurate with its material power prevented the United States from becoming a hegemon.

What the United States needed to become a hegemon after World War II was the will to lead the world by itself. Through two world wars, the United States learned that it could not be safe and prosperous alone (Gaddis, 1972). As President Wilson justified the entry into World War I as a quest “to *make* the world safe for democracy,” President

Roosevelt similarly had an ambitious, yet naïve, plan for the post-World War II international order, in which American national interests and identities would be protected better than in the prewar era in collaboration with other great powers.

Roosevelt's approach during World War II can be best explained by internationalism. Essentially, Roosevelt believed "that societal well-being is best served by committing national military power to relationships with the major powers in Europe and by supporting international institutions" (Legro, 2005, p. 52).

One of the first major documents through which Roosevelt expressed his internationalist vision for the post-World War II world order was the Atlantic Charter of August 1941. Along with ideals of individual freedom, the Charter proposed a new international order based on the principles of national self-determination, territorial integrity, nonaggression, freedom of the seas, and open access to markets and raw materials. To realize these principles, the Charter proposed a new global collective security institution, arms control, and international economic institutions, which would later be known as the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions. Along with other Allied Powers, the United States would serve as a world policeman to keep international order. Still, Roosevelt did not envision that the U.S. would take over a hegemonic position with global reach in the near-term. Instead, he negotiated dividing the world into loose spheres of influence among major powers in the wartime summits during Cairo, Casablanca, and Yalta. These loose spheres of influence would replace and be improvement over the traditional colonial system. Simply put, Roosevelt's vision for the post-World War II international order was somewhere between isolationist and hegemonic policies. The United States would more actively engage in establishment and

maintenance of an international order in the post-World War II world than in post-World War I world. Yet, it would do so through managed balance of power using international organizations, something similar to the Concert of Europe in the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Jervis, 1982, 1985). The U.N. is designed to give the major Allied Powers privilege to “police” the world as the Permanent Members of the Security Council. By giving them a veto power, the U.N. aimed at status quo of the world after World War II and any major changes should be accepted by the Permanent Members.

But Harry Truman had different understanding of post-World War II world from that of Roosevelt (Gaddis, 1972; Leffler, 1984). The differences between Roosevelt and Truman on their visions of postwar international order are clear when one compares the Atlantic Charter and the Truman Doctrine. Although the two presidents agreed on the limitations of pre-World War II American grand strategy based on isolationism, they came to different conclusions on America’s relations with other great powers. While Roosevelt hoped that the United States would actively engage in international relations in the key parts of the world, especially in Europe, as one of leading powers, Truman recognized that his country had to lead the rest of the great powers to fight against communism.

While the Atlantic Charter lists eight liberal principles of international relations Roosevelt and Churchill agreed upon, there is no specific reference to what special roles the United States would play in development of a new international order based on those principles. But the Truman Doctrine contains words of American commitment to the leadership in post-World War II international relations. It was announced in response to British urgent request for help when it could no longer provide economic aid to Greece



(Gaddis, 1982). The document is about what the United States would do for the rest of the world.

There is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn...No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary support for a democratic Greek government.

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion.

To ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. (Lillian Goldman Law Library, 2008d)

And President Truman was well aware of what was at stake. "If we falter in our leadership ... we may endanger the peace of the world...Our deepest concern with European recovery is that it is essential to maintenance of the civilization in which the American way of life is rooted" (Leffler, 2007, p. 63).

In addition to the optimistic vision of the U.S.-Soviet relations after the war, Roosevelt overestimated continuing influence and power of Britain and France in world affairs. During the war, Roosevelt closely consulted with Churchill on Allied strategies against Germany and Japan and postwar settlements in wartime summits in the Atlantic Ocean, Casablanca, Cairo, and Yalta. Atlee was invited to such summits as the Bretton Woods Conference to discuss establishment of international economic organizations and the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945 to discuss problems arising from Germany's defeat, including the arrangements for military occupation and the trial of war criminals, and issued an ultimatum to Japan demanding surrender.

But successors of President Roosevelt found themselves to take over international leadership from Britain and France and fight against communism in Greece, Turkey,

Indochina, on their behalves. Instead of policing the rest of the world in cooperation with the United States, Britain and France ended up begging the United States to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to balance against communist threats in Europe (Dueck, 2006). Great powers in the pre-World War II world turned into client states of the United States in the Cold War. In addition to material destruction, psychologically Europeans were not ready for another extended war after World War II. After two world wars, war became not only “unprofitable,” but also “unthinkable,” in the minds of most of Western Europeans (Mueller, 1989). Both the Allied and Axis powers lost significant numbers of civilian population and major parts of their industrial bases, which made it almost impossible to mobilize the nations for another war.

Another important factor of formation of the asymmetrical trans-Atlantic alliance was the advent of nuclear weapon. The United States not only monopolized the weapon at the time of NATO formation, but also the Truman administration was ready to use it to defend American allies of the Cold War. Although the United Kingdom developed its own nuclear weapons in 1952 and France did the same in 1960, the two countries would not use their nuclear weapons to defend other NATO members. America’s extended nuclear umbrella maintained its importance for American leadership within NATO throughout the Cold War. In order to balance against large and technologically advanced nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union, NATO members had to rely on the United States (Bundy, Kennan, McNamara, & Smith, 1982).

The hegemonic grand strategy extending deterrence to its major allies in Europe, Asia, and Middle East would have been impossible without public support in the United States. Unlike after World War I, internationalist and hegemonic foreign policy by the

Roosevelt and Truman administration received strong support from the Congress. The UN Treaty, Marshall Plan and the NATO treaty were all approved by the Congress with over 80% of votes. Gallup Polls found a wide range of social support for the containment policy. Not only in Washington, the containment policy won wide public support across the party line. For example, over 70% of Republican and Democrats believe that the U.S. should play active roles in world affairs in the February 1946 Gallup Poll. 56% of Republican and Democrats supported the Truman Doctrine while less than 35% opposed it. In the April 1948 Gallup Poll about two thirds of Republicans and Democrats supported the plan for the NATO (Holsti, 1996).

In contrast to post-World War I era, the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government share threat perception of communism. When the Truman administration was lobbying the Congress for the European Recovery Program, the members of Congress were more often convinced by national security threats from communism, rather than long term economic benefits the program would bring to American economy (Layne, 2006). The general public also formed a loose consensus on American foreign policy during the Cold War. First containment of communism was a widely accepted goal of American foreign policy. Second, American public opinion shifted from isolationist to internationalist views of a proper America's role in the world. In a Gallup survey in February 1943, 76% of the respondents agreed that the U.S. should take a more active role of postwar international orders (Holsti, 1996).

Backed by public support, since the end of World War II the United States has adopted the grand strategy of extraregional hegemony, developing predominant military, economic, and diplomatic influence over international order in the world's three most

important regions; Western Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf, in addition to the Western Hemisphere (Layne, 2006). Initially, U.S. leaders hoped that multilateral institutions for the postwar world economy would reduce the need for the United States to keep giving large foreign aid and to intervene frequently to maintain financial equilibrium (Keohane, 1984).

But by 1947, the Truman administration found that multilateral economic institutions alone would not save Western Europeans from economic collapse. European economic health had security implications because the Cold War was an economic struggle, as well as military and diplomatic one. Top officials in Washington saw real danger that people in economically devastated countries would choose communist governments. The Soviet Union appeared to threaten the American way of life by spreading a socialist economic system worldwide and limiting American economic opportunities in foreign markets. George Kennan understood the economic implications of the Cold War and supported economic means to fight communism, including foreign economic aid, opening American domestic markets for imports from American allies (Leffler, 1992).

The hegemonic and liberal identities of the United States have sometimes contradicted each other. The United States has been criticized for supporting undemocratic regimes in Asia, Middle East, and Latin American in the name of anticommunism (Johnson, 2004). But because of its liberal identity, the American style of hegemony is different from those of Britain the Soviet Union. Simply put, American foreign policy toward its allies and friendly nations have been guided by liberal theory of international relations. Based on the optimistic view that states can cooperate for

common interest even in the anarchical international relations, the United States created multilateral organizations to promote economic interdependence, enhance collective defense, and democracy.

In spite of persistent criticism, the way the United States has led the world is more benign than those by England and the Soviet Union. While England developed its hegemony by colonizing the key parts of the world and building an empire where the sun never sets (Ferguson, 2003), the United States built the Western block by a combination of military alliances, overseas bases, multilateral organizations, foreign aid, trade, and investment. Although the United States has developed an extensive network of its overseas bases, it has not used military forces to its allies to solve significant policy differences. For example, when France withdrew from the integrated military structure of NATO in 1967, the United States did not use military force or threat of it. Even during the Suez Crisis in 1956, the Eisenhower administration was able to force the British and French governments to withdraw their troops from Egypt without a threat of military force. Instead the United States held up U.S. financial assistance to the two allies until their military evacuation was complete. But the Soviet Union was as aggressive to its own allies as to its enemies. For example, the Soviet sent its troops to suppress the democratic movements in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The United States adopted a hegemonic identity because of its mistrust in multipolarity and balance of power mechanism of the European centered international politics (Layne, 2006). The United States entered two world wars to end the cycles of alignment and realignment among great powers. Both Wilson and Roosevelt seemed to believe that the United States could lead the world into the course of linear progress toward lasting

peace rather than going back to the cycle of war and peace. Both presidents called world wars “the war to end all wars” but also try to replace balance of power system with some form of collective security organizations.

Even before the U.S. entry into World War I, Wilson understood that the cycle of war and peace driven by balance of power among European states needed to be terminated. In his address to the U.S. Senate in January 1917, Wilson proposed “a peace without victory”:

Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement?.... There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace. (KCNET, 2001b)

Then he warned of the fragile nature of punitive peace, which had been common in Europe:

Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last, only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit. (KCNET, 2001b)

President Roosevelt was more realistic in his attempt to transform rules of international relations than President Wilson. He understood the reality of power politics and gave special privilege to largest allied powers in the Security Council in the United Nations. Roosevelt seemed to understand the difficulty in maintaining peace even when his nation was winning the war. In his speech he prepared for Jefferson Day, 13 April 1945, a day before he died, he would argue that “the work, my friend, is peace. More than an end of this war—an end to the beginnings of all wars” (Knowles, 2008). He was ready to recognize the Soviet’s sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe to keep

wartime cooperation between the United State and the Soviet Union. But, ironically, after his death, the United States had to engage in another cycle of international power struggle, this time as a hegemonic power, with the Soviet Union.

### *The Norm of Homeland Security*

While national security identities define contents of national interests of a particular state, national security norms provide ideational framework within which the state selects a means of defending culturally defined national interests. The most important national security norm of the United States is defense of its homeland. Physical security of their nationals and territorial integrity are the two essential subjects of national security policy of all nations. For that purpose, the majority of developed countries have military capability only enough to *respond* to foreign military attacks. What is unique about the American norm of homeland security is the nation's willingness and readiness to use military forces to *prevent* a foreign attack on its civilian population in its homeland.

The term "homeland security" has been used more commonly since establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In July 2002, the Bush Administration issued *National Strategy for Homeland Security* and defined the term of homeland security as "a concerted national effort to *prevent* terrorist attacks *within* the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur" (United States Office of Homeland Security, 2002).

While the DHS specifically seeks to defend the United States from terrorism after 9/11, the norm of homeland security, expressed by President George W. Bush as "the

reason we're fighting them over in Iraq is so we don't have to fight them here at home,” is not a brand new idea in U.S. defense policy. Rather, the American norm of homeland security was developed through its unique historical experiences dating back to its inception. The United States became a great power without fighting a major international war on its homeland and thus without significant civilian casualties. In American history the largest numbers of war deaths was recorded in the Civil War. No foreign army has come to the U.S. homeland and killed its citizens in large numbers. Thus for ordinary Americans, remaining safe from harm in its homeland, even when American soldiers are fighting war overseas, has become the normal expectation.

The United States has been exceptionally safe from external attacks for a great power in modern history. It is protected by the two oceans and sandwiched by two weaker and friendly neighbors. The United States and Canada signed the first border demilitarization treaty in modern history (Shore, 1998). Its process of territorial expansion marked much less military conflict with other countries in comparison with those of European great powers. For the most part, its territorial expansion was accomplished through diplomatic negotiations and purchase, as well as military conquests of Native American's land. For example, President Jefferson doubled U.S. territory through the Louisiana Purchase in 1803. It cost the United States just \$15 million to add 828,000 square miles to the national domain, from the Mississippi River to the Rocky Mountains (DeConde, 1976). In 1867, Secretary of State William Henry Seward bought Alaska from Russia for \$7.2 million, which not only added about one-fifth the size of the present contiguous United States but also has supplied valuable natural resources, including petroleum and uranium (Naske, 2001). Some parts of the



U.S. territories were acquired by war. For example, the United States gained the territory which later became today's states of California, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, and parts of Colorado and Wyoming as a result of the Mexican War (1846-48), but without a significant number of civilian casualties.

The importance of a national security norm is expressed best when it is breached. Instead of abandoning the norm, the American government and the people reconfirmed the importance of homeland security and intensified their efforts to prevent next foreign attacks on American homeland and the people. Historically, the norm of homeland security has been breached only four times: the War of Independence, the War of 1812, the Pearl Harbor Attack of 1941, and the 9/11 (Chace & Carr, 1988; Gaddis, 2004). After the first two incidents, the United States adopted the strategy of isolationism and tried to prevent foreign military forces from coming to the United States by minimizing its involvement in European great power games. In short, the United States should have had least incentives for oversea expansion. "For over two centuries the aspiration toward eventual condition of absolute security has been viewed as central to an effective American foreign policy" (Chace & Carr, 1988, p. 12)

But the United States learned that it could not be safe and prosperous alone after it had been dragged into two world wars. Since World War II the United States has tried to secure homeland security by expanding its defense parameters and by promoting democracy and capitalism in the key parts of the world. Thus since World War II, U.S. military forces have put heavy emphasis on power projection capabilities.

As a result, American public do not know modern warfare in the same way their counterparts in Europe and Asia do. In modern all-out war, the entire nation pays the

price of war. National economy is mobilized for war production. The government asks more tax and issues war bonds. Scarce resources are rationed. Some key industries are nationalized. Through national conscription, not only professional soldiers, but also ordinary citizens are sent to battlefields. Worst of all, in modern warfare there is no or little distinction between civilians and combatants. For example, during World War II, more civilians were killed in the Soviet Union, China, Germany, and Japan than combatants.

But except for few occasions, foreign military forces reached the mainland of the United States and killed U.S. citizens. The most notable exceptions were the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C. on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, in which more than 3,000 civilians were killed. However, compared with the civilian casualties in the other wars, even that number looks small. In addition, the United States terminated military draft after the Vietnam War. The majority of American public will no longer have to fear that his or her family members or close friends should be drafted and sent to battlefields. In sum, the combination of historical records of civilian's security in the U.S. homeland and isolation from human costs of war for American general public resulted in another key national security norm of the United States; respect for the military.

### *Respect for the Military*

As discussed in the previous section, fighting war overseas, rather than waiting for enemies to attack the U.S. homeland, has become one of the most important U.S. national security norms. In order to achieve homeland security, the United States has,

since World War II, maintained large military forces even in peacetime along with the capability to project its military power globally. Such expansive national security goals are only possible to achieve in a country where the respect for military service is high.

Based on the Gallup's "Confidence in Institutions" survey, the military has received higher public confidence ratings than the presidency, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Congress from 1975 to 2010. As of 2010, 75 % of the respondents had either a "Great deal" or "Quite a lot" of confidence in the military. In addition, the level of confidence in the military has increased over the long-term while, those in the U.S. Supreme Court, the presidency, and the Congress have decreased (see Table 1) (Gallup, 2010). Furthermore, only a small percentage of the respondents had strong negative opinions toward the military. Even in the worst year, 1984, the combined number of "very little" and "none" was smaller than "some" (see Figure 2).

Reflecting the high level of public respect for armed forces, military service is an asset and lack of it, or a bad record of it, is a liability in American politics. For example, presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Carter, and George H. Bush effectively used their military service records during their presidential campaigns while presidents Clinton and George W. Bush suffered from accusations of draft dodging. Although, the president of the United States assumes multiple responsibilities, ranging from the chief executive to the head of the state, no other title commands more public respect than "Commander in Chief" of the armed forces.

Not only presidents, but also members of the U.S. Congress are well aware of the political advantages of association with the U.S. military brings. In the 111<sup>th</sup> Congress, 102 members of the House of Representatives and 29 members of the Senate served in

Table 1. Confidence in the military. From  
<http://www.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx#1>

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*The military*

	Great deal	Quite a lot	Some	Very little	None (vol.)	No opinion	Great deal/ Quite a lot
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
2012 Jun 7-10	43	32	18	5	1	1	75
2011 Jun 9-12	47	31	16	3	*	1	78
2010 Jul 8-11	44	32	18	4	1	1	76
2009 Jun 14-17	45	37	12	5	*	1	82
2008 Jun 9-12	45	26	20	7	1	1	71
2007 Jun 11-14	39	30	21	8	1	*	69
2006 Jun 1-4	41	32	19	5	1	1	73
2005 May 23-26	42	32	18	7	1	*	74
2004 May 21-23	36	39	19	5	*	1	75
2003 Jun 9-10	48	34	14	4	*	*	82
2002 Jun 21-23	43	36	16	5	*	*	79
2001 Jun 8-10	32	34	24	6	2	2	66
2000 Jun 22-25	25	39	26	7	1	2	64
1999 Jun 25-27	34	34	26	6	*	*	68
1998 Jun 5-7	33	31	25	8	1	2	64
1997 Jul 25-27	30	30	27	10	2	1	60
1996 May 28-29	30	36	25	7	*	2	66
1995 Apr 21-24	33	31	27	7	1	1	64
1994 Mar 25-29	30	34	26	8	*	2	64
1993 Mar 22-24	32	35	23	8	1	1	67
1991 Oct 10-13	35	34	20	8	1	3	69
1991 Feb 28-Mar 3	52	33	11	3	*	1	85
1990 Aug 16-19	37	31	22	7	1	2	68
1989 Sep 7-10	31	32	26	9	*	3	63
1988 Sep 23-26	23	35	30	9	1	2	58
1987 Jul 10-13	24	37	28	9	1	2	61
1986 Jul 11-14	29	34	24	10	1	2	63
1985 May 17-20	24	37	28	8	1	2	61
1984 Oct 6-10	28	30	24	15	--	2	58
1983 Aug 5-8	23	30	29	12	1	5	53
1981 Nov 20-23	22	28	29	14	6	2	50
1979 Apr 6-9	25	29	29	14	1	3	54
1977 Jan 7-10	23	34	25	11	1	6	57
1975 May 30-Jun 2	27	31	25	11	1	5	58
1973 May 4-7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

(vol.) = Volunteered response

\* Less than 0.5%

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


Figure 2. Confidence in Institutions

the military sometime in their lives (Chambless, 2012). Membership on the Senate Armed Services Committee and House Armed Services Committee has gone to powerful members and has been used as training for future presidential candidates and secretaries of state and defense and helped them to accumulate expertise and experience in national security policy. Recent examples of such members of the Congress include Sen. John Kerry, Sen. John McCain, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Not only in politics, but also in business, the U.S. military has won respect and developed strong ties and influence. Although up until World War II, the relations between business interests and the military were characterized by distrust and even hostility, the wartime intermingling of civilian and military institutions and personnel

brought the two parties closer. President Truman surrounded himself with corporate internationalists including Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Averell Harriman, Robert Lovett, and John J. McCloy, who were instrumental in developing early Cold War policy and institutions (Waddell, 2008).

In the following section, I will address why the military is well respected in the United States and how the U.S. government has institutionalized respect for the military.

*Why do Americans respect the military?*

*Give me liberty or give me death.* Patrick Henry

*Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.* Benjamin Franklin

*Land of the Free, Home of the Brave.* The U.S. National Anthem

*Freedom is not free.* Korean War Memorial

*I will bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform noncombatant service in the armed forces of the United States when required by the law.* Naturalization Oath of Allegiance to the United States of America

As the words above well express, most Americans believe that liberty and freedom are worth fighting for and indeed, that the preservation of liberty requires continual sacrifice. Although not all American citizens are ready to join the military, there is a strong social consensus to support and respect men and women in uniform.

Respect for armed forces has been developed and institutionalized in the course of American history. Since its beginning, the United States has fought wars to establish,

defend and expand democracy. Although historians and political scientists have revealed other reasons behind American wars, the most widely embraced narrative about wars among the American public is that war is “the price of freedom,” as the military history exhibition at the Smithsonian National Museum of American History is named.


As in many aspects of the American culture, individualism and self-reliance have established the basis for the U.S. national security culture. Use of violence for self-defense and individual liberty is well accepted among American citizens. Nothing represents the individualistic and independent view of self-defense in American society more than the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. It protects people’s right to keep and bear arms because it is “necessary to the security of a free state.”

Based on Gallup opinion polls taken between 1960 and 2011, about 40 to 50 % of American households own a gun. In spite of widespread evidence that gun ownership makes a home more dangerous, the myth of self-defense through gun ownership has maintained strong support. For example, Dr. Wiebe’s 2003 study concludes that people who keep a gun in the home are almost 2 times more likely to be murdered with a gun and almost 17 times more likely to take their own lives using a firearm (Wiebe, 2003); yet a large number of Americans continue to believe that they are safer with guns in the home (see Figure 3).

Gun ownership in the United States particularly stands out when contrasted internationally. The United States is ranked at the top when it comes to civilian firearms ownership rate. For every 100 inhabitants, there are 88 guns in the United States, followed distantly by 54 per 100 inhabitants in Yemen (Zakaria, 2012) .

When it comes to questions of how strict gun control regulations should be, public

*Do you have a gun in your home?*



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Figure 3. U.S. Home Gun Ownership. From

<http://www.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx>

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
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opinion is divided almost equally (see Figure 4). But there have been few serious movements to repeal the Second Amendment from the Constitution or ban private gun ownership. Although Washington, D.C. tried to prohibit private ownership of handguns for self-protection, the U.S. Supreme Court found the D.C. law unconstitutional in the *District of Columbia v. Heller* (2008). Justice Scalia argued, in the majority opinion of the court, that the “inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment right. The handgun ban amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for that lawful purpose. The prohibition extends, moreover, to the home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute” (Whelan, 2008).

As the majority of Republican supporters do, when individual citizens believe the norm of self-defense and the right to bear arms, they also tend to support their



*In general, do you feel that the laws covering the sale of firearms should be made more strict, less strict, or kept as they are now?*



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Figure 4. U.S. Public Opinion on Gun Control. From

<http://www.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx>

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government's right for self-defense and strong military forces.

The second reason for high social respect for the military in the United States stems from the fact that the U.S. armed forces have successfully maintained homeland security, without abusing its power and privilege through actions against the civilian population. The third reason behind the high respect for the military is its media relations. In spite of traditional tensions between the news media and the military, especially during the Vietnam War, it has been mass media through which the majority of Americans have developed their views of the armed forces. Generally speaking, the mainstream national news media such as ABC, CBS, NBC in their daily reporting mainly focused on negative aspects of war including casualties, both combatants and civilians,

fiscal cost, misconducts of soldiers, and tactical failures.

On the other hand, local news media and some of special reporting programs by national media, such as 60 Minutes, pay more attention to local and human aspects of American wars. During the war, local news media report individual stories of soldiers returning from battlefields, struggles of families on their home front while their family members are deployed. In short, local news media personalizes war while national news networks communicate more generalized information of war focusing on political and strategic aspects, which happens in distant foreign countries.

In addition to the relatively positive and personal reports of wars by local news media, the U.S. military has established better control over the national news media after the Vietnam War. Instead of allowing journalists to investigate and report from the locations of their choices, more journalists are embedded with U.S. forces and relied on daily briefings from commanders on the ground and officials in Pentagon. Alarmed by the symbiotic relation between the military and the media, Professor Der Derian introduced the notion of “the military-industrial-media-entertainment-network” (MIME-NET) to describe powerful interests behind America’s expansive national security policy after 9/11 focusing on renewed and increased importance of information and cultural warfare against transnational and religiously motivated terrorism (Der Derian, 2001).

Until the Vietnam War, respect for the U.S. military had been developed and maintained by integrating it into the web of American civilian society. Based on the tradition of citizen soldiers, ordinary Americans had faced the possibilities that someone in their families or close friends should be drafted and sent to war. In the close civil-military relations, strong support of for the military is easy to explain. What is more

important is continuing social support for the military since the Vietnam War. Although I do not call the high level of social respect for the military “militarism,” I agree with Stephen Glain on his bottom-up explanation of American civil-military relation.

American militarism is unique for its civilian provenance. It didn't come at the point of a gun, or with the military formally declaring its control of the government. This militarism is no conspiracy, but is rather a natural consequence of a uniquely American impulse to choose force over statesmanship. (2011, p. 11)

The high level of social support for the military has been translated into the institutionalization and maintenance of large and capable military forces. The U.S. government has enacted laws, established organizations, and developed customs to honor the military.

#### *Institutionalization of respect for the military*

Among ten national holidays of the United States, two are dedicated to men and women in uniform; the Memorial Day and the Veterans Day. The Memorial Day, the last Monday of May, is observed nation-wide with parades of current and former service men and women, military bands, and military vehicles, and with ceremonies at cemeteries decorated by national flags.

President Reagan portrayed the holiday as follows:

Today is the day we put aside to remember fallen heroes and to pray that no heroes will ever have to die for us again. It's a day of thanks for the valor of others, a day to remember the splendor of America and those of her children who rest in this cemetery and others. (Brownfield, 2011)

The other national holiday for the military is Veterans' Day, which is celebrated on November 11<sup>th</sup>. While Memorial Day remembers and honors the U.S. military personnel who died in or as result of their service to the nation, Veterans Day is

celebrated for all those who served in the U.S. military both in wartime and peacetime. Relatively speaking, Memorial Day puts more emphasis on deceased veterans while Veterans Day is saved for thanking living veterans for their service (Office of Public and Intergovernmental Affairs, Department of Veterans Affairs).

In addition to holidays to honor military services, the United States is full of war memorial monuments and museums. As Benedict Anderson highlights the importance of museums in nation building (Anderson, 1991), military monuments and museums have played critical roles in building the U.S. national security culture respectful to the military. Among American war memorials, the Korean War Veteran Memorial and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial present different ideas about how the public remembers wars. As the first nation that established a republic by fighting a war, most Americans accept war as a means of protecting individual freedom and liberty. The inscription of “Freedom is not free” on the Korean War Veterans Memorial well represents the core of the American national security culture and a positive discourse about the war.

On the other hand the Vietnam Veterans memorial symbolizes more complex views of the war. While other war memorials show little conflict with official views of past American wars, the Vietnam War Memorial stands in stark contrast, clearly displaying ambivalent views of American society toward the war. Vietnam was the first war that the United States was not able to claim clear victory in and its veterans were not treated with a high level of social respect like veterans of previous wars. In planning the Vietnam War memorial, the two conflicting views of the war struggled for supremacy and repeated dialogues. The official side wanted to emphasize on national healing and reconciliation to restore national unity and patriotism and portray a generally positive

legacy of the Vietnam War. Veterans who had critical views toward the war, on the other hand, wanted to emphasize tragic aspects, especially individual loss and sacrifice for an uncertain and questionable cause (Bodnar, 1992).

In addition to war memorials, each service of the U.S. military has its own museums. The Department of Defense as a whole owns 96 museums. They “are often the most accessible and popular link between the public and military history.” Their “artifacts and collections ... encourage and maintain the American public’s support for its military.... By recruiting and training the warfighter, capturing the imagination of our youth, educating and involving the community, and providing a legacy of the Military Service members who defend our nation, military museums play a crucial role in our Nation’s past, present, and future” (Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Installations and Environment, 2010, p. 9). In 2009, about 8.1 million people visited the Department of Defense museums. In order to maintain and operate the museums, the Department of Defense spent \$94 million out of its Operation and Maintenance, Military Personnel, Military Construction, and Procurement appropriations. In addition, it raised another \$11 million from donation, gifts, and proceeds from museum shops.

The latest addition to these museums is the National Museum of the Marine Corps in Triangle, VA. In its dedication in November 2006, then PBS news anchor, Jim Lehrer, proudly explained to the public the values the U.S. Marine Corps represents:

this museum is about what it means to be a Marine.... knowing that you are only as strong and as safe as the person on your right and on your left; that a well-trained and motivated human being can accomplish almost anything; that being pushed to do your very best is a godsend; that an order is an order, a duty is a duty, that responsibility goes down the chain of command, as well as up, as do loyalty and respect; that leadership can be taught, so can bearing, discipline and honor; that "follow me" really does mean "follow me"; and that that Semper Fidelis really does mean "always faithful"; and that the Marines hymn is so much

more than just a song. (Lehrer, 2006)

Another important public institution that promotes social respect for the military is the cemetery for veterans. The Department of Veterans Affairs maintains 131 national cemeteries. No other public institution in the United States is more sacred than Arlington National Cemetery. Not only it is “America's premier military cemetery” but also “A national shrine - A living history of freedom - Where dignity and honor rest in solemn repose” (Arlington National Cemetery, 2013). It performs 27 to 30 funeral services each day and serves as “the final resting place for more than 14,000 veterans.” It also educates the public values of military services for the nation through approximately 3,100 nonfuneral ceremonies and approximately 4,000,000 tourists visit the cemetery annually. Even the strongest critics of on-going war think twice about staging demonstrations during military funerals near the cemetery. Because of its importance, the U.S. governments has spent a considerable amount of money to maintain the cemetery. Army National Cemeteries Program, which consists of Arlington National Cemetery in Arlington, Virginia and Soldiers’ and Airmen’s Home National Cemetery in Washington, DC, requested the budget of \$45,800,000 (The Committee on Appropriations, 2011).

Thus the general public has opportunities to understand and appreciate the role of the military in American history although the majority of Americans has not served in the military. The visitors of these military museums, war memorials, and veterans’ cemeteries include civilians as well as veterans and their families and friends, and have different levels of association with the military. But regardless of their backgrounds, the visitors of these institutions tend to develop a closer identity with and higher respect for the military after the visit.

But the reality of war and military service for individual soldiers is more complicated than the war memorials and cemeteries symbolize. Generally speaking, individual soldiers remember wars as private experiences: personal, concrete, often tragic, yet typically proud. Governments, military establishments, and powerful elites in contrast prefer to portray wars as public experiences: political, collective, patriotic, and glorious, yet abstract. In order to maintain positive images of war, a government sometimes tries to hide negative aspects of war from public eyes. For example, the Department of Defense tried to hide bodies of soldiers coming home from battlefields from mass media under the Bush administration.

In many countries, one perspective or the other dominates the public discourse of war. For example in developing nations, the official discourse often prevails, making it easier for the government to mobilize the society for armed conflicts. Conversely, in many developed nations, especially European democracies, individual and personal memories of war often prevail over official justifications of war making it more difficult for the governments to mobilize the nation into war.

American national security culture is unique in that the two contrasting views not only coexist but also sometimes reinforce each other to create broad consensus on respect for the military. For example, the film *Saving Private Ryan* initially shocked the audience by recreating the more brutal and explicit realities of war as experienced by individual soldiers to an extent greater than any previous war movie. But instead of provoking antiwar sentiments and pacifism among the public, the story of heroic acts of ordinary individuals in the movie has contributed to even greater societal respect for military service. In the long run, *Saving Private Ryan* has become a new kind of classic

war movie, broadcast to teach public lessons on the value of military service. Thus, the integration of the personal sacrifices of ordinary citizens and the idealistic foreign policy goals of the United States has been employed to create broad consensus on public support for the military.

Then why do the contrasting discourses of war reinforce each other in the United States? American soldiers have a wide variety of means to share their individual experiences with the larger society, including mass media, museums, monuments, schools, and public holidays. Although many individual war experiences are full of hardship and tragedy, most war veterans prefer to communicate positive and constructive meanings of their services and sacrifice. Few want to admit that their contribution was meaningless or the war in which they fought was not worth it.

Thus the fortunate lack of civilian casualties and the predominance of victories in American wars, even tragic and painful personal experiences of individual soldiers tend to contribute toward positive attitudes toward war and the military in American society. By winning the majority of wars and preventing foreign military attacks and civilian casualties on American soil, the sacrifices of individual soldiers have been justified as honorable service to the nation and democratic ideals.

But opinions, values, views, and policy preferences of all social groups are not treated equally in the development of American national security culture. As the disturbance theory of interest group formation suggests, public policy is most influenced by the groups with highest stakes at the issue (Truman, 1951). Although men and women directly engaged in national defense are a minority in American society, they have dominated public discourse on war by isolating the general public from a full



understanding of the cost of modern warfare. Those who paid the highest price in recent American wars, the men and women in uniform, their families and close friends, have vested interests in promoting positive narratives and remembrances of war. The general public has less authority and incentive to organize itself to express contrary views in the national discourse of war in America.

The role played by victories in shaping U.S. national security culture is further highlighted by the few cases in which America did not achieve a clear-cut victory. For example, the late 1960s and early 1970s were the low point for U.S. military forces in regards to public support. Because of the prolonged Vietnam War and mounting casualties, not only the approval rate of civilian leaders, especially that of President Johnson, but also public support for soldiers declined (Schwab, 2006).

The difference between American war experiences and its effect on national security culture and that of less fortunate countries is clearly displayed in respective approaches to making popular movies about war. For example, America's choice of a movie, such as *Saving Private Ryan*, to remember World War II contrasts starkly with the Japanese film, *Grave of the Fireflies*. This animation film produced by Studio Ghibli, has been chosen as a movie to remember the same war through airing more often than any other movie around August 15th, the day Japan surrendered to the Allied Powers. The movie does not contain many heroic combat scenes, but rather tragic stories of civilian casualties and survivors, especially orphans during and after World War II. The two main characters are a 14-year-old boy, Seita, and his 4-year-old sister, Setsuko. After losing their mother in the air raid by American warplanes, the two children try to survive on their own. They left unfriendly relatives who treated them like servants. Both during

and after the war, Japan was a difficult place to survive even for adults due to the lack of decent shelter and food. Unlike in Japanese society before the war, the two children had no support base in society; because of the destruction brought by war, they had no relatives, no neighbors, no school, and no public officials to turn to for help. Seita tried to feed his sister and himself by taking any job available, and in the end by stealing. Just before the war ends, Setsuko died from starvation. Although Seita survived the end of World War II, he eventually also starves to death a few weeks after his sister. The irony is that the two children survived the firebombs but could not survive the terrible economic and social destruction in wartime Japan.

The main message of the movie is the futility of war in general, which mirrors the dominant public discourse of World War II in Japan. The film also represents the official and popular interpretation of World War II, in which ordinary Japanese civilians were victims of a small number of vicious and crazy political and military leaders (Orr, 2001).

In democracies, public memories of war tend to shift from official, often simple and abstract, interpretations to more complicated sums of individual experiences. As a country matures as a democracy, individual citizens have more freedom and motivation to express and communicate their personal wartime experiences which assume greater provenience vis-à-vis the sanitized government version. This process of personalization of public war memories accelerates when a nation experiences war on its homeland and suffers a large number of civilian, as well as combat, casualties. As has occurred in Japan, the personalization of war memories has contributed to the deglorification of war and the military and to a realization of the limited efficacy of armed forces in modern warfare. Thus advanced democracies in Europe, including victors of World War II, have

significantly reduced the size of their military forces and are more selective in using them. But the lack of civilian casualties in war has contributed more positive views of war and the military in the United States and maintenance of its large military force.

### *Education*

Another institution that has supported the high level of social respect for American military is school. Although American schools have not engaged in explicit militarist education, they have provided venues and opportunities for the government to develop positive views of the nation and the constructive roles armed forces have played in it.

In response to the Sputnik shock of 1957, President Eisenhower signed the National Defense Education Act of 1958. The act aimed at educating Americans in both public and private sectors and advancing science, mathematics, and foreign languages by providing low-interest loans and fellowship to graduate students. In addition to those three areas of studies, the act also promoted technical education, English as a second language, counseling and guidance, school libraries, and educational media centers. Similarly, after the Cold War, President George H.W. Bush signed the National Security Education Act of 1991. The act established the National Security Education Board, the National Security Education Program and a trust fund in the U.S. Treasury in order to educate American citizens to understand foreign cultures, to strengthen U.S. economic competitiveness, and to enhance cooperation and security. The National Security Education Board composed of seven federal and six nonfederal officials provides program policies and directions. The National Security Education Program covers such

areas as less commonly taught languages and cultures relevant to U.S. national security, education of future leaders in the government and universities, and scholarships and fellowships for both undergraduate and graduate students (Samuels, 2006) .

### **How Does U.S. National Security Culture Shape Its Foreign and Defense Policy?**

Liberal hegemonic identity, the norm of homeland security, and respect for the military have provided ideational bases to U.S. foreign and defense policy. First, these elements of national security culture have had impacts on how the United States defines its national interest. In addition to physical security of its population and territorial integrity, the United States has included the survival and prosperity of other industrial democracies into its own national interest. As a liberal hegemon, preventing illiberal powers from dominating key areas of the world is in the national interest of the U.S.

#### *Power Projection*

The United States military force is not only largest in terms of the size of forces and defense budget, it has been distinguished from the rest of the world military forces with its heavy emphasis on power projection forces: U.S. Navy, Marines, and Air Force (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994). Power projection is use of military force in a place remote from a country's territory. It requires a large fleet of navy, air force capable of long-range attack, and amphibian forces (Klein, 1988).

Although other major powers have a certain level of power projection capabilities but not to the same extent as the United States. First, composition of U.S. military force

represents its emphasis on power projection strategy. Navy, Marines, and Air Force, major instruments, although not exclusively, of power projection, made up 64% of the entire U.S. military forces. At the end of the Cold War, 609,442, about 30% of the U.S. military personnel, were on duty overseas (Department of Defense, 1990). Andrew Bacevich explains America's belief in power projection capabilities as follows:

an abiding conviction that the minimum essentials of international peace and order requires the United States to maintain a global military presence, to configure its forces for global power projection, and to counter existing or anticipated threats by relying on a policy of global interventionism. (Bacevich, 2010, p. 14)

As a result, even 20 years after the end of the Cold War, the United States has the largest number of aircraft carriers (11), warships (112), and submarines (74), and combat airplanes (3,600) as of 2009. Although China has a larger number of active soldiers (2.2 million) than the United States (1.5), the ratio between active soldiers and general population of China is 1.7% while that of the United States is 3.2% (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994).

Scholars and military strategists have explained America's heavy emphasis on power projection capabilities with its geographic conditions. Admiral Alfred Mahan argued the supreme importance of naval force in his *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* and provided an intellectual basis for developing a blue-water navy that is capable of defeating enemy forces at sea rather than waiting for them to come to its shore. Mahan puts it this logic as follows, "the enemy at ease as regards his own interests and at liberty to choose his own time and manner of fighting"(p. 9). But even Mahan did NOT expect that the United States would use its Navy to defend its allies. Mahan proposed a naval strategy to protect American commercial interests overseas and

open sea-lanes for international trade in both wartime and peace time so that the United States could pursue its economic interests without its own colonial empire (Mahan, 1918). Likewise Aaron Friedberg points out that “Those that could afford to worry about far-flung enemies and to inject themselves into distant conflicts have been the exception rather than the rule” (Friedberg, 1993, p. 5).

In order to project its military power effectively, the Department of Defense has created regional commands to cover the entire world. As of 1994, when the United States and Japan started “redefining” their alliance, the U.S. military had five Regional Commands: Atlantic (USLANTCOM), Southern (USSOUTHCOM), European (USEUCOM), Central (USCENTCOM), and Pacific (USPACOM) Commands. The Africa Command was added in 2007 in response to rising terrorist threats from the region.

Among the regional commands, USPACOM is the oldest, established in January 1947. Its headquarters is located at Pearl Harbor, Oahu, Hawaii, and it has the largest area of responsibility, covering over 100 million square miles from the U.S. west coast to the east coast of Africa and from the Arctic to the Antarctic (less a part of the Pacific Ocean off South America under U.S. Southern Command and a part of the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea under U.S. Central Command) and over half the world's population. The Commander in Chief of USPACOM (CINCUSPACOM) is responsible for four subordinate unified commands, including U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ), and four service component commands such as U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Pacific Air Forces, U.S. Army Pacific, and U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific (“U.S. Pacific Command,” 2001)

The five regional commands were joined in the Unified Combatant Commands (UCC) system by four functional commands: Space (USSPACECOM), Special Operations (USSOCOM), Strategic (USSTRATCOM), and Transportation (USTRANSCOM). The UCC are responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for accomplishing the military missions assigned to them and exercising command authority over forces assigned to them. The operational chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the UCC.

The four functional commands were also designed to project U.S. military power overseas. The U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOMM) was established in 1992 by combining the U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) and the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS). JSTPS was established in 1960s to coordinate nuclear strategies between the Air Force and the Navy.

Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) have changed the way in which states project their military power in a long distance. Traditionally, power projection required long-distance deployment of military forces by transporting weapons and soldiers on road, by sea, and, since World War I, by air. With the advent of ICBMs, combined with nuclear warheads, states acquired a capability to destroy distant enemies in a matter of minutes without sending their soldiers into harm's way. When contending countries or coalitions of countries gain second strike capabilities, a major war became impossible to win. Thus the primary goal of national defense is to achieve deterrence against nuclear attacks (Jervis, 1989)

Like its predecessors, USSTRATCOMM's primary missions were to deter nuclear attacks on the U.S. homeland and its allies and to fight nuclear war in case

deterrence should fail. SAC tried to achieve nuclear deterrence and nuclear war-fighting capabilities by large number of long-range bombers during the Eisenhower administration and later development and maintenance of medium and long-range missiles since 1960s. SAC deployed those strategic forces not only in the United States but also overseas, including the United Kingdom, Germany, Turkey, South Korea, and Guam (Arkin, 1995). Overseas deployment of strategic forces not only gave the U.S. strategic advantages to strike the Soviet from closer and multiple locations but also reduced the risk of losing the majority of nuclear war fighting capabilities at once. SAC deployed its bombers to more than 50 domestic and foreign locations (Samuels, 2006). Although the majority of the American nuclear arsenal has been located in the United States, the targets of the U.S. nuclear weapons have other countries and the first choice of nuclear battlefield has been always overseas and the use of nuclear weapon within the United States has been considered as a strategic defeat, even though it is a tactical possibility.

Global power projection of U.S. military forces is only possible with effective management of logistics. The U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) was created in 1987 and provides strategic land, sea, and air transport across the full range of military operations. USTRANSCOM also serves as the U.S. Department of Defense worldwide manager for common user ports of embarkation and debarkation. Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and Air Mobility Command (AMC) all report to USTRANSCOM.

On the other hand, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is the principal military advisor to the President, Secretary of Defense, and the National Security



Council. The JCS is responsible for the strategic direction and planning of the Armed Forces, which includes allocation of resources to fulfill strategic plans, recommendations for the assignment of responsibilities within the Armed Forces in accordance with and in support of those logistic and mobility plans, comparison of the capabilities of American and allied Armed Forces with those of potential adversaries, and others (United States. Office of the Federal Register., 1995).

For example, during the Gulf War, General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander of the U.S. Central Command, was at the frontline of the war and was in charge of day-to-day operational conduct of the conflict. In contrast, General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was in Washington D.C. and advised President George H. W. Bush and Defense Secretary Cheney on strategic and diplomatic aspects of the war (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998; Powell & Persico, 1995; Woodward, 1991). In short, the JCS is responsible for long-term strategic advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense while the UCC execute short-term operational and tactical matters of U.S. defense policy.

U.S. Special Operation Command is another institutional expression of power projection strategy of the United States. Created in 1987, USSOCOM is responsible for coordinating special operation forces across services, including Army Special Operation Forces (Green Berets), Rangers, Delta Force, Air, Navy SEALs, and others. Special forces are elite military units specifically trained and organized to conduct unconventional warfare. Their mission include guidance of precision weapons, mine installation, personal rescue, human intelligence gathering, assistance of foreign government in their domestic counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, psychological warfare, counter-proliferation and other missions that large regular military forces are

unable or unsuited to conduct (Samuels, 2006; Special Operations Command, 2008). The goals of USSOCOM expressed outward orientation of special forces, quoting the words of General Wayne Downing, Commander of USSOCOM between 1993 and 1996;

*Conduct worldwide special operations, civil affairs, and psychological operations in peace and war in support of the regional combatant commanders, American Ambassadors and their country teams, and other government agencies” (Special Operations Command, 2008, p. 12, Italics added)*

### *Extended Deterrence*

Another strategic choice the United States has made to keep the norm of homeland security is the policy of extended deterrence. Stein argues that “U.S. grand strategy in the twentieth century has been geared to maintaining the balance of power abroad and providing extended deterrence to others” (Stein, 1993, p. 97).

Deterrence is a policy of preventing potential enemies from attacking the state and its allies by the threat of retaliation. The notion of strategic deterrence was nothing new. But it has taken on renewed importance since the advent of nuclear weapons (Jervis, 1989; Mandelbaum, 1981) and the Cold War, when the United States and the Soviet Union extended protection from nuclear threats from opposing side. What is called the “nuclear umbrella” requires both commitment and capabilities to punish a potential enemy if it attacks the United States or its allies.

Development of military technologies since World War I enabled and increased the need for extended deterrence and oversea military bases. The United States was no longer able to rely on its geographical isolation that had given the nation time to mobilize its forces after national security threats emerged overseas. Advent of aircraft carriers, which Japan used to attack Pearl Harbor, submarines, long-range bombers, and most

importantly nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles started posing feasible threats to civilian population in the U.S. homeland. In order to prevent foreign military forces from coming close to the United States, U.S. military forces need to fight them overseas.

The most tangible signs of extended deterrence are U.S. military presence overseas especially deployment of nuclear weapons. The United States deployed thousands of tactical nuclear weapons across Europe to balance against presumably superior ground force of Warsaw Pact countries during the Cold War. NATO developed its own nuclear stockpile. U.S. also deployed Jupiter missiles in Italy and Turkey and Thor missiles in U.K. In West Germany U.S. Pershing missiles, which was first deployed in 1964 and upgraded from 1983 onwards, were fixtures of the Cold War and the subject to peace and antiwar movements in the country. In addition, the United States adopted a nuclear first-use policy to assure European allies that the U.S. was ready to use its own nuclear weapons before Soviet nuclear weapons hit Europe (Schwartz, 1998)

Although the U.S. nuclear doctrine evolved from "balanced collective forces," "massive retaliation," "mutual assured destruction," to "flexible response," the basic assumption of remained the same. The goal of the U.S. nuclear strategy has been to "deter Soviet aggression and keep the peace by maintaining a credible connection between any large-scale assault, whether conventional or nuclear, and the engagement of the strategic nuclear force of the United States" (Bundy, Kennan, McNamara, & Smith, 1982, p. 754).

### *U.S. Troops Abroad*

The United States has maintained a large number of U.S. troops abroad even after the Cold War. As of 2007, over 190,000 U.S. troops stationed in 909 military facilities in 46 countries and territories, excluding those in Iraq and Afghanistan (Lutz, 2009).

Major U.S. military bases overseas have been counted and mapped by numerous scholars. Calder points out that “(f)ollowing the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 ... the global base network of Russia, Britain and France largely collapsed.” “the United States has filled .... All the major strategic functions of overseas basing” (Calder, 2007, p. 38).

The deployment of troops abroad is the most visible sign of security commitment among allies. Naturally, it “has been among the most controversial aspects of American foreign policy since the beginning of the Republic” (Holsti, 1996, p. 91). According to opinion polls conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, and 1994, compared with the elite, the general public was much more reluctant to the use of U.S. military forces in hypothetical cases in which American allies and friendly nations should be invaded. For example, the 1978 survey, 54% of the general public supported the use of American military forces in case Soviet troops invaded Western Europe, while 92% of the elite approved such policy. In a more recent survey taken in 1994, 82% of the elite agreed on the use of U.S. troops in case North Korea invade South Korea, but only 39% of general public. While the elite participants supported more active use of U.S. military forces to defend other countries than general public did, even they were concerned with a collective action problem among allies. In surveys conducted by Foreign Policy Leadership Projects in 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, and

1992, the majority of respondents agreed with the statement that “stationing American troops abroad encourages other countries to let us do their fighting for them” (Holsti, 1996, p. 94).

Thus by developing strong power projection capabilities and maintaining overseas bases, the United States has tried to maintain its homeland security and the security of its key allies, especially NATO members and Japan.

## CHAPTER 5

### CASE STUDY: REDEFINITION OF THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

#### Introduction

This chapter will demonstrate how the interdependent national security cultures of the United States and Japan, which were discussed in the previous chapters, framed the two countries' decisions to keep their bilateral alliance after the Cold War. In spite of dramatic changes in the international system since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the basic framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance remained the same and the only changes in the alliance were incremental. The two allies not only decided to maintain their Cold War alliance but also to strengthen it by promoting integration of their military forces. The process of strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance in the 1990s has been commonly called a "redefinition," although the U.S. and the Japanese governments never adopted the term officially for fear of provoking skeptics and opponents of the alliance in Japan (Honda, 2001) and in neighboring countries.

The redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold War has been a gradual and continuous process. Some analysts trace the origins of the redefinition process back to the Gulf War in 1991 (Funabashi, 1999; Giarra & Vogel, 2002), which was the first test of the alliance after the Cold War and which Japan failed miserably. Others point to publications of major policy papers from Washington and Tokyo, such as the Bottom-Up

Review of 1993 (Honda, 2001), the East Asia Strategic Review (EASR) of 1995 (Hughes, 2004) and the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) of 1995.

But it is still possible to specify diplomatic negotiations and agreements that marked significant developments in the U.S.–Japan alliance. In the 1990s, the most important agreements regarding the U.S.–Japan alliance were the final report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) of 1996 and the new Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation of 1997. They represent two competing forces behind the redefinition process of the U.S.–Japan alliance after the Cold War. While the former laid out the roadmap for reorganization of U.S. military bases in Japan in order to downsize The American military presence and ease the burdens of host communities in Okinawa, the latter provides a framework within which the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and U.S. military forces could develop more active and effective defense cooperation both in peacetime and emergencies. Thus, the redefinition of the alliance was a two-level game (Singer, 1961), especially for the Japanese government, in which decision makers had to balance between domestic and foreign policy goals. In order to maintain credible deterrence against regional instability while reducing the American military presence in Okinawa, it was necessary for Japan to assume more active roles in the alliance. The SCAO final report and the New Guidelines have served as broad frameworks within which the two allies would pursue seemingly conflicting goals after the Cold War.

The following parts of the chapter will examine the drafting processes and the contents of six major defense policy documents leading to the SACO final report and the New Guidelines: the Bottom-Up Review, Redefining the U.S.–Japan Alliance, the East Asia Strategic Review, the Higuchi Report, the National Defense Program Outline, and

the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security.

The Bottom-Up Review was the first major defense policy document produced by the Clinton administration to reconstruct U.S. military forces after the Cold War.

Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance was a semiofficial report on the U.S.-Japan alliance by an informal study group of Japan specialists in Washington, D.C. From this the Department of Defense developed the East Asia Strategic Review, the first official report on U.S. East Asian policy.

The Japanese government followed a similar process to develop their own post-Cold War defense strategy starting with a report by a semiofficial advisory group, the Higuchi Report, and then developing an official document, the National Defense Program Outline. The U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration signed by President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto on April 16<sup>th</sup>, 1996 marked the point where the defense policy processes of the two allies met and started an official unified process to redefine their alliance. The Joint Declaration announced common understandings of the regional security environment and the interests the two allies shared, which had been already discussed in the EASR and the NDPO, and presented a unified vision for the future of the alliance. The new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation was the final key document to codify the commitments and pledges the United States and Japan made to the future of their bilateral alliance.

Policy making process of the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance demonstrated high level of cultural interdependence between the two countries in their foreign and defense policies. Even at the stages of post-Cold War national defense planning in respective countries, the United States and Japan maintained close contacts between



foreign and defense policy makers. They formed informal study groups, exchanged drafts of respective national policy papers, and provided.

### **America's National Interests in the Asia Pacific**

#### **Region After the Cold War**

Why did the United States decide to maintain the alliance with Japan after the Cold War? Why did it agree to return Futenma Air Station? Why did it encourage Japan to take more active roles in potential regional contingencies by revising the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines? What were America's national interests in the Asia-Pacific region after the Cold War? More specifically, what roles did China and North Korea play in America's Asia policy after the Cold War? What domestic factors had impacts on the foreign policy process of the Clinton administration? In order to answer those questions above, this part will review two major U.S. defense policy documents released in the mid 1990s: the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of 1993 and the East Asia Strategic Review (EASR) of 1995. The former provided the global framework of U.S. national security policy by restating its national interest in the post-Cold War word and proposing the strategies to defend it. Within the framework the BUR established, EASR laid out more region-specific policy goals, proposed more concrete strategies, and served as the starting point for the United States in redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

#### *Bill Clinton: The First Post -Cold War President*

Bill Clinton was the first U.S. president elected after the Cold War, and the international and domestic environment in which he made foreign and defense policies

had different characteristics from that faced by his predecessors. First, the sources of national security threats were more diversified in kind and spread wider geographically. During the Cold War, the most serious national security threat to the United States came from the Soviet nuclear arsenal and the central stages of the bipolar struggle were Europe and East Asia. Although the two superpowers were involved in proxy wars almost all over the world, the priority placed on the eastern and the western ends of Eurasia was unmistakable. The Clinton administration had to deal with a wide range of national security issues, from human rights to nuclear nonproliferation, in its foreign policy without a clear-cut hierarchy among issues. In addition, the post-Cold War world had not been necessarily peaceful and armed conflict spread globally. *The SIPRI Yearbook* between 1987 and 1993 recorded more than 90 armed conflicts including those in Bosnia, Croatia, Somalia, Chechnya, Haiti, Rwanda, Iraq, Chiapas, Peru-Ecuador, Angola, Liberia, Georgia, Tajikistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Lebanon, Algeria, and Colombia (Jentleson, 1997). These post-Cold War international conflicts highlighted the need for American military involvement in addition to existing international organizations including the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which could not effectively replace American leadership (Lieber, 1997).

Second, economic issues increased their importance in international relations after the Cold War. Since the 1980s the United States had suffered from chronic twin deficits. As of 1992, the last year of the Bush administration, the U.S. fiscal deficit reached \$ 290 billion and the trade deficit \$ 84 billion. Although the most expensive programs of the federal budget were entitlement programs such as Medicare and Medicaid, Clinton focused on cutting the defense budget to attack the fiscal deficit. The proposed defense

cut of \$88 billion by 1997 was at the center of Clinton's long-term deficit reduction plan (Gellman, 1993). The United States had spent the largest amount for national security in the world. In 1993, the combined budget of the Departments of Defense and Veterans' Affairs was 332.4 billion dollars, which was 21.6% of the federal budget and 4.8% of GDP. Not only is that number much higher than that of other NATO member countries, which, on average, spent 2.4 % of their GDP, but the United States spent more on defense than next six states combined (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994)

While major U.S. allies achieved remarkable economic recovery and growth, the massive trade and fiscal deficits experienced by the United States at the end of the Cold War could no longer be sustained. A foreign policy commentator even wrote, "The Cold War is over. Japan and West Germany have won" (Hook & Spanier, 2000, p. 274). Annual unemployment rate reached 7.5% at the end of 1992. By the mid-1990s the annual trade deficits with Japan and China alone averaged \$80 billion. Important manufacturing sectors such as the auto industry suffered from foreign competition. Nothing was more telling about the frustration and sense of unfairness the American manufacturing sectors felt against foreign competitions, especially Japan than President Bush's visit to Japan in January of 1991. President Bush accompanied the top executives of U.S. auto-makers and called for opening the Japanese auto market to the U.S. products, only to provoke more anti-American sentiments among the Japanese public. By the early 1990s, more Americans viewed Japanese economic power as a bigger threat to American national interest than Russian military power (Destler & Nacht, 1993). Benjamin Cohen explains intensified economic disputes between the United States and its allies after the Cold War by the demise of common security threats from communist

countries, which had served as “the most important adhesive” among the Western allies (Cohen, 1997, p. 77). Clinton’s campaign slogan, “It’s the economy, stupid,” captured the public sentiment that economic recovery of the United States should be the government’s top priority. The combined result of the changed domestic and international political environments was much more contentious international political economic relations, especially among developed countries.

Third, in the post-Cold War era, domestic factors played larger roles in foreign and defense policy than in the Cold War era. In the 1992 U.S. presidential campaign, the foreign policy agenda took second place to domestic issues. Only 9 % of voters listed foreign policy among the top two issues of concern (Lieber, 1997). As domestic and economic issues occupied more important places in the Clinton administration, foreign and defense policy became an instrument, as well as a goal itself, of the domestic political agenda. Closures of military bases and termination of new weapons programs in the United States caused intense debate among the military, the White House, and members of Congress who would have electoral interests affected by such decisions.

President Clinton is reported to have had much less interest in foreign policy in the early years of his presidency than did his predecessors. Toward the end of 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake sent a memo to President Clinton asking for 1 hour a week to discuss foreign defense policy. Clinton agreed to meet them “when possible” (Lieber, 1997) .

In addition to public opinion on foreign policy and President Clinton’s personal preferences, the end of the Cold War also changed the balance of power between the

White House and the Congress. Although the formal separation of powers regarding foreign policy did not change at the end of the Cold War, nevertheless, the Congress sought to increase its influence over foreign and defense policy. Through confirmation of top officials, ratification of treaties, and budget manipulation, the Congress challenged decisions made by President Clinton and his advisors. For President Clinton, the disappearance of the Soviet threat “made it more difficult to gather sufficient public and congressional support for ambitious foreign policy measures, whether these involve the possible commitment of troops abroad, funds for foreign assistance and UN peacekeeping or even active and assertive foreign policy posture.” (Lieber, 1997, p. 17).

As the title of one of the most popular foreign policy textbooks on American foreign policy in the 1990, *Eagle Adrift*, indicates, the Clinton administration would try to define America’s national interests and the strategies to defend them in a much more fluid and fragmented international and domestic environments and would repeat trials and errors in the post-Cold War era (Lieber, 1997).

### *The Bottom-Up Review of 1993*

The Clinton administration had to pursue two conflicting goals in its defense policy. First they wanted to reduce the defense budget to fit the reality of the post-Cold War world, where the United States no longer faced a security threat from the Soviet Union. As he claimed during his presidential election, “It’s the economy, stupid!” Bill Clinton emphasized the importance of economic and domestic issues and downplayed that of traditional military and foreign policy issues in his administration. Cutting the defense budget was necessary not only to balance the federal budget, but also to revitalize

the American economy.

Second, the Clinton administration aimed at maintaining U.S. hegemony in global affairs. In his inaugural address, President Clinton declared his vision for American leadership in the world,

Today, as an old order passes, the new world is more free but less stable. Communism's collapse has called forth old animosities and new dangers. Clearly America must *continue to lead* the world we did so much to make. (Clinton, 1993, ¶.11, italics added)

In spite of wide-spread speculation about the return of American isolationism, the Clinton administration ended up keeping basic Cold War strategies, including forward military presence in Europe and Asia, maintenance of the majority of the Cold War alliances, and the largest defense budget in the world. Colin Dueck argues that the continuation of the Cold War strategies was justified by the two basic assumptions about American foreign policy. First, the United States has to be the preeminent world power with vital interests and obligations in all key regions of the world. Second, the United States has to assume special leadership to promote liberal political and economic systems (Dueck, 2006). The BUR was the first major policy document in which Clinton expressed this liberal hegemonic vision of American national security policy after the Cold War.

In order to cut defense spending and keep preponderant American military power, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin initiated a sweeping revision of U.S. defense policy as soon as he took office in January 1993. The first step of the revision was to rewrite the defense budget for fiscal 1994, which had been drafted by the Bush administration. The new \$263.4 billion defense budget of the Clinton administration saved more than \$11 billion compared with that the Bush administration. Mostly the savings came from

accelerating the personnel reductions planned for fiscal year 1995 to 1994 (Gellman, 1993).

The second step was development of a midterm defense plan by rewriting the Base Force structure, a military reorganization plan developed by the Bush administration. The Base Force was a brainchild of Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Powell planned to reduce the size and the cost of U.S. military forces by 25% between 1989 and 1999. Powell set a timetable to transform U.S. military forces for the post-Cold War world. Based on the timetable, DOD would reduce the size of and the budget for military forces by 5 % a year between 1990 and 1995. As the result, the total number of uniformed military personnel would have been reduced from 3.3 million (2.1 million active and 1.2 million guard and reserve) to 2.6 million (1.6 million active and 0.9 million guard and reserve). The Base Force was planned to assume four major missions: first, to fight across the Atlantic; second, to fight across the Pacific; third, to have a contingency force in the U.S. that could be deployed rapidly to hot spots; and fourth to maintain a nuclear force of sufficient size to deter our nuclear adversaries. Powell identified six rogue states which would be the main threats to U.S. national security with their relatively large military forces and potential for developing weapons of mass destruction: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cuba and North Korea. Powell devised the two-war strategy in which U.S. military should be capable of two major regional conflicts (MRC). In order to deter a rogue state from taking an advantage when another rogue state engaged with the United States, the United States should retain military forces large enough to fight two wars almost simultaneously. For that purpose Powell proposed a Base Force consisting of 11 ground divisions, 10 tactical air wings, and 12 aircraft

carriers with 1,626,000 active and 920,000 reserve personnel (Korb, 2000).

Aspin had been critical of the Base Force structure since he was Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. For him the Base Force structure was a top-down review of defense policy based on the Pentagon's organizational needs rather than the real threats to U.S. interests. He devised four smaller levels of force structure and argued that the Base Force structure was too large and too expensive. Instead Aspin believed that after the Cold War “a defense budget should be built from a kind of conceptual clean slate” by “adding ‘from the bottom up’ the capabilities required to meet the new world threats” (Washington Post, 1993, ¶. 10).

Aspin’s effort to override the Base Force met serious challenge of its author, Colin Powell, who continued to serve as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Clinton Administration. One of the major contentious points was the number of regional conflicts U.S. military forces had to deal with at once. Aspin first had an idea of a force premised on fighting one major conflict and a holding action against any other enemy until US military forces could finish the first fight (Barton & John, 1993). But, according to the Powell’s memoir, “Our South Korean allies immediately asked if they were the one who might be left ‘on hold’” (Powell & Persico, 1995, p. 579). In the end, Aspin accepted the two-war strategy developed in the Base Force structure.

The purpose of the BUR was “a comprehensive review of the nation’s defense strategy, force structure, modernization, infrastructure, and foundations.” For those purposes, the BUR first identified new dangers facing U.S. interests in the post-Cold War era. They included (1) the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; (2) regional dangers, posed primarily by the threat of large-scale aggression



by major regional powers with opposing interests; (3) dangers to democracy and reform in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere; and (4) economic dangers to national security.

To meet those new challenges, the BUR proposed the new strategy of engagement, partnership, and prevention. In order to prevent instability, the United States would keep engaging in key parts of the world, not only militarily, but also economically and politically by maintaining partnership with traditional allies and developing new ties with other nations, including former enemies of the Cold War, by promoting democratization and economic development.

The strategy of engagement can be seen as continuation of that of containment during the Cold War because both of them aim at maintaining hegemonic status of the United States in the world. The BUR reconfirmed American commitment to maintain the most powerful military forces, the largest economy, and rule-making and maintaining leadership in international institutions. In spite of Clinton's campaign pledge on more focus domestic and economic issues, the BUR warns against isolationism.

Our primary task, then, as a nation is to strengthen our society and economy for the demanding competitive environment of the 21st century, while at the same time avoiding the risks of precipitous reductions in defense capabilities and the overseas commitments they support. (United States. General Accounting Office., 1995, p. 8)

But it tried to maintain American hegemony more cheaply by reducing U.S. military presence overseas and asking allies for more burden-sharing of international leadership. In order to sustain continued America's international commitment, "this partnership will require the contributions of our allies and will depend on our ability to establish fair and equitable political, economic, and military relationships with them"

(United States General Accounting Office, 1995, p. 8). In addition, the BUR separates itself from traditional Cold War strategies by paying more attention to economic issues, democratization, and international institutions. Instead of containing its enemies and unfriendly nations by minimizing interactions and communication, the BUR argues for active involvement in liberalization of economic and political systems of those countries. Thus the BUR tries to achieve more collective and long-term interests not only for the United States, but also for world as a whole.

Among the four types of dangers cited above, the BUR identified regional aggression as the most serious one. The report used possible conflict involving North Korea, Bosnia, Iran, Iraq and others as examples. To deal with regional aggression and other regional dangers, DOD's strategy was to (1) defeat aggressors in major regional conflicts; (2) maintain a presence overseas—the need for U.S. forces to conduct normal peacetime operations in critical regions—to deter conflicts and provide regional stability; and (3) conduct smaller-scale intervention operations, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. In order to deter and fight major regional conflicts, the BUR proposed the new force structure and maintaining about 100, 000 troops each in Europe and North East Asia (see Table 2).

To counter growing threats from nuclear proliferation, the BUR proposed ballistic missile defense programs, similar to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) started by the Reagan administration. The BUR discussed two kinds of ballistic missile defense system; the National Missile Defense (NMD) and the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems. The former is designed to intercept long-range ballistic missiles coming to the U.S. homeland while the purpose of the latter is defense against theater short-range

Table 2. U.S. Force Structure-1999

Army	10 divisions (active), 5 divisions plus (reserve)
Navy	11 aircraft carriers (active), 1 aircraft carrier (reserve and training), 45-55 attack submarines, 346 ships
Air Force	13 fighter wings (active), 7 fighter wings (reserve), up-to 184 bombers (B-52H, B-1, B-2)
Marine Corps	3 Marine Expeditionary Forces, 174,000 personnel (active end-strength), 42,000 (reserve end-strength)
Strategic Nuclear Forces (by 2003)	18 ballistic missile submarines, up-to 94 B-52H bombers, 20 B-2 bombers, 500 Minuteman III ICBMs (single warhead)

ballistic and cruise missiles, which would pose threat to U.S. allies and U.S. forces overseas.

Lastly the BUR argued “in the post-Cold War period, perhaps most important set of dangers that U.S. strategy must confront is economic.” Recognizing a symbiotic nature between military and economic power, the BUR maintained:

DoD can help America seize the opportunity presented by the end of the Cold War to enhance its economic security and Military power supports and is supported by political and economic power. Likewise, security relationships support and are supported by trade relationships. (p. 15)

When published in September 1993, the BUR was criticized for the mismatch between expanded scope of missions U.S. military forces would assume and a downsized force structure (Powell & Persico, 1995). But in the end the BUR contributed to reduce U.S. defense budget significantly. Michael O’Hanlon writes, “The Clinton Pentagon oversaw the most successful defense drawdown in U.S. history -cutting military personnel by 15% more than the previous administration had planned while retaining a high state of readiness and a strong global deterrence posture” (O’Hanlon, 2003, p. 3).

The issues of regional conflict, nuclear proliferation, and burden-sharing among

allies albeit with significant modifications, would take central places in new Asian strategy of the Clinton administration and would be fully developed in the Nye Report.

*Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Nye Report*

The Bottom-Up Review set the starting point for the post-Cold War U.S. alliance policies, from which the U.S.-Japan alliance has evolved. The Clinton administration had a more optimistic outlook for international relations in the Asia-Pacific region than other regions and developed its Asian policy putting more emphasis on economic issues than the Bush administration. Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, in his speech titled “Vision for a New Pacific Community” presented a positive assessment of regional situations, saying “in that area, you can look toward the future.... There are problems of security; but, essentially, again compared to other regions, it is a fairly stable area” (Lord, 1993). He justified his assessment by pointing out high economic growth and slow but steady progress of democratization in such nations as South Korea, the Philippines, and Cambodia. He went on to argue that the United States had to engage in the region in order to rebuild American economy. In order to decrease the trade and fiscal deficits, to enhance economic competitiveness, and to promote jobs and exports, the United States needed to develop closer economic ties with Asia (Lord, 1993).

But these overly optimistic Asian policies did not last long. By the spring of 1994, Clinton’s Asia policy was “of disaster” because:

(t)he United States was drifting toward a military crisis with North Korea, a trade war with Japan, a confrontation with China over its most-favored-nation (MFN) status, and a clash with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) over human rights--all at the same time. (Harding, 1994, p. 58)

Joseph Nye Jr., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, realized the need for a “healthy dose of realism” (Nye, 2001, p. 95) in American Asia policy after the Cold War, advocating revitalizing military alliances with traditional allies and balancing against the biggest power in the region. He had been critical about U.S. policy toward Japan at the end of the Bush administration and the beginning of the Clinton administration, during which economic issues had taken priority over security issues and Japan had been even portrayed as a threat to the American primacy in the post-Cold War world (Nye, 1993). It was rather ironic that Secretary Nye, a prominent political scientist known for his landmark contributions to liberal theories of international relations including *Power and Interdependence* (Keohane & Nye, 1977) and *Bound to Lead* (Nye, 1990), prescribed realist policies as a practitioner.

Nye’s concern with the status of the U.S.-Japanese relations was shared by a group of Japan specialists in Washington D.C. Ezra Vogel, the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia at the National Intelligence Council, Patrick Cronin, Senior Researcher at the Institute for National Strategic Studies for National Defense University, Paul Giarra, Director of the Japan Desk and Senior Country Director for Japan in the Office of Secretary of Defense, and Michael Green, analyst at the Institute for Defense Analysis formed an informal study group on Japan’s defense policy after the Cold War. First, Giarra submitted a policy proposal based on the study the group conducted and proposed revising U.S.-Japan alliance to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Kent Wiedemann. But Wiedemann dismissed the proposal, saying “how can you tell we (the United States and Japan) are drifting?” (Funabashi, 1999, p. 228).

But Green and Cronin went forward anyway and published the result of the

group's study, *Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program* as the 31<sup>st</sup> McNair Paper from National Defense University in November 1994. This report first dismissed the myth of the stable U.S.-Japan alliance.

this close relationship is only a superficial continuation of policy trajectories established during the Cold War. The reality is that today the U.S.-Japan alliance is on shakier ground than most will admit... (T)he internal workings of the defense relationship are in need of more care and top-down leadership. (Green & Cronin, 1999, pp. 1-2)

The authors of the report were clearly alarmed with Japan's "hedging" strategy of seeking to reduce the dependence on the United States for its national defense by gradually shifting emphasis on multilateral security organizations.

there are growing signs in Japan's policy planning of renewed attention to the United Nations, to regional multilateral mechanisms, and to stronger independent capabilities as means of hedging against possible U.S. withdrawal or fatigue... (Green & Cronin, 1999, p. 3)

The report went on to analyze the reasons why Japan began to take the hedging strategy as follows:

the Japanese Government's apparent hedging strategy is based on miscalculations about U.S. intentions. The Department of Defense (DoD) focus on the Bottom-up Review, host nation support, the so-called Technology for Technology (TFT) initiative which seeks to increase the flow of Japanese dual-use technology back to the United States--and joint cooperation on theater missile defense (TMD) all strike Japanese. (Green & Cronin, 1999, p. 2)

Cronin and Green seemed to develop their position through discussions with Chisato Yamaguchi, Masayoshi Shimbo, and Nobushige Takamizawa, JDA officers on exchange to the National Defense University, who voiced concern about American withdrawal from Asia after the Cold War (Funabashi, 1999).

The authors of *Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance* were particularly alarmed by a report prepared by the Higuchi Commission, a private council for Prime Minister

Morihiro Hosokawa on national security issues. The report titled *The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: the Outlook for the 21st Century* was seen as predicting the direction of the new National Defense Program Outline of Japan. So Cronin and Green attached an English translation of the entire Higuchi Report to their report and discussed it in length.

The report's main recommendation is that Japan formulate a new comprehensive security strategy for the post-Cold War world resting on three pillars: multilateral cooperation, alliance with the United States, and a modern and efficient military... elements of the report do have troubling implications for Japan's alliance policy and require clarification ... The report's attention to strengthening the bilateral defense relationship with the United States is overshadowed, however, by the emphasis given to multilateralism and autonomous capabilities... the report's recommendations suggest that multilateralism is a hedge against waning U.S. commitments to the alliance. (Green & Cronin, 1999, p. 9)

Cronin and Green did welcome Japan's interest in a larger role in international security but wanted to redirect it to strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance, not to weaken it.

In addition to the policy prescriptions, Cronin and Green were critical of the drafting process of the Higuchi Report, pointing out that "(t)he report was prepared with only limited input from the United States" (Green & Cronin, 1999, p. 8).

The lack of communication between allies raised concern because the authors believed that the longevity and stability of the U.S.-Japan alliance was "not just the natural byproduct of a common external threat; the alliance was nurtured from within" (Green & Cronin, 1999, p. 4). And they warned that the internal network within Washington and Tokyo that sustained the alliance was weakened by the end of the Cold War and political changes in the United States and Japan. The expanded defense constituency on the U.S. side included the Office of the Secretary of Defense, State Department, the National Security Council, the U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Forces

Japan. In the Japanese government, the Foreign Ministry's North American Affairs Bureau, the JDA, the JSDF and the defense caucus (*boei zoku*) of the LDP supported the U.S.-Japan alliance.

But it was not only Japan that was not communicating well with its ally. The intergovernmental network behind the bilateral alliance was weakened under the Clinton administration as it focused on economic issues in U.S.-Japanese relations. Hajime Hatakeyama, deputy director-general of the JDA, lamented, “I don’t know whom I should call in Washington” (Funabashi, 1999, p. 238) when he met Nye in September, 1994. He wanted to know who was his counterpart in the Clinton administration and with whom he could discuss upcoming revision of the National Defense Program Outline of Japan. When Hatakeyama asked, “Where on earth should I phone?,” Nye assured that he would pick up Hatakeyama’s call any time (Funabashi, 1999, p. 238).

Cronin and Green concluded their report by recommending three policy goals: to maintain U.S. military presence in Asia, to encourage a more active Japanese defense policy “*in partnership with the United States*” (Green & Cronin, 1999, p. 14). and to discourage Japan from developing independent military capabilities and missions from the United States.

To implement the above, the report proposes to replace the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation with “the new Guidelines for Comprehensive Security Cooperation” and renew or create specific programs on base access, host-nation support, acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSA), joint exercise and training, missile defense, joint research and development of weapon systems, and joint intelligence gathering and sharing. All these concrete measures were necessary for better operation of



the U.S.-Japan alliance in regional contingencies, which seemed more realistic after the Cold War. In his interview with a Japanese journalist, Green emphasized that Japan needed to prepare for not only a foreign attack against Japan, but also for regional contingencies and argued that the bilateral alliance was a better means to deal with regional contingencies.

Multilateralism is a false dream. Multilateralism is not a bad concept. But how useful can it be for the United States and Japan in case something happens in Asia? Multilateralism will not enhance our ability solve the problem. The real problem in the U.S.-Japan alliance today is that all the joint contingency plans between the two allies are designed for a foreign attack against Japan although the Cold War is over. The question the United States and Japan should have asked was how should the two countries jointly deal with a possible contingency in the Korean Peninsula. (Honda, 2001, p. 495)

In short, Green and Cronin recommended a preemptive attack against the hedging strategy of Tokyo and laid out a blueprint for a new form of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Much of their vision of the future U.S.-Japan alliance would be implemented by 2000.

Cronin and Green had submitted a strategy paper similar to *Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance* to Nye before he asked Secretary Perry permission to initiate official strategic talks with Japan. Reportedly the memo Nye submitted to Perry contained similar policy recommendations to those in *Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance* (Honda, 2001) . In addition some of the members of the informal study group joined Nye in drafting the Nye Report in the Defense Department. Thus once an informal study group would form a core of the drafting team of one of the most important Asian policy document of the United States after the Cold War.

Nye and his team kept close contact with the Japan Defense Agency while drafting the Nye Report. In November 1994, Nye visited Japan to introduce himself to top officials of the Japanese government. One of them was Tetsuya Nishimoto, former

Chairman of the Joint Staff Council of the Defense Agency. Funabashi suggests that Nye reassured the need to develop coordinated defense policy between the United States and Japan to deal with rising power of China when he met Nishimoto (Funabashi, 1999). In Washington D.C., Ezra Vogel, the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia at the National Intelligence Council, Patrick Cronin, Senior Researcher at the Institute for National Strategic Studies for National Defense University, Paul Giara, Director of Japan Desk, Senior Country Director for Japan in the Office of Secretary of Defense, and Michael Green, Analyst at the Institute for Defense Analysis, who worked on the Nye Report with Nye, formed an informal study group with Nobushige Takamizawa, Director, Defense Operations Division, Defense Policy Bureau, Bureau of Defense, JDA, who was studying at the National Defense University and Yutaka Iimura, Councilor at the Japanese Embassy to develop common vision for the U.S.-Japan alliance (Honda, 2001).

Simultaneously, the Defense Department sent the drafts of the Nye Report to the Japan Defense Agency and sought feedback. One of the suggestions the JDA made was toning down the parts of the report discussing threats from rising Chinese power. “The early draft (of the Nye Report) had very strong alarming tone against China,” one of the officials who reviewed the draft recalled (Honda, 2001, p. 501). Andrew Bennett, Special Assistant to Nye, recognized the problem, saying, “the hardest part was the language... the most troubling ones; how to address China’s evolving role” (Funabashi, 1999, p. 256).

In addition to taking in Japanese feedbacks, showing the draft report to the Japanese counterpart had another purpose for Nye. Nye was deeply interested in the new National Defense Program Outline of Japan, which would be announced in the fall 1995.

Nye expected the JDA to show and ask for inputs on the draft of the new NDPO. In other words, Nye hoped that the Japanese government would reciprocate the trust in Japan the United States showed in the process of developing in its new Asia strategy.

Within 6 months of his appointment as Assistant Secretary of Defense in September 1994, he issued the East Asia Strategic Review, which has been often referred to as the Nye Report, or the Nye Initiative. The report was a manifestation of what Nye himself calls America's "leadership strategy" in the Asia-Pacific region (Nye, 1995a). While Nye recognized the importance of international economic relations, he warned that geopolitics still mattered after the Cold War. The Nye report compares security to oxygen. People do not realize its importance until they are running out of it. Nye attributes economic development in Asia after World War II to the American strategy in the region, which has "underwritten Asian security" and "underpinned Asia's economic development" (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1995, p. 6). Thus Nye tried to correct the overemphasis on economic issues in foreign policy which the Clinton administration had placed since its start.

In his press briefing on February 27<sup>th</sup>, 1995, Nye drew a historical lesson of America's Asia policy. In 1975, when U.S. forces withdrew from Vietnam, many predicted chaotic international relations in Asia. On the contrary, the region maintained stability and achieved remarkable economic development. Nye explained the unexpected regional stability in the Asia-Pacific region after the Vietnam War by continued American military presence in the region (Nye, 1995b). In order to maintain and promote regional stability and economic growth, Nye introduced a four-part strategy: forward deployment of American troops, continuation of the Cold War alliances, development of

multilateral institutions, and engagement of China (Nye, 2001).

After its introduction, the Nye Report proceeds with a section titled “America’s *Permanent* Interests in the Security of the Asia-Pacific Region” [Italics added]. This part lists four sets of national interests of the United States after the Cold War:

- to preserve the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure;
- to advance a healthy and growing United States economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and a resource base for national endeavors at home and abroad;
- to promote a stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish; and
- to enhance a system of healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations. (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1995, p. 5)

The list above is nothing new and self-evident. Yet by arguing that peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region are indispensable to defend and promote those national interests, the Nye Report set a basic assumption of the regional policy. As long as the interests listed above matter to the United States, which would not change in the foreseeable future, the United States would stay committed and engaged. Thus the United States would keep committed to peace and prosperity of the region *permanently*.

The similar arguments had been made in the BUR. Stable international relations in key areas of the world are a prerequisite of healthy world economy, in which the United States is the largest player and one of the largest beneficiaries. So the Nye Report writes, “the United States economy will be strengthened through trade and investment opportunities offered by the dynamic Asia economies” (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1995, p. 6). In order to maintain the hegemonic status with the strongest military power and the largest economic power, the United States could not withdraw

from the fastest growing economic region of the world, even though the archrival of the Cold War was gone.

The third section, titled “What Are the Challenges and Opportunities Facing America in Asia?” discusses America’s relations with key players and major international security issues in the region. The key players are categorized into three groups: Engagement, Enlargement, and Problems. The report maintains it is important to modernize and strengthen relations with traditional allies and friendly nations such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, ASEAN countries, New Zealand, and Pacific Island. It then suggests enlarging the circle of partnership by reaching beyond America’s traditional allies and friends and inviting China, Russia, and Vietnam to address the issues in the region together. By building closer, more constructive relations with all major players in the region, the United States can better address regional security problems regarding North Korea, Cambodia, the Spratly Islands, the Northern Territories, and Taiwan.

After America’s interests in the region and challenges to them, the last third of the Nye Report discusses the U.S. force structure in Asia. The report justifies continuation of Cold War bilateral alliances in Asia, instead of seeking to replace them with a new multilateral regional security institution. The report argues that “the leading states in the Asia-Pacific region have diverse threat perceptions and disparate cultures, histories, political systems, and levels of economic development” (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1995, p. 5). The U.S. military presence ensures political stability and the security of sea lanes from the Middle East, on which many Asian countries depend for oil supplies, and to the United States, on whose market many Asian economies rely.

After highlighting how important the region is for the United States and the benefits of the U.S. military presence, the next section identified four long standing regional issues that might undermine international security in the Asia Pacific region: North Korea, Cambodia, territorial disputes including the ones over the Spratly Islands and the Northern Territory, and Taiwan. Although they are all possible sources of regional conflicts in Asia, the Nye Report suggests different responses to each of them. Among four long-standing regional issues above, the United States saw the North Korea as the most serious source of regional conflict and “requires continue vigilance and commitment of United States forces” because;

North Korea's history of aggression, threats to peace, and exports of missile technology have created a context in which its development of nuclear weapons would be an extremely dangerous threat to security on the Peninsula, in Asia and for global nonproliferation. (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1995, p. 18)

The Nye Report sees Cambodia as a challenging case for U.S. democratic promotion abroad, which the Clinton administration included among national security goals. Unlike in North Korea, Cambodia needed “the continued support of international community” such as the U.N. peace keeping and foreign aid for reconstruction and rehabilitation. Similarly, the Nye Report suggests multilateral and diplomatic solution for the territorial dispute over the Spratly Islands. “The United States takes no position on the legal merits of the competing claims and is willing to assist in the peaceful resolution” and praised the Indonesian sponsorship of “non-official workshops on managing potential conflict in the South China Sea” (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1995, p. 20). Then the Nye Report spares only 57 words on the Taiwan issue and welcomed increased dialogue between Beijing and Taipei, although it justified the

U.S. arms sales to Taipei.

The last problem the Nye Report takes up is weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles in the region. They pose “a major threat to our security and that of our allies and other friendly nations” (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1995, p. 28). In order to stem proliferation of WMDs in the region, the Nye Report proposes development of Regional Theater Defense Systems, maintenance of extended deterrence by the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and enforcement of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NTP) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

After discussing America’s interests in the region and the challenges to them, the Nye Report saves the last third to present the U.S. force structure in Asia after the Cold War. This is the most important part of the report because it wiped out the suspicion of American withdrawal from the region and declared the renewed America’s commitment to the regional security. This part of the report first listed the functions of U.S. forward military presence in Asia:

- to ensure a rapid and flexible worldwide response credibility
- to discourage the emergence of a regional hegemon
- to enhance our ability to influence a wide spectrum of important issues in the region
- to enable significant economy of force by reducing the number of the United States force required to national security objectives
- to overcome the handicaps of time and distance presented by the vast Pacific Ocean
- to demonstrate to our friends, allies and potential enemies alike a tangible indication of the United States’ interest in security of the entire region.

(Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1995, p. 23)

In order to maintain these functions after the Cold War, the Nye Reports sets a

floor for America's troop reduction in the Asia-Pacific region by announcing a concrete number; in contrast, its predecessors the East Asia Strategic Initiatives of 1990 and 1992, had only set the ceilings on the troop level. Consequently the number of U.S. troops in the region had fallen from 130, 000 in 1990 to 100,000 in 1994. The Nye report put a stop to reductions, reaffirming the American commitment "to maintain a stable forward presence in the region, at the existing level of about 100,000 troops, for the foreseeable future" (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1995, p. i). Although Nye himself explained that 100,000 was not a fixed number and could be changed depending on regional security situations (Funabashi, 1999; Nye, 2001), he also recognized that the report needed to set forth a concrete level of regional forces to regain the credibility of the American commitment to regional security, which some countries began to question, especially after U.S. withdrawal from the Subic naval base and Clark Airfield in the Philippines in 1991. Nye explained that 100, 000 troops was the minimum number necessary to adequately deal with two regional contingencies at the same time, one of the key assumptions of the BUR.

The Nye Report left some of the important issues in Asia intentionally ambiguous. One such issue is the rise of China. Although China was the largest long-term security concern for both the United States (Funabashi, 1999) and Japan (Samuels, 2007), the Nye Report devoted relatively few pages to discussion of the potential threats from China's growing military power. Instead of treating China as a threat, the Nye Report proposed that the United States should continue engagement with China and seek to take it into the group of nations which would support and play by the rules the United States and its allies had developed since the end of World War II.



Nye repeated this point in his DoD press briefing on the day he released the Nye Report. When asked about the rise of the Chinese military power, he answered, “The report points out that we do *not* want to see China as an enemy” and warned the United States to “be careful not to put ourselves in a point where by predicting an adversarial relationship we create one. We want to be careful not to have a self-fulfilling fallacy here.” Instead of building anti-Chinese alliance emphasized the importance of military dialogue among China, its neighbors, and the United States to enhance transparency and build confidence (Nye, 1995b).

Most Chinese leaders saw continuation of the U.S.-Japan alliance in China’s interest because it would prevent Japanese remilitarization, give reassurance to Chinese neighbors anxious about rising China’s power, and stabilize the regional security environment (Garrett & Glaser, 1997). But the Chinese government was at least suspicious that some aspects of the renewed U.S.-Japan alliance including the Theater Missile Defense systems and more active roles for Japan in regional contingencies, were designed to containment China in the long run. In the triangular relations among China, Japan, and the United States, the closer the cooperation between America and Japan, the weaker China’s position. During the Cold War China accepted a strong American military presence in the region in exchange for a militarily weak Japan. But the revision of the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold War seemed to open the door to a more independent and militarily stronger Japan in exchange for a smaller U.S. military presence in Asia. The worst-case scenario for Beijing was U.S.-Japan joint military action in a possible contingency between China and Taiwan. In such a scenario, China would have to face both a large American military presence and a militarily stronger

Japan. Warning against American efforts to encourage Japan to adopt a more active defense policy, one Chinese military analyst cited a traditional Chinese expression, “When one raises a tiger, one courts calamity” (Christensen, 1996, p. 44). Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang expressed his concern for a stronger U.S.-Japan alliance with the statement “we hope the bilateral defense arrangement between Japan and the United States will not go beyond its bilateral nature and will not touch on any third party” (Garrett & Glaser, 1997, p. 387).

Although the Nye Report seems to contradict the allegation that the United States and Japan revitalized their alliance in order to balance against rising Chinese power, a part of the Nye Report argues that U.S. military presence “denies political or economic control of the Asia-Pacific region by a rival, hostile power or coalition of powers, preventing any such group from having command over the vast resources, enormous wealth, and advanced technology of the Asia-Pacific region” (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1995, p. 5) Although it went unsaid, it is obvious that only China had the potential to develop its economic and military power to challenge American hegemony in Asia.

This is a quite similar logic to that George Kennan used when he laid out the policy of containment:

[T]here were "only five centers of industrial and military power in the world which are important to us from the standpoint of national security." These were the United States, Great Britain, Germany and central Europe, the Soviet Union, and Japan. Only in these locations "would [you] get the requisite conditions of climate, of industrial strength, of population and of tradition which would enable people there to develop and launch the type of amphibious power which would have to be launched if our national security were seriously affected." ... the primary interest of the United States in world affairs, therefore, was to see to it that no others fell under such control. (Gaddis, 1982, p. 30)

It is no wonder that China saw the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance, combined with the enlargement of NATO, as part of a global U.S. strategy, designed to fixate and institutionalize its military preponderance as the hegemon by denying Russia and China any chance to catch up (Wang, 1998).

But the United States did not try to contain the growth of China's power in the region after the Cold War like it had done with the Soviet Union after World War II. Rather, Nye suggested integrating China into the international system the United States had created since the end of World War II. Instead of isolating China, the United States should trade with, invest in, and cooperate with China on such issues as nuclear nonproliferation. Also, the report was careful not to provoke the Chinese government. Although it refers to China's growing defense budget and the modernization of the People's Liberation Army, as well as the transparency issue of China's defense policy as a whole, the report only minimally discussed the contentious issues related to Taiwan, instead emphasizing the importance of the military-to-military dialogue between the United States and China. The report shows the picture of Secretary of Defense William Perry's travel to Beijing on October 1994, during which he delivered a speech to senior Chinese military officers at China's National Defense University.

In the secret memoranda Perry sent to the Army, Navy, and Air Force Secretaries in August, 1994, he emphasized the importance of communication between U.S. military forces and the People's Liberation Army.

China is fast becoming the world's largest economic power, and that combined with its UN PermFive status, its political clout, its nuclear weapons and a modernizing military, make China a player with which the United States must work together. Our posture dramatically improves if China cooperates with us. In order to gain that cooperation, we must rebuild mutual trust and understanding with the PLA, and this could only happen through high level dialogue and

working level contacts. (Perry, 1994)

But the Nye Report did not reflect true perceptions of growing Chinese power among key decision-makers in the Clinton administration. An anonymous source who participated in drafting the Nye Report testified that for Nye, the long-term goal of the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance was to stabilize the U.S.-Chinese relations (Honda, 2001). Nye himself confirmed this point in his interview with Funabashi. "I think we have a policy of engagement toward China, but it's much better if the U.S. and Japan work together to engage China than letting China play off Japan against the U.S" (Funabashi, 1999, p. 255). For the United States, stability in the Asia-Pacific region meant that it would maintain hegemonic status, rather than seeking a balance of power among several major powers. By preventing the emergence of a multipolar system in Asia, where the United States, China, and Japan would balance against each other by repeatedly aligning and realigning among themselves (Mochizuki, 1997), Nye's long-term strategy aimed at preservation of the unipolar system where the United States should primarily keep order, maintaining power with help from Japan. Under this conception, China could be allowed to grow as long as it played by the rules established by the United States.

The long-term threat perception Nye expressed toward the rise of China and the relatively nonoffensive strategy toward it in the Nye Report seem contradictory. But Nye was not the only one who tried to develop more nuanced, although theoretically not coherent, approach to rising Chinese power. Political scientists were divided on the prospect of war and peace in Asia, after the Cold War and consequently on proper policy prescriptions toward rising Chinese power.

Both realism and liberalism offer reasons to believe that a more powerful China would be a security threat to the United States and its regional interests in Asia. Friedberg and Mearsheimer argue that a multipolar structure in Asia created by the relative rise of Chinese and Japanese power and relative decline of America's would be less stable than the bipolar structure during the Cold War (Friedberg, 1993; Mearsheimer, 2001). Mearsheimer saw China as more threatening to U.S. interests in the region than Japan particularly because of its vast population and its geographic characteristic as a land power, which would create conflicts with the United States, a maritime power. Roy argues that China would use its increased economic power to modernize its military forces, which would trigger a regional arms race (Roy, 1994).

Conversely, other realists predicted stable international relations in Asia after the Cold War. For example, Robert Ross focuses on geographical factors, as does Roy, but argues that China would be satisfied to be a dominant land power while the United States would settle to be the leading maritime power in the region. Applying insights from defensive realism, Ross looked into the costs China would have to pay to become a dominant naval power in the Asia Pacific region and the cost the United States would have to pay to dictate international relations on the east end of Eurasia. For either of them the marginal benefits they would gain would not be worth the costs (Ross, 1999). Strangely, both groups of realists have prescribed strategies of containment to deal with the rising power of China, similar to that of dealing with the Soviet threat after World War II (Betts, 1993; Friedberg, 1993; Ross, 1999). Betts, especially, discourages the United States from pursuing a hegemonic policy in Asia "because it is not worth the cost of attempting to achieve it" (Betts, 1993, p. 74). Like the United States and the Soviet

Union dividing the world into two competing camps during the Cold War, China and America would similarly create independent spheres of influences in Asia. By limiting economic transactions with China, the United States could decrease vulnerability to Chinese financial blackmail, such as the threat of dumping U.S. treasury bonds, and control China's economic growth, which has financed Chinese military modernization and double-digit increase in defense spending since the early 1990s.

Like realism, liberalism has been divided on the prospects of war and peace in the Asia-Pacific region after the Cold War and the nature of rising Chinese power. On one hand, liberalism would predict less stable international relations in Asia than in Europe because of the lower level of institutionalized international cooperation, fewer democracies, and weaker economic interdependence among regional powers (Betts, 1993; Friedberg, 1993; Ikenberry & Mastanduno, 2003). On the other hand, increased economic interdependence among the United States, China, and Japan would make war among them more costly (Ikenberry & Mastanduno, 2003). Emerging regional security institutions, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Six-Party Talks on North Korean nuclear programs, would facilitate international cooperation among major powers in the region.

Liberal prescriptions for rising Chinese power would be, regardless of the evaluations of the current status of the regional economic and security environment and future prospects, more economic interdependence among major actors, a higher level of institutionalization of international cooperation, and the promotion of democratization in the region.

Thus neither realism nor liberalism offers coherent analysis and firm predictions

of the consequences of rising Chinese power. Both realism and liberalism contain multiple factors which have impact on the prospects of war and peace in Asia and resultant policy prescriptions. Betts admits that both realism and liberalism are too general to predict the future of international relations in Asia and offer sound policy prescriptions for U.S. foreign policy toward the region. Then he argues that “(o)nlý more specific theories within these broad schools offer clear predictions, which means that there is not yet any wide analytical consensus to serve as a basis for prescription”(Betts, 1993, pp. 74-75). The problem of under-specification, which both realism and liberalism suffer from, stems from their assumptions that actors of international relations behave rationally without asking what is the basis of rationality for given actors. In order to apply a general theory of international relations to a specific case, a researcher needs to consider the context that underlies actors’ rationality. Especially, the actors’ identities and norms in the case need to be one of the variables used to explain their behaviors.

Nye’s position on China can be better explained by the liberal hegemonic identity of the United States than either by realism or liberalism alone. Because of its liberal hegemonic identity, the United States should pursue foreign and defense policies that are designed to maintain the preponderance of America’s military and economic power and the spread of liberal political and economic systems in Asia. To maintain its hegemonic status in the region, the United States had to maintain its major alliances and a large military presence, while trading with and investing in the region and revitalizing its domestic economic bases in short term. In the long run, the liberal hegemonic identity prescribes policies of democratization of and economic interdependence with all major regional powers, including China.

As the United States successfully encouraged democratization of and economic interdependence with its regional allies, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, Nye seemed to envision peaceful and long-term solutions for the threat which a rising China might pose to America's vital national interests in the region. As the United States allowed West Germany and Japan to grow more powerful within the Western camp as they liberalized economically and politically, economic and political liberalization strategies toward China minimize the risk that its rising power should pose threats to the international system that the United States had created. Thus it was rational for the United States to choose a long-term liberalization policy toward China rather than a more confrontational containment policy.

The United States could have contained China with its preponderant economic and military power in the 1990s. As of 1994, the U.S. defense budget was \$278,730 million, more than 10 times larger than that of China. Economic disparity was even larger. The nominal GDP of the United States was \$6,737 billion in 1994 while that of China was \$509 billion (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995, pp. 264-265). In spite of its rapid modernization, the Chinese military was technologically 20 to 30 years behind the U.S. military (Christensen, 2001). Unlike the Soviet Union at the end of World War II, China was not projecting its military power outside its territory. In short, China after the Cold War was more susceptible to a strategy of containment than was the Soviet Union after World War II.

But the Clinton administration chose to engage in China because a containment strategy could have killed opportunities to advance the liberalization of China's political and economic systems. The Soviet Union rejected joining the liberal international



economic order the United States was trying to establish at the end of World War II by rejecting the offer of the Marshall Plan and denouncing the Bretton Woods institutions including the IMF and World Bank. Instead, the Communist states formed their own economic blocs, such as the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Gaddis, 1982; Leffler, 1992). China, in contrast, has joined global capitalist institutions, including the WTO, and actively traded with major capitalist economies, most notably the United States.

Compared with economic liberalization, the speed and degree of democratization in China in the early 1990s were far from satisfactory. Although the Clinton administration occasionally pressured the Chinese government on human right issues, mostly as a response to the demands from the Congress, it did not have many choices other than to wait and monitor the slow progress of democratization of China. Although Clinton criticized President Bush for not being tough enough on the Chinese government after the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989, forceful democratization of China was not an option, unlike the situation at the end of World War II when the United States could impose democratization on defeated Japan and Germany.

Another point of ambiguity in the Nye Report was its treatment of multilateral security institutions in Asia. The Nye report differentiates itself from the East Asia Strategic Initiatives of 1990 and 1992 on its emphasis of regional security institutions. Particularly the report focuses on the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), expecting it “can play a useful role in conveying governments’ intentions, easing tensions, constraining arms races and cultivating habits of consultation and cooperation on security issues” (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1995, p. 13). The emphasis on multilateral

institutions and preventive diplomacy seems natural application of the liberal strategy proposed by the BUR to the regional strategy for the Asia-Pacific. But Nye explained that the United States was not replacing bilateral alliances with multilateral institutions.

But let me make an important point here. The strategy is *not* based on multilateralism. The strategy is based on reaffirmation of the bilateral alliances we have. Japan, Australia, South Korea, so forth. What we are doing is adding a set of multilateral institutions, if you want, as a surrounding around this core of the bilateral relationship. So while we are indeed stressing the increased importance of multilateral institutions, it's not at the cost of our primary intention to reinforcing the traditional security alliances we have in the region. (Nye, 1995b, italics added)

Thus the Nye Report was carefully developed through collaboration between Washington and Tokyo. But selling the Nye Report outside of the U.S. and the Japanese governments was another matter. The most public and strong criticism of the Nye Report came from Chalmers Johnson, President of the Japan Policy Research Institute, in his article published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1995. The article titled “The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy” criticized the Nye Report for failing in recognizing erosion of American hegemony and increased importance of economic issues over security issues and for maintaining the same regional strategy dating back to the early 1950s (Johnson & Keehn, 1995).

Criticism of the Nye Report came not only from the United States but also from Japan. Former Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, who set up the Higuchi Commission to review Japan's long-term defense strategy after the Cold War, went so far to write “It is egoistic for Americans to believe that the United States has done Japan a favor by defending it all these years by stationing its forces within the country” (Hosokawa, 1998, p. 4).

But the most serious challenge to the Nye Report came from Governor Masahide

Ota of Okinawa Prefecture. He was shocked by the concrete troop level in the Asia-Pacific region the Nye Report announced. The number of the U.S. troops should be fixed for the next 10 to 20 years; he had no hope for realignment or reduction of American military bases in Okinawa. He was also angry with the top-down and one-sided way in which officials of Pentagon in Washington handled base issues in Okinawa. He even compared the U.S. Defense Department to the Japanese Imperial Army Headquarters and blamed it for “the tragic result of operations proposed at the tables ... hundreds of miles away from Okinawa”(Funabashi, 1999, p. 148). The mistrust Ota had in U.S. military forces and the Japanese government would play a significant role in the alliance redefinition process following publication of the Nye Report.

### **Japan’s National Interests in the Asia Pacific Region After the Cold War**

Like the United States, Japan went through a series of defense policy revision. Among them, the following section will focus on the Higuchi Report and the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) in and after FY1996, which had prepared Japan for the negotiation of the new Guidelines for Defense Cooperation with the United States.

#### *The Higuchi Report and the New National Defense Program Outline*

The National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) in and after FY1996 was the first major defense policy paper the Japanese government adopted after the Cold War. It assessed both the international and domestic environments in which the Japanese government had to develop national security policies, defined the purposes of its defense capabilities, and set the basic direction for the long-term defense capability of Japan.

Similar to the original NDPO published in 1976, the new NDPO was expected to remain effect for at least 10 to 15 years (Akiyama, 2002).

Officially the drafting process of the new NDPO started when Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa gathered the Advisory Group on Defense Issues, the so-called the Higuchi Commission named after its chair, Hitotaro Higuchi, chairman of Asahi Breweries, Ltd. in February 1994. The mission of the Higuchi Commission was to discuss “what kind of defense capability makes sense, taking into consideration the collapse of the Cold War international structure and the progress in science and technologies” (Honda, 2001, p. 498). Prime Minister Hosokawa wanted ideas for a new Japan defense policy after the Cold War from the broad basis of Japanese society as a whole in addition to the perspectives of the foreign and defense bureaucracies. The Higuchi Commission consisted of five businessmen including Mr. Higuchi, two academics, and two retired bureaucrats. Among the members of the Higuchi Commission, Seiki Nishihiro was Hosokawa’s point man. Nishihiro was the former Administrative Vice Minister of the JDA and was known as “Mr. JDA”; Hosokawa also found him to be “the most liberal of all the JDA old boys” (Funabashi, 1999, p. 233). Additionally Nishihiro selected the rest of the members of the Higuchi Commission (Ina, 1996).

Hosokawa came to believe that the SDF could be downsized after witnessing the dominance of U.S. high-technology weapons in the Gulf War of 1991. In his interview with Funabashi, Hosokawa said, “The number of Japan’s land self-defense forces had hardly changed even though the Cold war is over. I thought we needed to cut back the land forces and switch to a defense structure centered on the maritime and air forces.

That's why I had Nshihiro put the question at the start of the advisory group whether we couldn't cut the land division by half or a third" (Funabashi, 1999, p. 233).

In this sense, Hosokawa and Clinton shared their commitment to cut the size of military forces and defense spending of their countries. But in the end, Clinton achieved more radical downsizing of the military and reduction of defense budget than his counterpart. For example, the number of the numbers of armed forces had been reduced by 32% from 2.2 million to 1.5 million and the defense budget was cut by 21% from \$352.6 billion to \$277.8 billion between 1985 and 1995 in the United States. On the other hand, the Japanese defense budget had increased by 71% from \$29,4 billion to \$50.2 billion between 1985 and 1995 while the numbers in armed forces were cut from 243,000 to 239,500 thousand in the same period (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996).

Although Hosokawa had his own preferences on the new defense policy of Japan, he did not impose them on the Commission. Rather the members of the Commission felt at a loss because Hosokawa did not give any concrete direction to the discussion (Watanabe & Murata, 1998). In the first meeting, Hosokawa only asked the Commission to "reorganize basic ideas in the (original) NDPO and examine the modality of Japan's national defense from mid and long-term perspectives" (Asagumo Shimbun, 1994, p. 2). It was the only meeting Hosokawa attended and both of his successors, Prime Ministers Tsutomu Hata and Tomiichi Murayama followed suit. In the absence of specific high-level direction, the Commission first had to decide the scope of its discussion. Some of the members argued that they only had to discuss the modality of defense capabilities, which would be the third chapter of the Commission's final report. Others suggested first

defining the meaning of national security. In the end, the Commission members agreed on covering both theoretical and practical aspects of defense policy (Watanabe & Murata, 1998).

In particular, the Constitution was a difficult issue to discuss because the members had widely diverse opinions on it. Is the SDF constitutional? Should the Japanese government change official interpretation of Article 9? In the end the members decided to skirt more controversial issues and agreed to focus on what Japan could do to defend its national interest within the existing official interpretation of the Constitution. The commission members did not expect the Japanese government to accept any policy recommendations that would require major constitutional reinterpretation. At the same time, some of the members thought Japan could take a more active national security policy within the existing institutional framework (Watanabe & Murata, 1998). Instead of replacing old institutions with new ones, the Higuchi Commission tried to redefine Japan's role within existing national security institutions such as the United Nations, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the Self Defense Forces.

The early draft of the Higuchi report was secretly sent to Japan experts in Washington, especially former foreign and defense policy makers of Republican administrations including Richard Armitage, in hopes of receiving informed but unofficial comments (Funabashi, 1999; Watanabe, 1998). Those who read the draft report almost unanimously voiced their concern that multilateral security organizations were discussed first and the U.S.-Japan alliance came second. Despite such alarmed comments from the United States, Professor Watanabe, the main writer of the Higuchi Report, intentionally kept the order. He wanted to explore the proper place of the U.S.-

Japan alliance in a cooperative security environment after the Cold War, in which, he believed, multilateral security institutions would increase in importance. He tried to avoid an oversimplified choice between multilateral and bilateral security institutions. He was afraid that someday the Japanese public would want to replace the U.S.-Japan alliance with a regional multilateral security organization if the policy makers and the experts kept asking them to choose between the two. Japan would need both bilateral and multilateral security institutions in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Watanabe believed that more effort was necessary to strengthen multilateral bases for the defense of Japan because the bilateral base was already well developed (Watanabe & Murata, 1998).

On the other hand, Nishihiro emphasized continuing importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the need to transform the SDF to meet new challenges after the Cold War. Nishihiro had a certain vision for Japan's long-term national security policy well before he was invited to the Higuchi Commission. During the Bush administration, Nishihiro suggested to Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Advisor to the President, that the United States and Japan should start joint strategy talks to coordinate their China policies after the Cold War. Although the joint strategy talks never materialized during Nishihiro's term as the Vice Minister of JDA (Funabashi, 1999), he passed on his ideas to one of his successors. When Akiyama, who later became Vice Minister of the JDA, visited Nishihiro in 1993, they had an hour and half talk on the defense of Japan. Nishihiro believed that China's threat to Japan's national security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century would be political, social, and economical rather than military. He did not believe that the U.S.-Japan alliance would last forever; however, the bilateral alliance with America would be the best policy option based on which Japan should develop its national security

policy in good years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. For that purpose, the two allies needed to solve some problems; otherwise, the alliance would not function in contingencies. The SDF needed to increase the efficiency of military forces by significantly cutting back the number of the troops in the Ground Self Defense Force, by reducing the number of the Maritime Self Defense Force's P3C aircraft which had watched Soviet submarines during the Cold War, by downsizing the MSDF's mine sweeper units which had been established in the aftermath of the Korean War, and by upgrading its intelligence capabilities (Akiyama, 2002).

In August 1994, after 20 meetings, the Higuchi Commission published its final report, *The Modality of the Security and Defense Capabilities of Japan: The Outlook for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. The report argued for a more active national security policy:

Japan should extricate itself from its security policy of the past that was, if anything, passive and henceforth play an active role in shaping a new order. Indeed, Japan has the responsibility of playing such a role. (Cronin & Green, 1994, p. 30)

For this purpose, the report recommended the development of a comprehensive national security policy consisting of three specific strategies. First, Japan should promote multilateral cooperation for regional and global security. Second, it should strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance. Third, it should develop more efficient defense capabilities based on better intelligence and more agile emergency response. Simply put, the Higuchi Report was a synthesis of Watanabe's and Nishihiro's visions. The former emphasized changes in the international security environment of Japan, new dimensions of national security such as peacekeeping, disaster relief, and cyber threat, and the need for stronger multilateral defense cooperation. The latter focused on the continuing importance of military forces in national security, the importance of great powers in



international relations, and the unchanged centrality of the U.S.-Japan alliance in Japan's defense policy. Accordingly, the section titled "Multilateral Security Cooperation" in the second chapter of the Higuchi report reflected Watanabe's opinion, while the sections titled "Enhancing the Functions of the Japan-U.S. Security Cooperation Relationship" and "Maintenance and Qualitative Improvement of Self-Defense Capability" were based on Nishihara's ideas (Akiyama, 2000, p. 144).

But the Higuchi Commission's recommendations served as just one of the bases of the new NDPO. In the drafting process of the new NDPO, not only the Prime Minister, whom the Higuchi Commission reported to, but also U.S. Defense Department and the Japan Defense Agency played critical roles.

The Higuchi Commission's emphasis on multilateral security organizations as one of the three pillars of the Japanese defense policy was intentionally used by Michel Green and others to put pressure on the Defense Department to refocus on the U.S.-Japan alliance. Green met Watanabe in Tokyo after the Higuchi Report was published. Although Green seemed concerned with the increased importance of multilateral institutions in the Japanese defense in the Higuchi Report, he expressed his understanding of Watanabe's point in the end. So Watanabe was surprised to the "overreaction" to the Higuchi Report by the U.S. government (Watanabe & Murata, 1998).

After returning from Japan, Green co-authored a strategic paper titled *Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance* with Patrick Cronin and published it from the National Defense University in November 1994 (Cronin & Green, 1994). It was intentionally provocative, emphasizing Japan's hedging strategy and characterizing the status of the bilateral alliance as drifting. In his interview with Akiyama in September 2000, Green confessed

that the Higuchi Report served as a *Gaiatsu* (external pressure) and put pressure on the Clinton administration to shift its focus from economic to security issues in the U.S.-Japanese relations. Green even called the Higuchi Report a “balloon fish with a little poison” (Akiyama, 2000, p. 144).

Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye, Jr. agreed with Green and Cronin on the need for revitalizing the U.S.-Japan alliance. He ordered his team to exchange the drafts of the U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region and the new NDPO. By allowing the Japanese government to participate in the drafting process of America’s post-Cold War Asia policy, Nye expected to the Japanese government to do the same (Honda, 2001).

The Nye Report influenced the new National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) of Japan in two ways. First, new NDPO put more emphasis on the U.S.-Japan alliance than either the 1976 NDPO or the Higuchi report did. The new NDPO mentions “Japan-U.S. security arrangements” 11 times in the text while the old NDPO did so only twice. Second, the new NDPO broadened the geographic scope of national defense by including “regions surrounding Japan” within the scope of the bilateral alliance (Mochizuki, 1997).

As the United States could not develop its Asia policy without considering the U.S.-Japan alliance, the Japanese government started searching for an appropriate role of the alliance within its new grand strategy after the Cold War. As early as in 1990, several informal study groups met to discuss future of Japanese defense policy. But the official process of revising the NDPO began in JDA in February 1994. The JDA established the “Forum for Discussing Defense in a New Era” to provide information and opinions to the Higuchi Commission and discuss ideas for the new NDPO after the publication of the

Higuchi Report. The forum consisted of the Director General, Vice Ministers of the JDA, Chair of the Joint Chiefs, and chiefs of GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF. Through twenty-one meetings, the JDA and the SDF reconciled differences among the services and developed a consensus on the new NDPO (Akiyama, 2002).

For example, the GSDF accepted the reduction of troops from 180,000 to 160,000 upon condition of establishing a new ready reserve force, which would receive a higher level of training than regular reserves so it could be more rapidly mobilized. In the interest of fairness to the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF agreed to reduce their force levels in exchange for upgrading and modernizing their weapons (Akiyama, 2002).

After a consensus was formed within the Defense Agency, the next step of drafting the new NDPO was the Security Council of Japan (SCJ). The SCJ is an internal organ of the Cabinet to deliberate on important defense matters and adopt major defense policies such as the National Defense Program Outline and the Midterm Defense Program. Its members include the Prime Minister, the Director of the Defense Agency, Foreign Minister and other major cabinet members relevant to defense issues (Japan Defense Agency, 1996; Sajima, 2004). Based on the outcomes of the discussions by the Defense Agency and the Higuchi Commissions, the SCJ had 10 meetings between July and November to discuss and adopt the new NDPO. Depending on the topics, relevant ministers and agencies were invited for briefings. While general diplomatic and military issues were discussed based on the briefings by the MOFA and the JDA, officials of the Ministry of Finance were invited when the SCJ discussed fiscal imitations on defense policy. In the SCJ meeting on October 18<sup>th</sup> the Ministry of Trade and Industry presented its cases for defense industries (Jieitai). After 21 meetings the SCJ adopted the new

NDPO on November 28<sup>th</sup>, 1995.

The Japanese government needed a new NDPO to adjust to the changes brought by the end of the Cold War. The original NDPO was published in 1976 and most of the defense build-up plans it specified had been completed. In addition, the current Midterm Defense Program (MTDP) was about to expire by March 1996. The Japanese government was expected to develop a new NDPO first so that the MTDP for FY 1996-2001 could be developed within the framework of the new NDPO (Ina, 1996).

While the original NDPO was developed based on the assumption of stable bipolar international system, the new NDPO starts with the assessment that the post-Cold War international relations are more complicated and unpredictable, posing both promises and challenges. Instead of large scale military conflicts driven by global ideological struggle between the West and the East camps, future international security challenges would come from regional conflicts caused by unresolved territorial disputes and historical ethnic problems sealed by the Cold War. As for relations among the major powers, they were driven by economic interdependence and could be expected to remain generally peaceful. The opportunities for arms control, nonproliferation, and peacekeeping through international organizations such as the United Nations had increased. However, the new NDPO does not fail to recognize what country matters most in the unipolar world and states that “the United States, with its great power, continues to play a significant role for world peace and stability” (Defense Agency, 1995, ¶. 6).

But the new NDPO provided a more cautious assessment of the regional security environment in Asia: “there still remain large-scale military capabilities including nuclear

arsenals and many countries in the region are expanding or modernizing their military capabilities mainly against the background of their economic development” (Defense Agency, 1995, ¶. 3).

Not only externally, but also internally, the environment surrounding the JDA and the SDF had changed since the original NDPO was published in 1976. The Japanese public expected the SDF not only to assume the main responsibility for Japan’s national defense but also to play more active roles in disaster relief and peacekeeping operations (PKO) of the United Nations. The heightened expectation for the U.N. PKO derived from the SDF’s successful first mission in Cambodia in 1992. Already the SDF had been deployed in 4,653 cases for disaster relief operations between FY1991 and 1995, including the earthquake in Kobe in January and the terrorist attacks against Tokyo subways in March, 1995 (Japan Defense Agency, 1996). After the Kobe earthquake, the SDF deployed 2.2 million troops and 34,000 vehicles in 100 days (Akiyama, 2002). As the result, 72.2% of the respondents to the Public Opinion Poll on the SDF and Defense Issues by the Cabinet Office in 1994 listed disaster relief as the most useful mission the SDF had accomplished (Japan Defense Agency, 1995). In addition to natural disaster such as earthquakes and typhoons, the drafters of the new NDPO meant to include terrorism in the “disaster” to which the SDFs should be deployed. Fresh out of the poison gas attacks in Tokyo subways in 1994, the Japanese government took the threat from terrorism very seriously.

But the JDA and SDF were conditioned to expand their scope of activities with reduced resources, considering “such factors as recent advances in science and technology, a decreasing population of young people and increasingly severe economic

and fiscal conditions” (Defense Agency, 1995, ¶. 6).

In order to meet the uncertain and unpredictable regional security environment, the new NDPO argued it necessary “to maintain firmly the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and to build up appropriate” (Defense Agency, 1995, ¶. 1). On the other hand, multilateral security institutions, which were emphasized in the Higuchi Report, were given secondary missions such as peacekeeping operations and disaster relief. In that sense, the treatment of multilateral security institutions with respect to U.S.-Japanese relations in the new NDPO is closer to that in the Nye Report than the Higuchi Report. While the Higuchi Report gave equal emphasis on multilateral institutions, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the Self Defense Forces as means of achieving national security goals, the new NDPO, like the Nye Report, suggested supplementing the bilateral alliance with multilateral organizations. Asahi Shimbun critically points out that the ASEAN Regional Forum, which the Japanese government claimed its international leadership in the establishment of, is mentioned nowhere in the new NDPO (Asahi Shimbun, 1995). The omission is even more ironic considering the fact that the Nye Report has higher expectation for the ARF, stating, “We envision that the ARF will develop over time into an effective region-wide forum for enhancing preventive diplomacy and developing confidence-building measures” (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1995, p. 13).

The new NDPO emphasizes the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance not only for the defense of Japan, but also for the security and stability of Asia.

The close cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, will help to create a stable security environment, provide the foundation for securing the engagement of the United States and the U.S. military presence which are necessary for peace and stability

in this region, and thus will continue to play a key role for the security of Japan, as well as the stability of the international community. (Defense Agency, 1995, ¶. 6)

Based on that recognition, the new NDPO reveals Japan's willingness to play more active roles in regional security within the framework of the bilateral alliance.

Should a situation arise in the areas surrounding Japan, which will have an important influence on national peace and security, [Japan will] take appropriate response in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws and regulations, for example, by properly supporting the [sic] U.N. activities when needed, and by ensuring the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements (Defense Agency, 1995, ¶. 10).

The new NDPO goes on to stress the need to upgrade the alliance “to enhance the credibility of the U.S.-Japan Security Arrangements and ensure their effective implementation” (Defense Agency, 1995, ¶. 2) through increased and upgraded policy consultations, joint studies, mutual exchanges of equipment and technology, and facilitation of smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan.

In the end, the new NDPO laid out new force structure of the SDF. The number of the Self-Defense personnel was reduced from 180,000 to 160,000, including 15,000 ready reserves. In the Maritime Self Defense Force, the destroyer units in regional districts were reduced from 10 to 7 divisions and the minesweeping units were halved from 2 to 1 unit. The new NDPO required relatively modest downsizing for the Air Defense Force. For example, out of 10 interceptor units, 9 were maintained (Forum, 1996).

Scholarly evaluations of the new NDPO vary, with some seeing continuity with the past and others significant departures there from. In the former camp, Professor Christopher Hughes of the University of Warwick found more continuity than change in the new NDPO, which “reflected the conservatism of the defense establishment and

confirmed many traditional principles and patterns” (Hughes, 2004, p. 169). In his view, the new NDPO builds on the concept of basic and standard defense, exclusively defense-oriented defense, and three nonnuclear principles, like its predecessor. The force structure the new NDPO set forth still contained the majority of the ASDF’s interceptor aircraft, the MSDF’s ASW warships, and the GSDF’s main battle tanks. But the most important element of continuity in the Japanese post-Cold War defense policy was the U.S.-Japan alliance.

The renewed commitment to the bilateral alliance in new NDPO was enthusiastically welcomed in Washington, D.C. Secretary Perry awarded medals of recognition to Campbell and his team in December 1995 soon after the Japanese government authorized the new NDPO. Hisayoshi Ina of Nikkei Shimbun suggests that the medals were given because Campbell and his team successfully influenced the drafting process of the new NDPO and the document recognizes the centrality of the U.S.-Japan alliance in Japanese defense policy (Ina, 1996). The level of emphasis on the U.S.-Japan alliance in the new NDPO was even more surprising considering the fact it was adopted by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, the head of the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP). The JSP had argued that the SDF was unconstitutional and been opposed to the U.S.-Japan alliance until it took power in 1994. The members of Commission were afraid that the Murayama administration would abort the Higuchi Commission or order radical changes in the agenda and contents of the final report after the LDP-Socialist coalition took back power from Hosokawa’s Shinshin Party.

The Murayama Cabinet tried to show some resistance to further integration between American and Japanese defense policies. Murayama declined diplomatic



negotiations to revise the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation when it announced the new NDPO even though it mentions the need to address regional contingencies (Funabashi, 1999) . It was not until Ryutaro Hashimoto of LDP became the Prime Minister that the Japanese government started official negotiations for revising the Guidelines.

The new NDPO was not only the most basic document of Japan's defense planning after the Cold War, but also was a response from Tokyo to the Bottom-Up Review and the Nye Report. Based on the new NDPO Japan negotiated with the United States and together they developed the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security of 1996 and the new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation of 1997.

### **Bilateral Negotiations and Agreements**

#### *The Final Report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa*

The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in November 1995 in response to a rape incident in Okinawa on September 4<sup>th</sup> of the same year. Three U.S. servicemen abducted and raped a 12-year-old elementary school girl in the northern part of Okinawa. On September 28th, Governor Masahide Ota of Okinawa announced that he would not sign the resale agreements of the land confiscated by the Japanese government on behalf of U.S. forces. Okinawa Governor had authority to sign the lease agreement of land for U.S. military bases as eminent domain in case the individual owners of the land refused to sign the contracts. The rape incident resulted in the largest public demonstration against U.S. military bases in Okinawa since its reversion to Japan in 1972. On October 21<sup>st</sup>, over 8,5000 citizens gathered at the Seaside

Park in Ginowan City and over 700 organizations, including all major political parties in the prefectural assembly, labor unions, business organizations, and women's right organizations participated in the demonstration (Funabashi, 1999; Honda, 2001; Okinawa Times, 1996).

The United States government and military responded to the crisis more quickly and sincerely than ever before. The American Naval Criminal Investigation Service held the suspects in custody on September 8<sup>th</sup> after the Okinawa prefectural police had a warrant of arrest. The first official apology came from the U.S. consul-general in Okinawa, Aloysius O'Neill on September 11<sup>th</sup> when he visited Governor Masahide Ota (Funabashi, 1999). On September 20<sup>th</sup> Ambassador Walter Mondale met Governor Ota and said, "Please accept my heartfelt apologies to the victim, her family, and the Okinawan people"(Mainichi Daily News, 1995, p. 1). In his meeting with Foreign Minister Yohei Kono on September 21<sup>st</sup>, Mondale was reported to describe the suspects as "inhuman" and "animals" (Funabashi, 1999, p. 301). Secretary Perry followed Ambassador Mondale and said, "On behalf of all members of the armed forces, I want to express my deep sorrow and anger for this terrible act" (Kristof, 1995, p. 7). President Clinton mentioned the rape incident in his radio address and promised that "We will not allow any injustice to the Japanese people to be taken lightly" (Kristof, 1995, p. 7).

On September 19<sup>th</sup> the Okinawa Prefectural assembly passed the resolution of protest against the rape incident and demanded revising the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) and downsizing the U.S. military bases in Okinawa. But Tokyo was slow and reactive to the incident. Foreign Minister When Governor Ota asked Foreign Minister Yohei Kohno to start negotiating the revision of the SOFA, he declined it, saying "I have

heard the investigation is conducted smoothly. It is too extreme to demand immediate revision of the SOFA” (Honda, 2001, p. 511).

The rape incident of September 1995 was a wake-up call for top officials in Tokyo and Washington. They recognized that military bases in Okinawa were critically important for the U.S.-Japan alliance and realized that failing to address the base issues would endanger the survival of the alliance (Funabashi, 1999; Honda, 2001). Before the incidents, technocrats of the Defense Facilities Administrative Agency (DFAA) of Japan and uniform officers of U.S. Forces in Japan or the Pacific Command, not high-ranking political appointees, had dealt with issues and problems regarding U.S. military bases in Japan (Akiyama, 2002). After the rape incident, one of the top civilian officials of the JDA, Akiyama Masahiro was shocked to learn that the Japanese government had never asked the U.S. government why there was so many bases in Okinawa and if they could be reorganized or consolidated (Honda, 2001).

On October 24<sup>th</sup>, Foreign Minister Kohno and Ambassador Mondale agreed to speed up the trial process of U.S. servicemen committing crimes within the existing Status of Forces Agreement and set up a committee to discuss reorganization and downsizing of U.S. military bases in Okinawa and named it the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO). The members of SACO included Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Charles Kartman, and State Department’s Deputy Chief of Mission, Tokyo, Rust Deming from the American side. The Japanese government was represented by Bureau of Defense Policy Director Masahiro Akiyama, Counselor to the Bureau of Defense, Takemasa Moriya from the Defense Agency, and from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Director

General of the North American Affairs Bureau Masaki Orita, and Deputy Director General of the North American Affairs Bureau Hitoshi Tanaka (Funabashi, 1999). The membership the SACO demonstrated upgraded interest in and sense of urgency of the base issues in Okinawa. In addition to high-ranking civilian officials of the JDA, instead of DFAA, the Japanese government was represented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Similarly, the U.S. government sent both civilian officials of Defense Department and diplomats of State Department to the SACO (Akiyama, 2002).

The goal of SACO was “to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa” by recommending reorganization plans for U.S. military facilities to meet the new realities after the Cold War. The final report recommended that about “21 percent of the total acreage of the US facilities and areas in Okinawa” should be returned. Among forty some U.S. military facilities in Okinawa, the report recommended to return Futenma Air Station, the Northern Training Area, Sobe Communication Site, Camp Kuwae, and others. The report also recommended adjusting training and operational procedures to reduce the risks accidents and the noises. For example, U.S. military forces would terminate artillery live-fire training over Highway 104 and limit night flight training operations. Finally, the report recommended improving Status of Forces Agreement procedures. Tokyo and Washington had already agreed to speed up transfer of the accused in serious criminal cases, including murder and rape, as early as in October 1995. The final report added other issues to be addressed including accidents reports in and around the U.S. military bases, and transparency of the Joint Committee on Status of Force Agreement procedures. The secretaries of Defense and State of the United States, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director of the Defense Agency of Japan

approved the final report on December 2, 1996. Considering the fact that the Japanese government had never before asked the United States government why U.S. military forces had so many bases in Okinawa and whether it could reorganize and reduce the size of its bases (Honda, 2001), the SACO final report was a landmark achievement of the Hashimoto administration. But the very central part of the report, reversion of Futenma Air Station, would turn out to be the most difficult agreement to be implemented. As of today, the airfield has not been returned and has become one of the most controversial issues between the United States and Japan since the Democratic Party of Japan took power in September 2009.

*The New Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation*

The new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation (the new Guidelines) represents a renewed effort to develop more concrete plans for military cooperation between the United States and Japan in cases of foreign military attacks against Japan and regional contingencies around Japan, as well as in peacetime.

In the Joint Declaration on Security of April 1996 Japan and the United States agreed:

to initiate a review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation to build upon the close working relationship already established between Japan and the United States.

The two leaders agreed on the necessity to promote bilateral policy coordination, including studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan. (President of the United States & Prime Minister of Japan, 1996, ¶. 5)

The review was conducted by the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) under SCC. SDC consisted of the director general of the Bureau of Defense Policy, the

Defense Agency, representative of the Joint Staff Council of The Self-Defense Force on the Japanese side, and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense and State, the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the representative of the U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC), and the representative of the U.S. Forces, Japan (USFJ) on the American side. The report was intended to promote understanding of the review and to provide a basis for domestic discussion (Japan Defense Agency, 1997). SDC met in California in August, Tokyo in October, Hawaii in December of 1996 and Tokyo in February 2007 to conduct simulation of regional contingencies and discussed specific scenarios such as North Korea's invasion of South Korea (Honda, 2001). Although the New Guidelines emphasize continuity from the original guidelines and consistency with the existing legal frameworks of American and Japanese defense policies such as the Constitution of Japan, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and the U.N. Charter, it is the most significant change in the alliance since the signing of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960. The New Guidelines aim at both widening of the scope the alliance and deepening the level of defense cooperation between the United States and Japan.

The most significant difference between the original Guidelines and the New Guidelines is the emphasis on defense cooperation in "situations surrounding Japan" (*shuhen jitai*). Like the original Guidelines, the New Guidelines lay out three scenarios in which the United States and Japan take joint military actions. The first of them is normal circumstances. During peacetime, the two countries exchange intelligence, engage in consultation, and participate in joint training. The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) of the secretaries of Defense and State, and the Director of JDA and Minister of Foreign Affairs in particular provides an important forum where

the top officials of the two governments meet regularly to discuss foreign and defense issues. The two allies also cooperate to promote cooperation in arms control, peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian relief missions of the United Nations.

The second scenario is foreign military attack on Japan. This part is divided into two subsections. One is “When an Armed Attack against Japan is Imminent” and the other is “When an Armed Attack against Japan Takes Place” (*The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation*, 1997).

In the former case

The two Governments will intensify information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, and initiate at an early stage the operation of a bilateral coordination mechanism. (*The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation*, 1997)

This part of the new Guidelines reminds of deterrence effects of U.S. military bases in Japan by writing “Japan will establish and maintain the basis for U.S. reinforcements.” In addition to the part on regional contingencies, this part represents a significant departure from the old Guideline, which writes: “Japan by itself will repel limited, small-scale aggression” (*The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation*, 1997). The old guidelines sets more clear conditions for American participation in military operation in defense of Japan. “When it is difficult to repel aggression alone due to the scale, type and other factors of aggression, Japan will repel it with the cooperation of the United States” (The Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation & Committee, 1978, ¶. 3). In other words, under the new Guideline, U.S. military forces could join the SDF in any foreign attack against Japan. Although the new Guideline has a sentence writing, “bilateral cooperation may vary according to the scale, type, phase, and other factors of the armed attack” (*The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation*, 1997), it does

not prohibits the United States from using military forces. Here again the drafters of the New Guidelines emphasized the importance regional contingencies:

Recognizing that a situation in areas surrounding Japan may develop into an armed attack against Japan, the two Governments will be mindful of the close interrelationship of the two requirements: preparations for the defense of Japan and responses to or preparations for situations in areas surrounding Japan. (*The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation*, 1997)

In the latter case, “Japan will have primary responsibility immediately to take action and to repel an armed attack against Japan as soon as possible”. But the United States will support Japan in “coordinated bilateral operations, steps to prevent further deterioration of the situation, surveillance, and intelligence sharing” (*The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation*, 1997) .

The original 1978 Guidelines put the most emphasis on this part, using 772 words to spell out plans for the bilateral defense cooperation while using only 178 words for regional contingencies. The Japanese government has faced fewer legal obstacles to cooperate with the U.S. when it defends its own territory and population. A joint study on contingencies in Japan was roughly completed in the summer of 1981 for submission to Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki although that on regional contingencies never completed (Murata, 2007). Since the adoption of the original Guidelines, the Self Defense Forces have participated in joint military exercises with U.S. military forces more actively. The Air Self Defense Force conducted the first joint military exercise with U.S. Air force in November 1978 and the Ground Defense Force followed suit in 1981, all of which were designed for foreign military attacks against Japan (Chosashitsu, 1997). The new Guidelines have more specific items of defense cooperation between Japan and the United States, including command and coordination, communications, intelligence, and



logistics. This part of the new Guidelines also highlighted the need for cooperation in missile defense, reflecting new development in the Korean Peninsula since the end of the Cold War.

The third scenario is regional contingencies, which is called “situation in areas surround Japan.” The New Guidelines uses 1716 words in this part, compared with 178 words in the original Guidelines. In addition, the three-page annex document to the new Guidelines spells out 40 concrete measures the Self-Defense Force could take to support U.S. military forces in contingencies happening in “areas surrounding Japan”(The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, 1997), including logistic support for the U.S. forces in rear areas (noncombat zones), inspection of ships under economic sanctions, evacuation of civilians, mine sweeping, and others.

This part grew out of bitter lessons the United States and Japan had learnt during the North Korean Missile Crisis in 1993 and the Taiwan Crisis of March 1996. In the both crises, Washington and Tokyo failed in working together as allies. There were no policy talks during the crisis and cooperation between U.S. military forces and the Japanese Self Defense Force was “nonexistent” (Funabashi, 1999, p. 398).

The new Guidelines have had significant impacts on domestic legislation of Japan although “[t]he Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines will *not* obligate either Government to take legislative, budgetary or administrative measures”(The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, 1997). As the new Guidelines write below, the U.S. government expected the Japanese government to take major legislative measures to implement defense support for U.S. forces.

However, since the objective of the Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two

Governments are *expected* to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgments, in their specific policies and measures. All actions taken by Japan will be consistent with its laws and regulations then in effect. (*The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation*, 1997)

The Japanese government answered that expectation by passing so called Guidelines related acts, namely the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, the Revised Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement and the Revised the Self-Defense Force Law in June 1999. Thus the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan Alliance in the 1990 not only secured the continuity of the alliance, it laid the groundwork for upcoming changes of the Japanese defense policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

The present dissertation has demonstrated importance of identities and norms of states in national security policy by synthesizing three major theories of international relations: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. The eclectic model of military alliance proposed in the dissertation not only provides a rich description of what happened to the U.S.-Japan alliance in the critical transition from the Cold War to the-Post Cold War era, but also demonstrates how the national security cultures of the two allies have been institutionalized, defined their national interests, and rationalized their threat perceptions toward North Korea and China. Instead of singling out one of the factors emphasized by realism, liberalism, or constructivism in order to explain the endurance of the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold War, the preceding chapters have analyzed how identities, norms, and institutions of national security and threat perceptions are related. Building on a constructivist model of national security culture in which cultural and institutional structures, identity, interest and policy are related in five ways, the present dissertation has focused on the two most important ways through which national security culture shapes national security policy. While national security identities define the contents of national interest, national security norms provide a framework of defense policies within which states choose the proper means of defending the nation. When applied to alliance

politics, cultural model of national security better explains the endurance and evolution of America's Cold War alliances than does the balance of power model alone. The U.S.-Japan alliance survived the end of the Cold War because of their interdependent national security cultures. While the two countries' shared identities as capitalist democracies defined the common foreign policy goals, their interdependent national security norms made the two partners indispensable to each other in ensuring national security. By tracing the decision-making processes of both nations internally and externally with each other as they refined their bilateral alliance, the dissertation has also provided a model of holistic analysis that synthesizes both the domestic and international politics of military alliance.

As displayed in Figure 5, which was introduced and fully explicated in Chapter 2, in addition to their shared identity as capitalist democracies, compatible national security norms between the two countries have been crucial to the endurance and evolution of U.S.-Japan alliance despite the demise of the major Cold War threats that had been the *raison d'être* of the alliance. True, regional threats persisted, but America's strong and continuing interest in promoting democracy overseas, developing global markets, and assuming international leadership cannot not be explained solely by the replacement of the Soviet threat with growing security threats from North Korea and China. Likewise, the peaceful end of the Cold War did not change Japan's interest in maintaining national security and pursuing economic prosperity in the liberal international order the United States and its Western allies have established. At the end of the Cold War, Japan was not ready to assume more independent responsibilities in its national defense, much less leadership in international security, because of its institutionalized culture of

antimilitarism. While America's norms of homeland security and respect for the military have required and allowed it to pursue a hegemonic national security policy, Japan's norm of antimilitarism required an alliance with the United States, including the continuing presence of U.S. military bases in Japan. Although Asia was the most dangerous region in the world during the Cold War, where two "hot" wars were fought, Japan became the first mature democracy in Asia and one of the most successful industrialized economies in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The bilateral alliance has not only served the national security of Japan, but also that of South Korea, Taiwan, and even countries in the Gulf regions. The U.S.-Japan alliance has transformed the worst enemies of World War II into the closest allies and served as the anchor of regional security in the Asia-Pacific region.

The cultural explanation for the endurance of the U.S.-Japan alliance can be applied to other American alliances that survived the end of the Cold War. By comparing the U.S.-Japan alliance with other American Cold War alliances, such studies will reveal the relations between the level of cultural interdependence and the alliance endurance. For example, the existing literature on NATO focuses on a single factor to explain its survival after the Cold War, including democratic identity among its members (Risse-Kappen, 1996) and its highly institutionalized nature (McCalla, 1996). Like the U.S.-Japan alliance, the endurance of NATO can be better explained by the interdependence of national security cultures between the United States and its trans-Atlantic allies. Through World War I and II, European countries, both the victors and vanquished alike, learned the futility of war as a means of national security because the wars were fought in their homelands and claimed large numbers of civilian casualties (Müller & Wright, 1994).

The low confidence in the efficacy of military forces, combined with the Soviet threat, made even former great powers, such as Britain and France, accept an asymmetrical alliance with the United States. The peaceful end of the Cold War validated the legitimacy of NATO and promoted its transformation from an anti-Communist military alliance into a regional collective security organization. While the shared identity as democratic capitalist states and economic interdependence among NATO members deepened through the Cold War, differences in national security cultures between the U.S. and other NATO members widened. The victory of the Cold War reconfirmed America's norm of homeland security and expansive power projection policy and validated the defensive national security policies with limited military capabilities of other NATO members. Although the trans-Atlantic allies disputed how best to fight against terrorism after 9/11 because of their different national security cultures (Kagan, 2003), general long term stability and peaceful relations among Western democracies is also product of their interdependent national security cultures. Some scholars even suggest that Western democracies have established a zone of peace in which major war is unthinkable (Adler & Barnett, 1998; Jervis, 2002).

But the interdependence of national security cultures between the United States and its allies has also caused some problems. Behind the "success" story of the U.S.-Japan alliance were collective action problems of national security both in the United States and Japan. In order to maintain homeland security and pursue global hegemony, the United States must maintain large standing military forces with strong power projection capabilities even in peacetime. Although the American public in general has paid the fiscal cost of national defense through taxes, military personnel and their

families, representing only a small proportion of the population, have shouldered the most serious costs of war in human casualties, loss of life, and suffering. While the general public has enjoyed safety and comfort on the American homeland, soldiers and their families are sent to overseas military bases and battlefields. Although the U.S. military has enjoyed higher levels of respect and support from civilian society than its counterparts in other developed nations, civil-military relations in the United States have displayed an ever-widening gap, especially since the termination of military conscription after the Vietnam War.

For its part, Japan faces a different kind of collective action problem than the United States. In order to maintain its antimilitarist national security culture while dealing with dangerous national security issues in the region, notably China's rising military power and North Korea's nuclear weapons program, Japan has deepened its level of military integration with the United States. While the benefits of the U.S.-Japan alliance has been enjoyed by the entire nation, people in Okinawa have paid disproportionate costs by hosting over 75% of U.S. military bases in Japan. Although Japanese public opinion in general has been sympathetic to the predicament of Okinawans, no other prefectures of Japan are ready to accept more U.S. military bases. In short, the general public of neither the United States nor Japan have seriously questioned the real costs of their national security policies, especially the U.S.-Japan alliance, supporting them instead by focusing solely on their benefits. In other words, the cultural bases of the U.S.-Japan alliance have not been tested by rational cost-benefit calculations and contain the risk of losing public support if the general public of either nation ever begins to seriously understand and question the true costs of the alliance.

By identifying long-term sources of stability and problems the alliance has faced, the present research will provide an analytical starting point for understanding the significant changes that the alliance has undergone since 9/11. By comparing continuities in the 1990s and changes since 9/11 in the alliance, one can better understand the dynamics among competing factors affecting the alliance. In the 1990s when external threats were relatively small compared with those confronted during the Cold War, such domestic factors as established national security institutions and the culture behind them secured continuity of the alliance, despite the evaporation of the existential threats to entire country. In spite of a significant shift in the regional balance of power, neither United States nor Japan tried to end the alliance. Although both countries went through quantitative reductions to their military forces by cutting defense budgets and reducing the size of the military forces, their grand strategies did not change qualitatively. The United States maintained its hegemonic grand strategy and major Cold War alliances with its worldwide network of overseas bases. Similarly, Japan did not divert from the Yoshida Doctrine, keeping a relatively low-profile defense policy and focusing on economic and diplomatic means of statecraft. In sum, the peaceful end of the Cold War was a validation for the national security institutions of Japan and the United States. The two nations did not feel the need to change their national security cultures.

But the stability and continuity of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the 1990s stand in stark contrast with the dynamics of national security policies in the United States and Japan since 9/11. The U.S. norm of homeland security was most seriously challenged by the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C., which killed more than 3,000 civilians in the World Trade Center and 184 Defense Department workers. But



rather than causing the U.S. to abandon its homeland security norm, 9/11 served to strengthen this aspect of its national security culture. The Bush administration reaffirmed the vital interests of homeland security by creating the Department of Homeland Security in order to defend American citizens from terrorism on American soil. The Bush Doctrine announced in 2002 reasserted the efficacy of military forces in national defense by defining terrorism as act of war which can be best dealt with by military force. This is a uniquely American interpretation of counter-terrorism. In other countries, terrorism had been mostly interpreted as a domestic crime, dealt with by the police and other law enforcement institutions. The United States has renewed its determination to maintain homeland security, not only traditional threats from other great powers, but also from terrorism committed by nongovernmental organizations such as Al Qaeda. The United States expanded, rather than contracted, its network of alliances to include such countries as Pakistan and projected its military power by deploying large-scale military forces to Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. interests in maintaining leadership in developing and defending a liberal international order have not changed, either. Rather the United States renewed its efforts to support democratization all over the world because it believes undemocratic regimes are more likely to support terrorism or radicalize their citizens.

Ironically, the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, along with changes in the regional security environment in Asia, have caused more significant cultural changes in the Japanese defense policy. While the democratic and capitalist identity of Japan has not changed, the norm of antimilitarism has been challenged slowly but steadily. In order to support the United States in the War on Terrorism, Japan deployed its Self Defense Force to Iraq and the Indian Ocean. While Japan still believes that its national security is

best maintained by the alliance with the United States, rather than by developing large and independent military forces with strong power projection capabilities of their own, the national security crisis of its senior ally has precipitated national security cultural changes across the Pacific. Though this study has focused on a cultural continuity in alliances, changes do occur anytime and not in the case of a strong negative shock such as 9/11. The development of cultural model of alliance change which would complement the cultural model of alliance endurance developed in the present dissertation, is essential to have a full understanding of cultural dynamics within alliances, and is a worthy subject for future research.

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